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I. Introduction  
Credit markets serve a vital function in capitalist economies: 
evaluating the riskiness of a range of possible investments and 
channeling resources toward those investments that investors 
believe are most likely to prove successful. This process is known 
as the “risk-based pricing” of credit. Ideally, risk-based pricing 
should lead to lower cost of capital for lower risk investment 
choices with larger rewards, and therefore more investment in 
such promising activities. Conversely, risk-based pricing should 
lead to higher costs of capital—and therefore less investment—in 
high-risk activities with relatively low rewards. If creditors are 
well informed and analytic, and borrowers respond to financial 
incentives, then risk-based pricing—compared to uniform credit 
pricing—leads to a more efficient allocation of society’s limited 
resources.  
Although risk-based pricing is standard in business-loan 
markets, and may be increasingly common in consumer-credit 
markets such as mortgages and credit cards, risk-based pricing is 
seldom used in the market for student loans.1 Most student loans 
are extended under Federal Student Loan programs 
administered by the Department of Education. These federal 
programs have historically offered loans at rates lower than those 
offered by most private lenders, on terms that are more attractive 
to student borrowers, and without adjusting the pricing on loans 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Wendy Edelberg, Risk-Based Pricing of Interest Rates in Household Loan 
Markets 3–4 (Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2003-62, 2003), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2003/200362/200362pap.pdf (analyzing data 
from the 1980s and 1990s and documenting the growing use of risk-based pricing in 
credit cards, auto loans, and mortgages, but not student loans); cf. infra Part V.C 
(contrasting efficient risk-based credit pricing with “opportunistic” credit pricing). 
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according to the risks inherent in different courses of study or 
lending to different types of borrowers.  
The Federal Student Loan programs—first established in the 
mid-twentieth century to increase the supply of skilled labor, 
promote economic and technological development, and provide 
upward socioeconomic mobility—are broadly successful. They 
have provided low-cost credit to millions of students, helped 
increase educational attainment, held administrative costs lower 
than those of the private sector, and generated a profit for the 
federal government. 
However, Federal Student Loan programs have not 
incorporated many recent insights from financial, developmental, 
and labor economics that distinguish between different types of 
education. Because of this, Federal Student Loan programs, and 
more broadly, U.S. labor markets, are not performing at their full 
potential. There is a large mismatch between the skills workers 
have and employers’ needs, and this mismatch contributes to 
structural unemployment, reduced output, and student loan 
defaults. 
This Article argues that introducing risk-based pricing in 
federal student loans would advance the interests and values 
that Congress articulated when it first established federal 
support for higher education. Risk-based pricing of student loans 
would signal the long-term financial risks inherent in different 
courses of study. This price signal would likely improve students’ 
ability to make informed decisions about the course of study that 
would best balance their innate abilities and individual 
preferences with postgraduate economic opportunities. Similarly, 
price signals would enhance postsecondary educational 
institutions’ abilities to adjust their programs to improve their 
students’ postgraduate prospects. 
Allocating educational resources more efficiently would not 
only benefit individual students and their families. It would 
enhance the productivity and competitiveness of the U.S. labor 
force, with beneficial consequences for both the private sector and 
public finances. Over the long term, such efficiencies could 
increase the resources available for further investment in 
education and research. 
Transparent, risk-based student loan pricing could greatly 
benefit students and educational institutions, particularly if it 
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were data-driven and sensitive to the values of equal opportunity 
and independent research that are central to the academic 
enterprise. This Article discusses legal and policy reforms that 
could facilitate risk-based student loan pricing, potential hazards 
from a shift toward risk-based pricing, and safeguards that could 
help protect students and educators from abuse.  
This Article focuses primarily on the economic consequences 
of education rather than on moral or philosophical views about 
the ideal purpose of education or its proper role in society. The 
economic focus of this Article is not intended to deny the 
intellectual merit of philosophical views about education, but 
rather to reflect the fact that government support for higher 
education in the United States has primarily been driven by 
economic considerations, particularly during the mid-twentieth 
century when Federal Student Loan programs were established.  
Part I of this Article discusses rationales for government 
support for higher education, with an emphasis on Human 
Capital Theory. Part II discusses the U.S. federal student loan 
system. Part III discusses coordination, information, and 
incentive problems in the higher education and skilled labor 
markets. Part IV explains the theory of risk-based credit pricing 
and how risk-based pricing of federal student loans could 
ameliorate some of the coordination problems discussed in Part 
III. Part V discusses predictors of income, employment, and 
student loan default, and also considers ethical and moral 
considerations that might limit or preclude the use of certain 
predictors to risk-adjust student-loan pricing. 
II. Government Support for Higher Education 
In most developed economies, government provides some 
form of public support for higher education, either through grants 
or loans.2 Rationales for government support for higher education 
                                                                                                     
 2. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. (OECD), EDUCATION AT A 
GLANCE: 2011 OECD INDICATORS 163 (2011), http://www.oecd.org/edu/higher 
educationandadultlearning/48631582.pdf; Gabrielle Demange, Robert Fenge & Silke 
Uebelmesser, The Provision of Higher Education in a Global World—Analysis and 
Policy Implications, 54 CESIFO ECON. STUD. 248, 253–54 (2008); Panu Poutvaara, 
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generally relate to positive externalities beyond the direct 
benefits to the individual student.3 These externalities may be 
economic in nature, or may relate to more subjective values 
espoused by a given polity. Values-based rationales in the United 
States often cite the role of public investment in education in 
reducing inequality or providing socioeconomic mobility.4  
A. Higher Education as an Investment in Human Capital 
Economic benefits of higher education are well known: 
education increases wages5 and reduces the risk of 
                                                                                                     
Educating Europe: Should Public Education Be Financed with Graduate Taxes or 
Income-Contingent Loans? 50 CESIFO ECON. STUD. 663, 665 (2004). 
 3. See John A.E. Pottow, The Nondischargeability of Student Loans in 
Personal Bankruptcy Proceedings: The Search for a Theory, 44 CAN. BUS. L.J. 245, 
258–59 (2006); Anthony Stokes & Sarah Wright, Measuring the Social Rate of 
Return in Public Sector Labor Markets, 6 J. BUS. & ECON. RES. 1, 4 (2008). 
 4. See E. DIGBY BALTZELL, THE PROTESTANT ESTABLISHMENT: ARISTOCRACY 
AND CASTE IN AMERICA 351 (1964) (“[T]he campus community has now become the 
principal guardian of our traditional opportunarian ideals.”); JOHN A. DOUGLASS, 
THE CALIFORNIA IDEA AND AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: 1850 TO THE 1960 MASTER 
PLAN 1–2 (2000) (“California was not alone in its efforts to nurture higher 
education as both a tool for socioeconomic mobility and an engine for economic 
growth.”); OECD, supra note 2, at 13 (“During the past 50 years, the expansion of 
education has contributed to a fundamental transformation of societies in OECD 
countries. In 1961, higher education was the privilege of the few . . . .”); Lani 
Guinier, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term: Comment: Admissions Rituals as 
Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
113, 137 (2003) (“I identify four important values associated with access to higher 
education: individualism, merit, democracy, and upward mobility. Of these four, 
the value that seems to integrate the other three with higher education is upward 
mobility.”). 
 5. See GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION 246 (1994) (“The rate of return 
to an average college entrant is considerable, of the order of 10 or 12 percent per 
annum”); id. at 247 (“[A]bility explains only a relatively small part of the [earning] 
differentials [between high school and college educated workers] and college 
education explains the larger part.”); Orley Ashenfelter & Alan Krueger, 
Estimates of the Economic Return to Schooling from a New Sample of Twins, 84 
AM. ECON. REV. 1157, 1157 (1994) (estimating from a sample of identical twins 
that an additional year of schooling increases wages by 12% to 16%, and reporting 
that this is probably not due to differences in innate ability); Thomas Lemieux, 
Postsecondary Education and Increasing Wage Inequality, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 195, 
196 (2006) (“By 2003–2005 . . . the return to post-secondary education is much 
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unemployment,6 presumably by increasing labor productivity.7 In 
addition to benefiting the student by facilitating higher future 
income, education may also lead to positive financial externalities 
such as increased tax revenues,8 reduced burdens on public services,9  
                                                                                                     
higher than the return to elementary and secondary education.”); id. at 199 
(“[P]ost secondary education plays a crucial role in explaining [increasing wage 
inequality]. By contrast, labor market experience, primary and secondary 
education, and the position of workers without postsecondary education in the 
wage distribution play a small role in explaining changes in the wage structure 
over the last 35 years.”); OECD, supra note 2, at 13 (“Among the 34 OECD 
countries, most of those in which college enrolment expanded the most over the 
past decades still see rising earnings differentials for college graduates . . . .”). 
 6. See Jacob Mincer, Education and Unemployment 22 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. w3838, 1991), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=226736; W. Craig Ridell & Xueda 
Song, The Impact of Education on Unemployment Incidence and Re-Employment 
Success: Evidence from the U.S. Labor Market, 18 LABOUR ECON. 453, 462 (2011); 
OECD, supra note 2, at 116–17, Chart A7.1 (“Higher education improves job 
prospects, in general, and the likelihood of remaining employed in times of 
economic hardship.”). The differences in unemployment between those with 
postsecondary degrees and those without widens during times of financial 
distress. Id. at 118–20. 
 7. See Mincer, supra note 6, at 22; David A. Wise, Academic Achievement 
and Job Performance, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 350, 364 (1975) (providing evidence that 
college education increases productive ability); cf. Samuel Bowles & Herbert 
Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America Revisited, 75. SOC. EDUC. 1, 1 (2002) 
(“[T]he contribution of schooling to individual economic success could be explained 
only partly by the cognitive development fostered in schools. . . . [S]chools prepare 
people for adult work rules by socializing people to function well and without 
complaint in the hierarchical structure of the modern corporation.”); Joseph 
Stiglitz, The Theory of “Screening,” Education, and the Distribution of Income, 65 
AM. ECON. REV. 283, 298 (1975) (arguing that education acts to provide 
information to employers about the innate abilities and characteristics of 
prospective employees and that education may not in and of itself improve labor 
productivity); Paul J. Taubman & Terence J. Wales, Higher Education, Mental 
Ability, and Screening, 81 J. POL. ECON. 28, 43 (1973) (supporting the screening 
hypothesis). 
 8. OECD, supra note 2, at 165 (“Investments in education also generate 
public returns from higher income levels in the form of income taxes, increased 
social insurance payments and lower social transfers.”).  
 9. See id. at 193 
A large body of literature suggests that education is positively 
associated with a variety of social outcomes, such as better health, 
stronger civic engagement and reduced crime. A small but increasing 
number of studies further suggest that education has a positive causal 
effect on these social outcomes. There is also research suggesting that 
education can be a relatively cost-effective means to improve health 
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and more rapid technological innovation and economic growth.10  
  
                                                                                                     
and reduce crime. (citations omitted). 
Completion of postsecondary education is also associated with lower rates of 
bankruptcy filing. Abbye Atkinson, Race, Educational Loans and Bankruptcy, 16 
MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 2 (2010). High levels of education for spouses is associated 
with lower divorce rates, particularly if the education is completed prior to 
marriage. Torkild Hovde Lyngstad, The Impact of Parents’ and Spouses’ 
Education on Divorce Rates in Norway, 10 DEMOGRAPHIC RES. 121, 138 (2004); 
Jessie M. Tzeng & Robert D. Mare, Labor Market and Socioeconomic Effects on 
Marital Stability, 24 SOC. SCI. RES. 329, 343, 344 tbl.3 (1995). 
 10. See DEREK BOK, BEYOND THE IVORY TOWER: SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF 
THE MODERN UNIVERSITY 138–39 (1982) (discussing the importance of university 
research on technological innovations); DOUGLASS, supra note 4, at 1 (“We almost 
owe more of our economic gains in the last seven decades to investment in people 
than to saving and the amassment of capital. And the margin in favor of people is 
increasing.” (quoting John Kenneth Galbraith)); Philippe Aghion & Peter Howitt, 
A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction, 60 ECONOMETRICA 323, 324 
(1992); Angel de la Fuente & Rafael Domenech, Human Capital in Growth 
Regressions: How Much Difference Does Data Quality Make?, 4 J. EUR. ECON. 
ASSOC. 1, 1 (2006) (noting that the counterintuitive results on human capital and 
growth are partly due to inadequate data); Alan B. Krueger & Mikael Lindahl, 
Education for Growth: Why and for Whom?, 39 J. ECON. LIT. 1101, 1102 (2001) 
(arguing that studies that failed to find a connection between education and 
growth suffered from poor-quality data, and that such relationships are evident 
with better data); Paul Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, 98 J. POL. 
ECON. S71, S71 (1990) (“[T]he stock of human capital determines the rate of 
growth [and] too little human capital is devoted to research in equilibrium.”); 
Jacob Mincer, Human Capital and Economic Growth (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 803, 1981), available at http://www.nber.org/ 
papers/w0803 
Just as accumulation of personal human capital produces individual 
(income) growth, so do the corresponding social or national 
aggregates. . . . growth of human capital is both a condition and 
consequence of economic growth . . . . [h]uman capital activities 
involve . . . the production of new knowledge which is the source of 
innovation and of technical change which propels all factors of 
production. 
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Some college, no degree
High school diploma
Less than high school diploma
Educational attainment and median weekly earnings, 2011 
2011 USD, workers age 25 or over 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor and U.S. Census Bureau, 















Some college, no degree
High school diploma
Less than high school diploma
Educational attainment and average unemployment rates, 2011 
Percent of workers age 25 or older who were unemployed 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor and U.S. Census Bureau, 
Current Population Survey 
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Figure 1.2: Decades of Data Show that Educated Workers Are 
Less Likely to be Unemployed 
  


















Average annual unemployment rates, age 25 or older, 1992-2011 
Percent of workers age 25 or older who were unemployed 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor and U.S. Census 
Bureau, Current Population Survey, Labor Force Statistics 
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Figure 1.3: Decades of Data Show that Educated Workers Earn 
More, and the Wage Premium Has Increased over 

























Median usual weekly earnings of full-time workers 25 years and over by educational 
attainment, 1979-2011 
Real 2011 USD 
Source: Current Population Survey, Bureau of Labor Statistics 
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This perspective—known as “Human Capital Theory”11—is 
the leading economic explanation for the higher wages of 
educated workers. An alternate view that developed during the 
1970s, “Signaling Theory,” claims that education leads to a more 
efficient allocation of talent by sorting workers according to 
innate ability.12 Risk-based pricing of student loans is compatible 
with either a Human Capital or Signaling view, although the case 
for subsidized education is stronger under Human Capital 
Theory.  
Empirical evidence in favor of Human Capital Theory has 
mounted over the last thirty-five years, including many studies of 
wage differences of identical twins who differed with respect to 
the number of years of education.13 In addition to the twin 
studies, there have been many careful econometric studies that 
controlled for various measures of innate ability.14 These studies 
                                                                                                     
 11. Gordon Marshall, Human-Capital Theory, in A DICTIONARY OF 
SOCIOLOGY 1998 (1998) (“Human capital arises out of any activity able to raise 
individual work productivity.”). 
 12. See Stiglitz, supra note 7, at 283 (discussing a “screening” process that 
allows individuals to be labeled by their productivity); Taubman & Wales, supra 
note 7, at 43–49 (suggesting using education as a screening device). Under 
Signaling Theory, education can create value because it enables the employers 
who value skilled workers the most to identify those workers and bid for their 
services, leading to a more efficient allocation of skilled labor. Signaling Theory 
implies that labor market outcomes should not depend on what students study, 
but only on how well they perform academically relative to other students with 
similar standardized test scores, or perhaps whether they demonstrate a strong 
work ethic by choosing a challenging major.  
 13. See, e.g., Ashenfelter, supra note 5, at 1157; Dorothe Bonjour et al., 
Returns to Education: Evidence from U.K. Twins, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1799, 1799–
1812 (2003); Colm Harmon & Ian Walker, Estimates of the Economic Return to 
Schooling for the United Kingdom, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1278, 1278–86 (1995); 
Paul Miller, Charles Mulvey & Nick Martin, What Do Twins Studies Reveal 
About the Economic Returns to Education? A Comparison of Australian and U.S. 
Findings, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 586, 586–99 (1995); Oddbjorn Raaum & Tom Erik 
Aabo, The Effect of Schooling on Earnings: Evidence on the Role of Family 
Background From a Large Sample of Norwegian Twins, 26 NORDIC J. POL. ECON. 
96 (2000); Cecelia Elena Rouse, Further Estimates of the Economic Returns to 
Schooling from a New Sample of Twins, 18 ECON. EDUC. REV. 149, 149–157 
(1999); cf. David Neumark, Biases in Twin Estimates of Returns to Schooling, 18 
ECON. EDUC. REV. 143–48 (1999) (discussing how within-twin estimates may 
result in an upward bias). 
 14. See David Card, The Causal Effect of Education on Earnings, in 3 
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suggest that a college degree on average increases wages by 
40%.15 
Figure 1.4: Education Boosts Wages After Controlling for 
Student Ability 
Early Human Capital Theory focused on the number of years 
of schooling or the completion of a degree, while more recent 
studies have focused on differences between fields of study. These 
studies generally conclude that choice of field of study affects 
wages and employment, even after controlling for ability 
                                                                                                     
HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 1801 (Orley C. Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 
3d ed. 1999) (reviewing the empirical literature). 














Economists’ estimates of increase in wages caused by one year of schooling 
Percent increase in lifetime wages from an additional year of school,  midpoint estimate  
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sorting.16 Figures 2.1 through 2.3 below show differences in 
earnings and employment by college major, both at graduation 
and later in life. 
 
Figure 2.1: Some Academic Majors Have a Higher Initial Labor 
Market Value Than Others 
  
                                                                                                     
 16. See Amanda Thorson, The Effect of College Major on Wages, 13 THE 
PARK PLACE ECONOMIST 45, 48 (2005), https://www.iwu.edu/economics/PPE13/ 
thorson.pdf (“Every study on the matter . . . shows that at least some gap 
remains even after controlling for human capital variables when looking at 
































Visual & Performing Arts
Recent graduates’ median starting salary offer by major, 2011 
2011 USD thousands  
Source: National Association of Colleges and Employers, The Class of 2011 Student 
Survey Report 36 Figure 30. 
Note: Bachelor’s degree recipients only. 
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Figure 2.2: Some Academic Majors Are More Likely to Lead to 


































Job offer rate by major, 2011 
Percent of  recent graduates with job offers at graduation 
Source: National Association of Colleges and Employers, The Class of 2011. 
Student Survey Report 34 Figure 28. 
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Figure 2.3: Over the Long Term, College Graduates in Some 























































All workers with earnings
Annualized median earnings by bachelor degree field, 2009 
Population age 18 and over where highest degree is bachelor’s 
2011 USD thousands 
Source: US Census Bureau, Survey of Income and Program Participation, 
2008 Panel, Table 4G. 
Note: Bachelor’s degree recipients only; annualized earnings calculated by 
multiplying monthly earnings by 12. 
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Human Capital Theory helps explain wage and employment 
differentials between theoretical and applied majors.  For 
example, although math majors on average have higher 
standardized test scores than engineering or computer science 
majors,17 math majors are less likely to be offered employment at 
graduation and receive lower starting salary offers than students 
who majored in computer science or engineering.18  Similarly, 
business majors, who have relatively low average standardized 
test scores,19 have better labor market outcomes than higher-
scoring social science or humanities majors.20 
  
                                                                                                     
 17. COLL. BD., 2010 COLLEGE-BOUND SENIORS TOTAL GROUP PROFILE 13 
tbl.25 (2010); NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 
2011, tbl.155 (2011). Unfortunately, the data only provides average SAT scores 
by incoming students’ intended majors, rather than by graduates’ completed 
majors. Some studies suggest that students with relatively low abilities and 
poorer academic preparation tend to switch from their intended majors in STEM 
or economics to less rigorously graded and less demanding humanities and 
social sciences fields. See, e.g., PETER ARCIDIACONO ET AL., WHAT HAPPENS AFTER 
ENROLLMENT? AN ANALYSIS OF THE TIME PATH OF RACIAL DIFFERENCES IN GPA 
AND MAJOR CHOICE 20 (2011), http://public.econ.duke.edu/~psarcidi/grades_ 
4.0.pdf. 
 18. NAT’L ASSOC. OF COLLS. & EMP’RS, THE CLASS OF 2011 STUDENT SURVEY 
REPORT 34 fig.28, 36 fig.30 (2011); NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF 
EDUCATION STATISTICS 2005, at 620 tbls.374 & 375, 623 tbl.377; NAT’L CTR. FOR 
EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 2011, at 591 tbl.403, 592 
tbl.404; see also Dan A. Black et al., The Economic Reward for Studying 
Economics, 41 ECON. INQUIRY 364, 375 (2003). 
 19. See supra note 17. 
 20. See supra note 18. 
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Figure 3.1: Differences in Earnings by Major Do Not Appear to Be 










































2011 Starting Salary 2007 Math SAT Score 2007 Reading SAT Score
2011 median starting salary offer and 2007 mean SAT score by college major 
Real 2011 USD thousands  SAT Score   
Source: Digest of Education Statistics, 2006-2011; College Entrance Examination 
Board, College-Bound Seniors: Total Group Profile [National] Report; National 
Association of Colleges and Employers, The Class of 2011 Student Survey Report 
36 Figure 30 
 
Note: Differences in SAT scores may be underestimated because SAT scores are for 
intended majors and salaries are for completed majors.  There is some evidence 
that lower ability students switch from challenging majors such as Engineering 
and Computer Science into less challenging majors such as Business, English, and 
other social science and humanities fields.   
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Figure 3.2: Differences in Earnings by Major Do Not Appear to Be 
Due Solely to Differences in Student Ability 
Although these observations could be interpreted in 
various ways,21 the differences appear to reflect the value of 
                                                                                                     
 21. It is possible that low-ability students are “signaling” commercialism 
rather than developing practical skills, but presumably entering the work force 
at a younger age would signal commercialism more forcefully than studying 
something “commercial.”  
Another possibility is that high-ability math, social science, and humanities 





























































Area, ethnic, cultural and gender studies
Theology and religious vocations
Liberal Arts/ Humanities










Public affairs and services
Math Score Reading Score
Average SAT scores of high school seniors by intended college major, 2005-2008 
Source: Digest of Education Statistics, 2006-2011; College Entrance Examination Board, 
College-Bound Seniors: Total Group Profile [National] Report  
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field-specific skill development rather than differences in 
ability levels. Even within engineering, there are large starting 
wage differences by specialty.22 
Human Capital Theory also helps explain higher average 
per-capita productivity and wages in states and nations with 
higher levels of educational attainment. If education only 
sorted workers according to ability, it would presumably only 
increase the variance of wages (i.e., income inequality), while 
leaving the mean unaltered.23  
Further, Human Capital Theory helps explain the 
willingness of many employers to pay for professional degree 
programs for successful employees.24 Employers’ willingness to 
educate workers whom employers already know to be of high 
quality suggests that employers believe that professional 
education has skill-development value rather than mere 
sorting value. 
Just as corporations depend on the productivity of their 
employees, workers’ productivity and wages are an extremely 
important source of revenue for central governments. Labor is 
less mobile than capital, and therefore easier to tax.25 
                                                                                                     
only the students in these fields with relatively low abilities may enter the labor 
market at college graduation, driving down reported wages and employment.  
 22. Colby Ardis, Top-Paid Majors for the Class of 2011, NAT’L ASS’N OF 
COLLS. & EMP’RS (July 20, 2011), http://www.naceweb.org/s07202011/ 
top_majors_engineer/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 23. Signaling Theory can explain these findings either by assuming that 
sorting creates collective as well as private benefits, or under strained 
interpretations of the data—for example assuming that prosperity causes 
education, or that a third unidentified variable consistently causes both high 
levels of education and high levels of prosperity. See, e.g., Andrew Weiss, 
Human Capital vs. Signaling Explanations of Wages, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 
145–46 (1995) (addressing objections to the “Sorting Approach”). 
 24. See, e.g., Jingying Yang, Finding a Sponsor to Pay for That M.B.A., 
INT’L HERALD TRIB. (Mar. 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/15/ 
education/15iht-SReducation-mba15.html?pagewanted=all (last visited Feb. 3, 
2013) (discussing how many employers are still willing to pay for an M.B.A. for 
their employees) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 25. It is far more difficult to learn a new language and emigrate than to 
convert capital to a new currency and invest across borders. See, e.g., OECD, 
TAX POLICY REFORM AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 19 (2010) (“Globalization may . . . 
increase the opportunities for tax avoidance and evasion especially as concerns 
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In a country such as the United States, which taxes wages 
at much higher rates than capital, public expenditures that 
increase wages are more likely to benefit public finances 
through higher future tax revenues than public expenditures 
that increase the return on private capital.26  
Whereas the capital gains tax rate is typically fifteen 
percent, the average effective tax rate on human capital—that 
is, the tax on the increase in wages attributable to education—
will often be around thirty to fifty percent because the wage 
premium will fall into high federal, state, and local income tax 
brackets and will often also be subject to payroll taxes.27 In 
addition, education is not treated as favorably under the Tax 
Code as other forms of investment with respect to the ability to 
recover investment costs, deduct interest on loans, or smooth 
income across tax years.  
In sum, a large proportion of the benefits of human capital 
redound to public finances rather than to the educated worker. 
Education is generally a profitable public investment, not a 
                                                                                                     
mobile capital income tax bases.”); id. at 138–40 (describing increased capital 
mobility leading to tax competition and lower capital gains and corporate taxes 
in many developed countries).  
 26. Wages are subject to both federal income taxes and federal payroll 
taxes, whereas capital gains and dividends are subject only to income taxes. 
Income tax rates for capital gains and dividends are much lower than income 
tax rates for wages. The difference in tax treatment of income from wages and 
income from capital is so extreme that although the income tax is nominally 
progressive, in practice extremely wealthy individuals who derive most of their 
income from investments have much lower average federal tax rates than 
middle class workers who derive most of their income from wages. See Martin A. 
Sullivan, Economic Analysis: At the Helmsley Building, the Little People Pay the 
Taxes, 130 TAX NOTES 855, 855–56 (2011) (discussing how tax rates are lower for 
the very wealthy than for the average person). Some have countered that 
corporate income taxes should be counted as additional taxes on capital, but 
whether the incidence of corporate tax is primarily on investors, employees, or 
customers remains hotly debated. See, e.g., Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Elusive 
Incidence of the Corporate Income Tax: The State Case, 9 PUB. FIN. Q. 395, 395–
98 (1981) (discussing the controversies and approaches to the corporate income 
tax). 
 27. See, e.g., OECD, TAXING WAGES 2008–2009, at 109 (2010) (estimating 
total 2009 marginal tax burden on labor in the U.S. to be between 30% and 60% 
for workers earning at least 50% of the average wage, with the highest tax 
burdens on singles). 
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mere expenditure.28 In fact, the public benefits from higher 
education in the United States are the highest in the developed 
world, while public costs are among the lowest,29 suggesting 
that public investment in higher education in the United 
States could be profitably increased. 
B. The Demand for Skilled Labor and Social Mobility 
Whereas private higher education in the United States 
was originally a form of luxury consumption—training for the 
financially secure children of the upper class that emphasized 
cultural refinement and social grace over technical skill30—
federal government support for higher education emerged with 
a belief by business leaders that education can and should 
promote economic development by training skilled labor and 
supporting applied research.31 This emphasis on economic 
development is evident in the requirements of the Northwest 
Ordinances of 1785 and 178732 and the Morrill Act of 1862,33 
                                                                                                     
 28. OECD, supra note 2, at 158–60 (reporting that public and private 
benefits of education in OECD countries, including the U.S., greatly exceed 
public and private investment in education). 
 29. Id. at 165–67. 
 30. DOUGLASS, supra note 4, at 2; OECD, supra note 2, at 13. 
 31. DOUGLASS, supra note 4, at 2–3, 33–34. The strongest proponents of 
practical education were Northeastern business interests, while the principal 
opposition came from Southern conservatives. Id.  
 32. See the full text transcripts of Land Ordinance 1785, available at 
http://memory.loc.gov/cgibin/query/r?ammem/bdsdcc:@field(DOCID+@lit(bdsdcc
13201)), and 1787, available at http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=8 
(last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
DOUGLASS, supra note 4, at 20 (“The constitutions of existing states provided for 
one or more state-supported institutions of higher learning as a means to 
further social and economic progress and as a legal mechanism for securing 
federal land grants for education under the Northwest Ordinances of 1785 and 
1787.”). 
 33. Officially known as the Agricultural College Land Act. 7 U.S.C. §§ 301–
49 (2012). See BOK, supra note 10, at 62 (“Americans tended to look on higher 
education as a means for providing the knowledge and trained man power that 
a rapidly developing society required. In 1862, Congress embodies this spirit in 
the Morrill Act . . . .”); DOUGLASS, supra note 4, at 34 (“As a condition for 
accepting Federal scrip, by 1866 each state would need to charter either existing 
or new institutions to fulfill the purpose of the act: namely, to provide 
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under which the federal government granted land to state 
governments to fund public institutions of higher learning that 
would teach labor-market-relevant skills.34  
Similarly, Congress emphasized the need for a technically 
skilled labor force, particularly in areas of science and 
technology, when it implemented the first federal student loan 
program through the National Defense Education Act of 1958 
(NDEA).35 The need for greater central government support for 
higher education was made salient in 1957 by the Soviet 
Union’s launch of Sputnik I and II, the first man-made 
satellites.36 These early Soviet technological triumphs over the 
United States were generally attributed in the U.S. to the 
Soviet Union’s seemingly superior system of education.37 The 
Soviet educational system, compared to the U.S. system, was 
believed to be more meritocratic, to focus more on science and 
technology, and to more closely coordinate its efforts with 
national economic and military priorities.38 During the space 
                                                                                                     
agricultural, mining, and mechanical education in support of the state’s 
economy.”). 
 34. DOUGLASS, supra note 4, at 33–34. 
 35. See id. at 198; Atkinson supra note 9, at 14 n.44 (citing National 
Defense Education Act of 1958, ch. 17, §§ 401–602, 72 Stat. 1589 (repealed 
1970); Jonathan D. Glater, The Other Big Test: Why Congress Should Allow 
College Students to Borrow More Through Federal Aid Programs, 14 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 11, 37 (2011) 
The guaranteed student loan program [established by the Higher 
Education Act of 1965] took as its model . . . loans offered under the 
National Defense Education Act (NDEA), a law passed in 1958 in 
reaction to the launch of the Sputnik satellite by the Soviet Union. At 
that time, lawmakers encouraged Americans to educate themselves 
in scientific and technical fields. 
 36. See DOUGLASS, supra note 4, at 198 (“[T]he substantial increases in 
direct student aid under post-Sputnik federal legislation initiated a new era of 
federal involvement in higher education.”); id. at 234 (“Sputnik was a 
technological marvel. It was the first intercontinental missile, opened the space 
age, and marked the beginning of satellite communications. It was also a 
profound political event.”). 
 37. See id. at 234 (“American popular opinion credited the Soviet 
Educational System with Sputnik’s success. Here was the source for its 
scientists and research. Conversely, the reason for America’s apparent second 
place position . . . was its faltering schools and universities.”). 
 38. See id. (“The quick conclusion of many was that America’s system of 
education was disorganized, it failed to provide sufficient training in the 
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race that followed, the U.S. shifted toward a centralized, 
taxpayer-funded, and government-coordinated model of 
university-based scientific and technical research, coupled with 
increased education subsidies. 
In approving subsequent federal student loan programs, 
such as the guaranteed loan program established by the 
Higher Education Act of 1965,39 Congress emphasized the need 
for greater equality of opportunity and social mobility as well 
as the need for a skilled labor force.40  
Recently, state governments have renewed their insistence 
that public support for higher education should be conditional 
on higher education serving the needs of the labor market and 
economic growth.41 And educational leaders have recognized 
the legitimacy of government efforts to coordinate universities’ 
activities with economic priorities.42 
                                                                                                     
sciences, and it catered to mediocrity at the expense of the promising student.”); 
see also BOK, supra note 10, at 40 (“We should also not suppose that the 
aggregate efforts of many hundreds of institutions and many thousands of 
professors will automatically distribute themselves in a pattern that matches 
the country’s needs.”). 
 39. Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219. 
 40. Glater, supra note 35, at 20, 35–38. 
 41. See ERIN SPARKS & MARY JO WAITS, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N CTR. FOR 
BEST PRACTICES, DEGREES FOR WHAT JOBS? RAISING EXPECTATIONS FOR 
UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 40 (2011), 
http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/1103DEGREESJOBS.PDF 
(“Governors and state policymakers are increasingly recognizing the importance 
of ensuring that students who graduate from institutions of higher education . . . 
are equipped with the skills to fill good, high-paying jobs that are in high 
demand by employers, thereby boosting the state’s economic growth.”). 
 42. See BOK, supra note 10, at 40 
[W]e cannot assume that . . . market forces will automatically lead 
colleges and universities to train physicians or doctoral students in 
numbers corresponding to society’s needs. If the government is 
subsidizing university programs or if these programs are important 
enough to the public, officials will naturally wish to intervene 
whenever the results stray too far from the nation’s interests. 
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C. Values-Based Arguments for Higher Education Funding 
In addition to financial benefits, many commentators have 
argued that education provides some ethical, spiritual, or 
political benefits, not only to the individual student, but also to 
society at large.43 Purported benefits of education range from 
promoting equality or social mobility, to safeguarding liberty, to 
reinforcing moral and ethical behavior, to fostering informed 
participation in democratic processes, to encouraging voluntarism 
and civic virtue.44  
In the nineteenth century, private colleges—in contrast to 
state universities—often saw their role as the ethical and moral 
development of good parishioners and good citizens. However, by 
the mid-twentieth century, this moralistic view was largely 
supplanted even at elite private colleges by a focus on the role of 
higher education in promoting individual and collective economic 
advancement.45  
In the United States, social mobility, equality of opportunity, 
and material progress were viewed not only as private goods, but 
also as public benefits that legitimized the United States’ political 
and economic systems, brought more talented individuals into 
leadership positions, and dampened the appeal of communism. 
Even as the Cold War has receded into distant memory, the 
prospects of equal opportunity and social mobility continue to be 
                                                                                                     
 43. See OECD, supra note 2, at 192 (“Adults aged 25 to 64 with higher 
levels of educational attainment are, on average, more satisfied with life, 
engaged in society and likely to report that they are in good health, even after 
accounting for differences in gender, age and income.”). 
 44. See Glater, supra note 35, at 12–13, 16–19; Guinier, supra note 3, at 
115–33, 137. 
 45. See BOK, supra note 10, at 3–4 
[In the early 1900s,] the American University was evolving from a 
church-oriented college into a larger, more diverse institution with 
stronger graduate and professional programs capable of serving the 
needs of a developing economy. . . . [B]usinessmen and financiers 
quickly replaced the clergy as dominant figures on the boards of 
leading universities. 
See also id. at 62–66; id. at 121 (“[B]y the mid-twentieth century, little remained 
of the earlier efforts of colleges and universities. Catalogues continued to speak 
of moral development as a prominent aim of the institution, but there was scant 
evidence of any serious effort to pursue this objective.”). 
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cited as justifications for inequality—in effect, the prospect of 
social mobility is a substitute in U.S. political discourse for 
equality.46  
                                                                                                     
 46. See SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET & REINHARD BENDIX, SOCIAL MOBILITY IN 
INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 2–4, 11–12 (1991). See generally Thomas Piketty, Theories 
of Persistent Inequality and Intergenerational Mobility, in 1 HANDBOOK OF 
INCOME DISTRIBUTION 429 (Anthony B. Atkinson & François Bourguignon eds., 
2000); Marco H.D. Van Leeuwen, Social Inequality and Mobility in History: An 
Introduction, 24 CONTINUITY & CHANGE 399 (2009).  
There is also a conservative justification for both high inequality and low 
levels of social mobility, which rests on an assumption of very high heritability 
of talent or ability, and assumes that those who are poor are deficient in ways 
that are heritable and largely immutable. See, e.g., RICHARD HERRNSTEIN & 
CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN 
AMERICAN LIFE (2004) (arguing that genetically heritable intelligence 
determines class structure in the United States).  
Most labor economists, demographers, sociologists, and psychologists reject 
this view as inconsistent with the data. See, e.g., MICHAEL HOUT ET AL., 
INEQUALITY BY DESIGN: CRACKING THE BELL CURVE MYTH (1996) (reanalyzing the 
data used in the Bell Curve and arguing that the authors overestimated the role 
of intelligence in setting wages and underweighted the role of manipulable 
factors such as education); Lisa Barrow & Cecilia Rouse, The Economic Value of 
Education by Race and Ethnicity, 2006 ECON. PERSP. 14, 23 (analyzing data and 
concluding that returns on education do not differ by race); James J. Heckman, 
Lessons from the Bell Curve, 103 J. POL. ECON. 1091, 1091–1120 (1995); Orley 
Ashenfelter & Cecilia Rouse, Schooling, Intelligence, and Income in America: 
Cracks in the Bell Curve (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
6902, 1999), http://www.nber.org/papers/w6902.pdf (reviewing the econometric 
literature and concluding that the economic returns on schooling do not differ 
significantly by family background or by measures of ability of the student); 
Christopher Winship & Sanders Korenman, A Reanalysis of the Bell Curve 1, 
21–22 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 5230, 1995), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=225294 (arguing that the 
measure of parental socioeconomic status used in the Bell Curve did not capture 
important family characteristics such as single-parent family structure at age 
fourteen, and therefore overestimated the effects of intelligence).  
Psychologists continue to debate the extent to which intelligence is 
genetically heritable. See, e.g., RICHARD E. NISBETT, INTELLIGENCE AND HOW TO 
GET IT: WHY SCHOOLS AND CULTURES COUNT 211 (2010) (arguing for a strong 
environmental role in shaping intelligence); cf. J. Philippe Rushton & Arthur R. 
Jensen, Race and IQ: A Theory-Based Review of the Research in Richard 
Nisbett’s Intelligence and How to Get It, 3 OPEN PSYCHOL. J. 9, 9–35 (2010) 
(arguing for heritability). 
However, whatever the heritability of intelligence, there is substantial 
evidence from randomized controlled studies and quasi-experimental designs 
that early childhood interventions, smaller class sizes, career training programs, 
and college completion can improve educational and economic outcomes. See 
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D. Higher Education Funding and Independent Research 
Governments may also fund educational institutions because 
of the benefits of unbiased research47 conducted by experts who 
are insulated from political and market pressures. Notable 
leaders of educational institutions have expressed concerns that 
external funding can corrupt academic research.48 For example, 
industry funding of research is affiliated with scientifically 
questionable pro-industry conclusions in pharmaceutical 
research,49 nutritional research,50 and environmental research.51 
                                                                                                     
JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JORN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS 
3–24 (2009) (discussing studies regarding how certain external factors affect 
educational outcomes).  
 47. See Charles I. Jones, Sources of U.S. Economic Growth in a World of 
Ideas, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 220, 228 (2002) (arguing that 30% of U.S. growth 
between 1950 and 1993 is attributable to the rise in educational attainment and 
50% is attributable to the rise in worldwide research intensity). 
 48. See, e.g., DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE 
COMMERCIALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION 76 (2003) (discussing how external 
sources of funding may distort the results found). 
 49. See, e.g., Justin E. Bekelman, Yan Li & Cary P. Gross, Scope and Impact 
of Financial Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research: A Systematic Review, 289 
J. AM. MED. ASS’N 454, 455 (2003),  http://jama.jamanetwork.com/data/Journals/ 
JAMA/4865/JRV20091.pdf; Joel Lexchin, Lise Bero, Benjamin Djulbegovic & 
Otavio Clark, Pharmaceutical Industry Sponsorship and Research Outcome and 
Quality: Systematic Review, 326 BMJ 1667, 1667 (2003), http://www. 
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC156458/pdf/el-ppr1167.pdf; Sergio Sismondo, 
How Pharmaceutical Industry Funding Affects Trial Outcomes: Causal Structures 
and Responses, 66 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1909, 1909 (2008), http://post. 
queensu.ca/~sismondo/ssm_6194.pdf.  
 50. See, e.g., Tommy Boone, Is Sports Nutrition for Sale?, 
PROFESSIONALIZATION OF EXERCISE PHYSIOLOGY ONLINE (July 2004), 
http://faculty.css.edu/tboone2/asep/IsSportsNutritionForSale.html (last visited 
Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Barrie 
Margetts, Editorial, Stopping the Rot in Nutrition Science, 9 PUB. HEALTH 
NUTRITION 169, 171 (2006), http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract? 
fromPage=online&aid=584696. 
 51. The hydrocarbon/energy industry has funded numerous attacks on the 
science behind global warming, although virtually none of them have survived 
peer review and virtually all peer-reviewed scientific research supports the 
theory of man-made global warming. See ROSS GELBSPAN, THE HEAT IS ON: THE 
CLIMATE CRISIS, THE COVER-UP, THE PRESCRIPTION 45 (1997); 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: 
SYNTHESIS REPORT 30, http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_ 
syr.pdf (“Warming of the climate system is unequivocal . . . .”); id. at 37 (“There 
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When government funding comes with direct control by political 
leaders, such funding also creates the risk of attempts to 
politicize education or enforce a rigid ideology.52 Federal 
                                                                                                     
is very high confidence that the global average net effect of human activities 
since 1750 has been one of warming . . . .”); id. at 39 (“Most of the observed 
increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely 
due to the observed increase in anthropogenic [greenhouse gas] 
concentrations.”); NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: 
HOW A HANDFUL OF SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO 
SMOKE TO GLOBAL WARMING 2–9 (2010) (addressing the doubt cast upon 
scientific research in regard to the tobacco industry and global warming); JAMES 
LAWRENCE POWELL, THE INQUISITION OF CLIMATE SCIENCE 64–65 (2011) (noting 
the criticism of scientists who dissent from the findings of the IPCC); Riley E. 
Dunlap & Aaron M. McCright, Climate Change Denial: Sources, Actors, and 
Strategies, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOCIETY 240, 240–
45 (Constance Lever-Tracy ed., 2010) (examining how uncertainty regarding 
climate change has been manufactured over time). 
In one notable incident, the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), a pro-
business “think tank” funded in part by the oil industry, offered scientists 
$10,000 to produce research that would cast doubt on the scientific consensus 
regarding global warming. Juliet Eilperin, AEI Critiques of Warming 
Questioned, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/02/04/AR2007020401213.html (last visited Feb. 3, 
2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Ian Sample, Scientists 
Offered Cash to Dispute Climate Study, GUARDIAN (UK), Feb. 1, 2007, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2007/feb/02/frontpagenews.climatechan
ge/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 52. See, e.g., RAYMOND S. BRADLEY, GLOBAL WARMING AND POLITICAL 
INTIMIDATION: HOW POLITICIANS CRACKED DOWN ON SCIENTISTS AS THE EARTH 
HEATED UP (2011); DOUGLASS, supra note 4, at 200–01, 206–13 (discussing 
politically motivated firings of University of California professors and other 
politically motivated attacks on academic freedom during the Red Scare and 
McCarthyism); ELLEN SCHRECKER, THE LOST SOUL OF HIGHER EDUCATION: 
CORPORATIZATION, THE ASSAULT ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM, AND THE END OF THE 
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY (2010) (discussing historical challenges by political 
leaders to academic freedom, particularly during the Red Scare and 
McCarthyism eras, and renewed attacks in modern times). Politically motivated 
purges of university professors are not a unique feature of right-wing populism 
in the United States—similar politically motivated attacks on higher education 
took place in Nazi Germany, Tsarist Russia, the Soviet Union, and both 
Nationalist and Communist China. ZHENGYUAN FU, AUTOCRATIC TRADITION AND 
CHINESE POLITICS 281 (1993); IGAL HALFIN, STALINIST CONFESSIONS: MESSIANISM 
AND TERROR AT THE LENINGRAD COMMUNIST UNIVERSITY 91–96 (2009); SAMUEL D. 
KASSOW, STUDENTS, PROFESSORS, AND THE STATE IN TSARIST RUSSIA 29–30 (1989); 
KRISTIE MACRAKIS, SURVIVING THE SWASTIKA: SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN NAZI 
GERMANY 74–76 (1993); Douglas Stiffler, Resistance to the Sovietization of Higher 
Education in China, in UNIVERSITIES UNDER DICTATORSHIP 213, 217–19 (John 
Connelly & Michael Grüttner eds., 2005); see also BOK, supra note 10, at 21–24 
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government control over education curricula and personnel 
decisions is now restricted by statute.53 Tuition—and indirectly, 
student loans—can provide a neutral source of funding for 
unbiased research because students are unlikely to have a 
personal financial or partisan interest in the outcome of their 
professors’ research. 
E. Higher Education Funding Options: Student Debt or General 
Taxes 
To the extent that one accepts the existence of one or more 
positive externalities of education, education may be a natural 
public good that should be subsidized by government.54 
However, a government’s ability to benefit from educating its 
citizens may be constrained when government-funded education 
provides portable skills and workers can readily seek 
employment across political borders.55 A government that 
generously funds education with the expectation of higher 
future tax revenues may fall prey to another government that 
actively seeks educated immigrants and can charge lower taxes 
because it does not provide as much public funding for 
education.56 Governments can reduce the financial risk of 
                                                                                                     
(discussing attacks on academic freedom in the United States by conservatives 
in the 1950s and by the radical left in the 1960s). 
 53. Limits on U.S. government control over education are codified at 20 
U.S.C. § 1232a. 
 54. Guinier, supra note 4, at 129–30 (“[The] shift in funding priorities 
[away from education] was driven in part by an ideological shift during the 
Reagan era. Higher education was presented as a private benefit to be financed 
by the individual, instead of a public good to be funded by the government.”). 
 55. See Demange, Fenge & Uebelmesser, supra note 2, at 248 (arguing that 
the mobility of students has made educational competition between countries 
more intense); Poutvaara, supra note 2, at 663 (stating that the training 
government does not fully realize return of educational investment for 
emigrants). 
 56. The United States has been particularly successful at attracting 
technically skilled immigrants educated in—and often at the expense of—other 
countries, but not particularly successful at providing technical education to its 
native population. See Frederic Docquier & Abdeslam Marfouk, International 
Migration by Education Attainment, 1990-2000, in INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION, 
REMITTANCES AND THE BRAIN DRAIN 151, 152–53, 187 (Caglar Ozden & Maurice 
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emigration by structuring public funding for education as loans 
rather than as outright grants.57  
Higher education in the United States—a country where 
relatively few graduates have internationally transferable 
technical skills58 and out migration rates are relatively low59—is 
unusual because of heavy reliance on private funding rather 
than public funding.60 In much of the rest of the developed 
                                                                                                     
Schiff eds., 2006), http://www.ime.gob.mx/2006/estudios/migracion/inter_ 
migration_remittances.pdf; infra notes 53, 61–62. The U.S. has also attempted 
to poach skilled workers for political rather than purely economic reasons. For 
example, the U.S. actively encourages medical doctors from Cuba to defect, 
according to some, partly to disrupt Cuban economic and foreign policy. Joel 
Millman, New Prize in Cold War: Cuban Doctors, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203731004576045640711118766
.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 57. See Poutvarra, supra note 2, at 680–82 (proposing income-contingent 
loans as one solution to problems facing European public education). 
 58. The percentage of U.S. graduates with science, math, computer science, 
or engineering degrees is very low compared to the rest of the developed world. 
See JEFFREY J. KUENZI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, 
ENGINEERING, AND MATHEMATICS (STEM) EDUCATION: BACKGROUND, FEDERAL 
POLICY, AND LEGISLATIVE ACTION, at CRS-1 (2008) (“When compared to other 
nations, the math and science achievement of U.S. pupils and the rate of STEM 
degree attainment appear inconsistent with a nation considered the world 
leader in scientific innovation.”); OECD, supra note 2, at 80 (showing that the 
United States lags behind other countries in the number of tertiary graduates in 
science-related fields). A disproportionately large share of awarded and 
commercialized U.S. patents are authored by immigrants who were educated 
elsewhere. See Jennifer Hunt & Marjolaine Gauthier-Loiselle, How Much Does 
Immigration Status Boost Innovation? 23 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 14312, 2008), http://www.nber.org/papers/w 14312.pdf (“We 
find that a college graduate immigrant contributes at least twice as much to 
patenting as his or her native counterpart. The difference is fully explained by 
the greater share of immigrants with science and engineering education.”). 
 59. See Docquier & Marfouk, supra note 56, at 168–72 (estimating that 
North America had an emigration rate for skilled labor of only 0.9%, by far the 
lowest of any region studied). 
 60. See OECD, supra note 2, at 165 (“Direct costs for education are 
generally borne by the public sector, except in Australia, Japan, Korea, and the 
United States, where private direct costs such as tuition fees constitute over 
half of the overall direct investment costs.”); id. at 231–34 (showing the United 
States as having a much greater reliance on private funding for higher 
education than the average country); Demange, Fenge & Uebelmesser, supra 
note 2, at 253–54 (stating that unlike in the European Union, private sources of 
funding for education are more important than public sources in the United 
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world, governments primarily finance higher education through 
general tax revenues.61 Students are expected to pay minimal 
tuition and fees while they are in school, and as a result, recent 
graduates are burdened with minimal debt. Access to university 
education may be allocated through competitive examination,62 
but inequality in family financial resources generally has a 
limited impact on educational attainment.63 Because the 
government provides much of the funding for education, the 
government can readily prioritize certain fields of inquiry by 
devoting more resources to those subject areas, and can try to 
match educational offerings to employment opportunities. 
By contrast, in the United States, federal government 
support to students is generally in the form of loans that must 
be repaid with interest,64 and students therefore graduate with 
high debt burdens.65 Although some state governments support 
                                                                                                     
States). 
 61. See Demange, Fenge & Uebelmesser, supra note 2, at 253 (stating that 
public funding based on tax revenues is dominant in European Union countries). 
 62. OECD, supra note 2, at 48 (“[I]n Finnish higher education . . . the 
number of entry places is restricted.”); Demange, Fenge & Uebelmesser, supra 
note 2, at 264–65 (discussing access restrictions in Germany and France). 
 63. See OECD, ECONOMIC POLICY REFORMS: GOING FOR GROWTH 2010, at 194 
[hereinafter OECD, ECONOMIC POLICY REFORMS] (“In some countries, there exist 
social transfer programmes that are specifically directed to paying part of 
[parent costs in poor households of investing in the education of their children]. 
Such redistributive policies could thus reduce current income inequalities across 
parents so that their descendants’ income would converge more quickly.”); 
Charlene Marie Kalenkoski & Sabrina Wulff Pabilonia, Parental Transfers, 
Student Achievement, and the Labor Supply of College Students, 23 J. 
POPULATION ECON. 469, 494–95 (2010) (finding that students who receive less 
support from their parents work longer hours while in school, and that longer 
work hours reduce these students’ GPAs). 
 64. As of 2010, federal loans exceed federal grants by a factor of more than 
two to one. Earlier in the decade, the proportion of loans was even higher. 
COLLEGE BD., TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2011, at 10 tbl.1 (2011), 
http://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/Student_Aid_2011.pdf. Total 
grants and total loans—not just federal—each account for roughly half of the aid 
to undergraduates, but for graduate students, loans exceed grants by a factor of 
two to one. Id. at 17, tbls.8A & 8B. Government support has declined as a share 
of U.S. educational institutions’ revenue since the early 1980s. Michael S. 
McPherson & Morton O. Schapiro, U.S. Higher Education Finance, in 
HANDBOOK OF ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION 1403, 1403–34 (Eric Alan Hanushek & 
Finis Welch eds., 2006). 
 65. See Elizabeth Warren, Sandy Baum & Ganesh Sitaraman, Service 
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public universities that offer lower tuition to residents, state 
support for higher education has been eroding for decades, and 
public universities increasingly resemble private universities in 
their dependence on tuition revenues.66 Parental financial 
resources are a strong predictor of educational achievement,67 
and intergenerational social mobility is low by developed-world 
standards.68  
                                                                                                     
Pays: Creating Opportunities by Linking College with Public Service, 1 HARV. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 127, 127 (“[S]tudents . . . are leaving college deep in debt.”); id. at 
129 (stating that most United States college graduates take on debt to pay for 
college); Guinier, supra note 4, at 130 n.67. In 2009–2010, 56% of students who 
attended four-year public colleges borrowed money to do so, and they each 
borrowed an average of $22,000. Sixty-five percent of students who attended 
four-year private colleges borrowed, and they each borrowed an average of 
$28,000. The percent who borrowed and the average dollar value of debt 
(adjusted for inflation) have both increased over the last decade. COLLEGE BD., 
supra note 64, at 4, 19 figs.10A & 10B. 
 66. See Guinier, supra note 4, at 129 (“[S]tates shifted resources from 
education to the criminal justice system, the federal government cut Pell 
Grants, and state revenues plummeted, leading to higher tuition and reduced 
financial aid.”); see also COLLEGE BD., supra note 64, at 9 (discussing high and 
growing student debt levels at public colleges). The trend away from grants has 
changed slightly since 2008—Pell Grants and grants to Military Veterans grew 
dramatically, but are still dwarfed by loans. Id. at 10 tbl.1. 
  European governments have also slightly reduced the proportion of 
public support for higher education, but public support still accounts for a much 
larger share than in the United States. See Demange, Fenge & Uebelmesser, 
supra note 2, at 265–66. 
 67. See OECD, ECONOMIC POLICY REFORMS, supra note 63, at 183  
Parental or socio-economic background influences descendants’ 
educational, earnings and wage outcomes in practically all countries 
for which evidence is available. . . . The influence of parental socio-
economic status on students’ achievement in secondary education is 
particularly strong in Belgium, France and the United States . . . . 
Inequalities in secondary education are likely to translate into 
inequalities in tertiary education and subsequent wage inequality. 
See also Warren, Baum & Sitaraman, supra note 65, at 127 (“[A]lmost 20% of 
low income-high school graduates with high test scores do not manage to enroll 
in college at all within two years of graduating high school.”). 
 68. See OECD, ECONOMIC POLICY REFORMS, supra note 63, at 185 fig.5.1, 
187 (finding that intergenerational wage mobility as measured by father-son 
pairs is lower in the United States than in Denmark, Australia, Norway, 
Finland, Canada, Sweden, Germany, Spain, or France; only Italy and the U.K. 
had less social mobility than the United States). The OECD notes that genetic 
heritability of innate ability should be constant across countries, but wage 
mobility seems to be higher in countries with more generous taxpayer funded 
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Figure 4: Federal Student Loans Are an Increasingly Important 
Source of Education Financing 
  
                                                                                                     
social welfare and education policies. Id. at 186, 196. The OECD also notes 
substantial evidence that early childhood education and care programs improve 
labor market outcomes for children from poorer backgrounds. Id. at 193–94. It is 
unclear if government funding of higher education has as large an impact on 
mobility as funding early childhood education. 
Relatively low social mobility in the United States may be surprising to 
many; the statistical reality of a stable class structure starkly contrasts with 
perceptions of the United States as a dynamic, open, and fluid society. However, 
within the OECD, social mobility and equality appear to be complementary—
the least equal societies tend to have the least mobility. Id. at 195 fig.5.10. See 
also supra note 46 for different perspectives on the desirability of mobility. 
Private, not for 
profit 














Full-time, full-year undergraduates receiving federal student loans, 1993-2008 
Percent of undergraduates, by type of institution 
Source: National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics 
2011, Table 358; Digest of Education Statistics 2008, Table 340 
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III. U.S. Federal Student Loan Programs  
The overwhelming majority of the U.S. student loan market 
consists of federal government loans.69 Prior to the emergence of 
federally-backed student loans, student loans were rare and 
expensive, and higher education was generally only available to 
the children of the wealthy.  
Historically, the largest category of government-backed 
loans was federal guaranteed loans, which were guaranteed, 
subsidized, and regulated by the government, but originated and 
owned by private financial institutions or sold to private 
investors through securitization.70  
However, Congress eliminated guaranteed loans in 2010 
and shifted all lending to the government’s direct loan 
program.71  Guaranteed loans were eliminated because of a widespread  
                                                                                                     
 69. As of 2011, 90% of new student loans were federal government loans. 
Government loans have been a majority of the market for many years, but 
increased dramatically after 2008 as private lending collapsed. Jonathan Riber 
& Maxim Berger, U.S. Private Student Loan Landscape, 7 U.S. STRUCTURED FIN. 
NEWSL. (DBRS, Toronto, Ont.), Oct. 5, 2011. 
 70. Technically, the loans were guaranteed by a guarantee agency and 
reinsured by the Department of Education. CLAIRE J. MEZZONOTTE ET. AL., FITCH 
RESEARCH, STUDENT LOAN FINANCE 101, at 1 (1997). Most securitized private loans 
were federally guaranteed loans. See Kevin Drawbaugh, Securitizing Student 
Loan Debt, REUTERS (Aug. 28, 2007), available at http://www.reuters. 
com/article/2007/08/28/idUSN2723050420070828 (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Claire J. Mezzonotte et. al., Student 
Loan ABS, 6 DBRS STRUCTURED FIN. NEWSL., Feb. 22, 2010. According to the 
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), there were over 
$230 billion in student loan asset backed securitizations (SLABS) as of the end of 
2011. New SLABS issuances peaked at $67 billion in 2006, plummeted during the 
U.S. financial crisis in 2008 to $28 billion, and continued to fall thereafter. SLABS 
issuance dropped below $14 billion in 2011. SIFMA, U.S. ABS Issuance and 
Outstanding, available at http://www.sifma.org/uploadedFiles/Research/Statistics/ 
StatisticsFiles/SF-US-ABS-SIFMA.xls (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
For an explanation of the process of securitization, its benefits, and its risks, 
see Michael Simkovic, Competition and Crisis in Mortgage Securitization, 88 IND. 
L. REV. 213 (2013) or Michael Simkovic, Secret Liens and the Financial Crisis of 
2008, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 253 (2009). 
 71. Jean Braucher, Mortgaging Human Capital: Federally Funded 
Subprime Higher Education, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 439, 462 n.111 (2011); 
Glater, supra note 35, at 57. 
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perception that the guarantees and subsidies—which reduced the 
riskiness of the loans to only slightly higher than U.S. government 
Treasuries, but enabled private lenders to profit by charging far 
higher interest rates—represented a subsidy to private financial 
institutions and their investors rather than a benefit to students or 
taxpayers.72  
Federal direct government loans are administered by the U.S. 
Department of Education. The government retains ownership of 
these direct loans, and can therefore profit when the interest rate 
spread above Treasuries exceeds losses from defaults and 
administrative costs. Federal student loans are generally less 
expensive than private loans, but the federal direct loan program 
is still a moneymaker for the federal government.73  
A. Student Eligibility Criteria Are Generally Not Risk-Based 
The borrower eligibility criteria for federal student loans are 
fairly minimal, and generally not risk-based. A student must be 
                                                                                                     
 72. See Glater, supra note 35, at 39–40 (discussing the preferences of 
Senator Edward Kennedy and President Bill Clinton for direct lending on 
grounds of cost effectiveness and aggressive lobbying by private lenders against 
direct lending); id. at 57 n.224 (discussing costs savings from ending the 
guaranteed loan program); see also Deborah J. Lucas & Damian Moore, 
Guaranteed versus Direct Lending: The Case of Student Loans, in MEASURING 
AND MANAGING FEDERAL FINANCIAL RISK 163, 164 (Deborah J. Lucas ed., 2010) 
[T]he guaranteed program appears to be fundamentally more 
expensive than the direct program. . . . [G]uaranteed lenders are paid 
more than is required to induce them to lend at statutory terms. . . . 
To the extent that the market is not perfectly competitive, 
guaranteed lenders presumably are able to retain some of the 
surplus. 
 73. See DEBORAH KALCEVIC & JUSTIN HUMPHREY, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 
CBO MARCH 2012 BASELINE PROJECTIONS FOR THE STUDENT LOAN AND PELL 
GRANT PROGRAMS, tbls.2 & 3 (Mar. 13, 2012) (projecting a negative subsidy, i.e., 
profit, for federal student loans originated in 2013 of around 32% of lending 
volume, or $36.5 billion in profit). After subtracting $1.6 billion in 
administrative costs (equal to 1.4% of lending volume), projected 2013 profits 
are $34.9 billion. Id. at tbl.4. The student loan program remains profitable in 
every year projected, although profits decline to around $10 billion in later 
years. See also DEP’T OF EDUC., STUDENT LOANS OVERVIEW, FISCAL YEAR 2013 
BUDGET REQUEST, at R-11 to R-12 (providing similar profit estimates for 2012 
and noting that the federal student loan program was profitable in 2009–2012).  
562 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527 (2013) 
enrolled in a program at an accredited higher educational 
institution “leading to a recognized educational credential” such 
as a degree or certificate,74 must maintain “academic standing 
consistent with the requirements of graduation”75 unless there 
are “special circumstances,”76 must not currently be in default on 
a federal student loan,77 must be a U.S. citizen or on the path 
toward citizenship,78 and if previously convicted of defrauding the 
federal student loan program, must have made restitution.79 
Eligibility can be suspended or terminated for drug offenses.80 
The use of more restrictive eligibility criteria than those provided 
for by statute is generally prohibited.81 
B. Only Exceptionally Poorly Performing Institutions Are 
Excluded  
Similarly, the eligibility criteria for educational institutions 
are fairly minimal, with the Department of Education relying 
heavily on state accreditation agencies.82 Two sets of regulations 
have been established over the past two and a half decades to cull 
some of the worst performing institutions from student loan 
eligibility, but regulations do not seek to make fine performance-
based distinctions among eligible institutions. 
First, in response to high student loan default rates at some 
“proprietary” or “for-profit” educational institutions in the 1980s, 
Congress passed the Student Loan Default Prevention Initiative 
Act of 1990 (SLDPA).83 Under the SLDPA, institutions lost their 
                                                                                                     
 74. 20 U.S.C. § 1091(a)(1) (2012); id. § 1094. 
 75. Id. § 1091(c)(1)(B). 
 76. Id. § 1091(c)(3)(C). 
 77. Id. § 1091(a)(3). 
 78. Id. § 1091(a)(5). 
 79. Id. § 1091(a)(6). 
 80. Id. § 1091(r). 
 81. Id. § 1077A(e); id. § 1077A(f).  
 82. Braucher, supra note 71, at 446, n.19. 
 83. Student Loan Default Prevention Initiative Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1001). 
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eligibility for student loans if their cohort default rate (CDR)84 
exceeded twenty-five percent for three years in a row.85  
The CDR measure helped eliminate some small and poorly 
performing institutions, but sophisticated educational 
institutions increasingly manipulated the CDR statistic by 
moving recent students into deferment86 or forbearance87 so that 
they would not count as defaulters.88 CDR had a positive but 
limited effect.89  
Recently, largely in response to another wave of high defaults 
at some proprietary educational institutions, the Department of 
Education established a Gainful Employment Rule (GER) that 
again attempts to cull the worst performing institutions.90 GER 
may be more difficult to manipulate than the older CDR measure 
                                                                                                     
 84. The CDR was the percent of students entering repayment in a given 
year who defaulted during the subsequent year, and CDR was therefore roughly 
a one-year default rate because students typically entered repayment in October 
or November. In 2008, the CDR measure was extended by one year (so that it 
captures students who enter repayment in one year and default by the end of 
the subsequent two years), and the maximum CDR was increased to 30%. 
Braucher, supra note 71, at 464–65 & n.121. 
 85. Id. at 464. 
 86. Deferment refers to a postponement of payment on a loan that is 
allowed under certain conditions and during which interest does not accrue for 
subsidized loans. Deferment is available for student borrowers who are enrolled 
at least half time in an eligible postsecondary school or studying full time in a 
graduate fellowship program or an approved disability rehabilitation program. 
It is also available for up to three years of unemployment and economic 
hardship, or for active duty military service. Direct Loans, Deferment and 
Forbearance, DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www.direct.ed.gov/postpone.html (last 
visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 87. Forbearance refers to a postponement of payment on a loan, typically if 
the borrower does not qualify for a deferment and is unable to make payments 
for a reason such as poor health. Interest continues to accrue during 
forbearance. Id. 
 88. Braucher, supra note 71, at 465 n.127. 
 89. Id. at 464–65 (finding that CDR regulation helped shut down some, but 
not all of the worst performers). 
 90. The Department of Education published its final Gainful Employment 
Rule on June 13, 2011. The Rule was scheduled to go into effect on July 1, 2012, 
and the earliest any educational institution might lose eligibility under the GER 
Rule is 2015. Id. at 466. 
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because GER measures performance based on repayment rates 
rather than default rates.91  
GER uses two tests—one that looks at whether former 
students are in fact repaying their loans92 and another that looks 
at debt-service-to-income ratios to determine whether graduates 
have sufficient income to enable them to have a reasonable 
chance of repaying their loans.93 An educational institution may 
remain eligible for student loans if it passes either test in at least 
two out of four consecutive years.  
C. Borrowing Limits Depend on Grade Level and Dependent 
Status 
Federal student loan borrowing limits are set by statute.94 
The loan limits are determined by the students’ grade level and, 
for undergraduates, students’ status as dependents. Annual 
Stafford Loan limits increase as undergraduates progress from 
year one to year three, and are higher for students who are 
“independent.”95 Stafford and Perkins Loan limits are higher for 
graduate students than for undergraduates.96  
The federal loan limits are less than the total cost of 
attendance at most private colleges and many flagship public 
                                                                                                     
 91. Id. at 467–69. 
 92. A program can remain eligible if at least 35% of students are repaying 
at least some portion of the principal on their federal loans. Id. at 467–68. 
 93. A program can remain eligible if either the mean or the median annual 
student loan payment of graduates of their program is either 12% or less of 
annual earnings or 30% or less of discretionary income. Id. at 468. 
 94. 20 U.S.C. § 1078(b)(1)(A)&(B) (2006) (setting forth loan limits for 
Subsidized Stafford Loans); id. § 1078–8(d) (setting forth loan limits for 
Unsubsidized Stafford Loans); id. § 1087dd(a)(2) (setting forth loan limits for 
Perkins Loans); id. § 1087E(a)(1) (noting that limits on direct loans are the 
same as limits on guaranteed loans). 
 95. Undergraduate students are “independent” if they meet any of the 
following criteria: the student is at least age twenty-four, is married, is a 
veteran or on active duty in the military, is an orphan or a ward of the state, or 
has legal dependents other than a spouse. Direct Loans, Glossary, DEP’T OF 
EDUC., http://www.direct.ed.gov/glos.html#anchor388090 (last visited Feb. 3, 
2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 96. See sources cited supra note 94. 
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colleges, and students with financial need may therefore turn to 
private loans to help make up the difference.97 Graduate students 
and the parents of dependent undergraduate students with good 
credit histories also have access to PLUS Loans, under which 
borrowing is limited by the students’ financial need rather than a 
fixed dollar amount.98  
The federal student loan limits could at best be described as 
crudely risk-based: as students exceed loan limits for less 
expensive lending programs, such as subsidized Stafford Loans 
and Perkins Loans, they will move on to more expensive 
programs such as PLUS Loans and their borrowing costs will 
increase. Students may also turn to higher cost private student 
loans or credit card debt when federal student loans are 
inadequate to finance their education.99 
A fully risk-based approach to loan limits would focus on 
expected debt-service-payment-to-income ratios. The relevant 
question is not simply how much students borrow each year. 
Instead, the relevant question is whether students’ incomes at 
graduation and beyond will be sufficient to repay their debts over 
the next ten to thirty years. 
D. Federal Student Loan Pricing is Statutory, Not Risk-Based 
In theory, rather than cut off access to credit entirely to poor 
performing institutions and ignore risk differences above a 
minimal threshold, the Department of Education could embrace a 
more nuanced approach by incorporating risk levels into loan 
pricing. However, in practice, federal student loan pricing is 
largely uniform and not risk-based. 
Interest rates on government loans are set by statute at the 
same level for all eligible borrowers under a particular loan 
program. Federal student loan rates are currently set at a fixed 
rate between 3.4% and 7.9%, with lower rates available to 
                                                                                                     
 97. Glater, supra note 35, at 42–43. 
 98. 20 U.S.C. § 1078-2(a)(1) (discussing eligibility for PLUS Loans); id. 
§ 1078-2(b) (limiting PLUS Loan borrowing to a student’s estimated cost of 
attendance, minus other financial aid). 
 99. See generally Glater, supra note 35, at 42–46. 
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undergraduates than to graduate students.100 The rates have 
changed over time, but have historically been either a fixed 
interest rate, or a capped variable rate determined by adding a 
spread to a variable Treasury bill rate.101  
The interest rates are not risk-based. A successful medical 
student with virtually no risk of becoming unemployed or 
defaulting on her debts would pay the graduate student rate—
between 6.8% and 7.9%—while a struggling art history major 
with rather less secure employment prospects would pay the 
undergraduate rate of 3.4%. 
                                                                                                     
 100. The interest rate for new loans made under the William D. Ford 
Federal Direct Loan Program (DLP),  made on or after July 1, 2006, is a fixed 
rate, generally either 6.8% or 7.9%, depending on the loan program. 6.8% is the 
rate for Federal Direct Stafford Loans and Federal Direct Unsubsidized Stafford 
Loans; 7.9% is the rate for PLUS Loans. 20 U.S.C. § 1087E(b)(7) (2006). 
Between July 1, 2008, and July 1, 2013, a lower interest rate was available for 
undergraduate student borrowers under DLP Loans—this rate was 3.4% for 
undergraduate DLP Loans originating between July 1, 2011, and July 1, 2013. 
Id. § 1087E(b)(7)(D). The interest rate for Perkins Loans made after October 1, 
1981, is 5%. Id. § 1087dd(c)(1)(D). 
 101. For example, the interest rate for Stafford Loans dispersed between 
October 1, 1998, and July 1, 2006, was 2.3% plus a 91-day Treasury bill rate, 
capped at a maximum rate of 8.25%. Id. § 1087E(b)(6). 
The interest rate for federal Perkins Loans is established by 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1087DD(c)(1)(D). The interest rates for DLP Loans  are established by 20 
U.S.C. § 1087E(b)(7). Maximum interest rates for federal guaranteed loans 
made under the Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP), including 
PLUS Loans, were established under 20 U.S.C. § 1077A (“applicable interest 
rates”). Lenders were permitted to charge less than the maximum, but rarely 
did so. Glater, supra note 35, at 40 & n.139. 
When student loan rates were variable, the most commonly used reference 
rate was the 91-day (3-month) Treasury bill rate, although the 52-week (1 year) 
Treasury bill rate was also used. The interest rate the borrower actually paid 
might have in some instances been lower because of interest subsidies described 
in 20 U.S.C. § 1078. Students can convert their variable-rate loans into fixed-
rate loans through consolidation.  
The same terms and conditions generally apply to loans made under the 
FFELP and DLP. 20 U.S.C. § 1087E(a)(1). 
RISK-BASED STUDENT LOANS 567 
IV. Higher Education and Labor Market Coordination Problems  
Resources are increasingly allocated to U.S. educational 
institutions through a market-based process.102 Students with 
admissions offers from multiple schools resemble customers who 
pay for the education they receive and can choose from several 
different options. Educational institutions, like suppliers in any 
competitive market, offer discounts to preferred customers.103 
Students with financial resources or access to credit decide where 
they will study, and what they will study. This market-based 
approach is consistent with values that emphasize autonomy for 
individual students and political independence for academic 
institutions. 
However, this freedom may come at a steep price to 
employers, lenders, and ultimately to the students themselves. As 
discussed above, government support for mass higher education 
has always been intended to supply skilled labor, boost economic 
growth, and encourage social mobility through increased wages 
and employment.104 However, skewed incentives and information 
asymmetries have increasingly shifted educational resources 
away from human capital investment and toward present 
consumption. 
A. Students as Customers Create Pressure to Reduce Academic 
Standards 
The student-as-customer approach creates pressures toward 
grade inflation and lower educational standards.105 Because 
                                                                                                     
 102. See David D. Dill, Allowing the Market to Rule: The Case of the United 
States, 57 HIGHER ED. Q. 136 (2003) (noting the United States’ distinctly 
market-based approach to higher education, and expressing concerns that the 
United States’ market-based approach may lead to inefficiency because of 
information asymmetries and reliance on reputation as a gauge of quality). 
 103. Warren, Baum & Sitaraman, supra note 65, at 128 (“Over the past 
decade, the federal government, state governments, and colleges and 
universities have all directed increasing portions of their funds toward high-
achieving middle- and upper-income students in order to influence their choices 
about where to go to college.”). 
 104. See generally supra Part II. 
 105. See infra notes 107–10. The same dynamic observed in U.S. higher 
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universities depend on enrollments for revenue, and students 
decide where to enroll, administrators and faculty have strong 
incentives to ensure that students enjoy their time at the 
university. Universities can and do cater to students’ appetites by 
offering amenities such as luxury dorms and athletic facilities—
amenities many students appear to value more than good 
instruction.106 Emphasis on keeping the student-customer happy 
also extends into the classroom.  
One of the ways that universities can encourage faculty to 
focus on student enjoyment is by linking departmental funding 
and professors’ promotion to student enrollment numbers and 
course evaluations.107 Professors can increase enrollments and 
                                                                                                     
education—competition for enrollments contributing to grade inflation and 
reduced standards—has been observed in Sweden at the secondary-school 
level after the introduction of school choice. See Jonas Vlachos, Firskolor i 
förändring, 66, in Laura Hartman, SNS FÖRLAG, Konkurrensens Konsekvenser: 
Vad Händer Med Svensk Välfärd? (2011); Richard Orange, Doubts Grow Over 
the Success of Sweden’s Free Schools Experiment, GUARDIAN (UK), Sept. 10, 
2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/10/sweden-free-schools-experi 
ment?INT CMP=SRCH (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); cf. Gabriel H. Sahlgren, Opponents of School Choice Are 
Misinterpreting the Data, INST. OF ECON. AFFAIRS (June 20, 2012), 
http://www.iea.org.uk/blog/opponents-of-school-choice-are-misinterpreting-the-d 
ata (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 106. See BRIAN JACOB, BRIAN MCCALL, & KEVIN STANGE, THE CONSUMPTION 
VALUE OF POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION 33 (2011), http://www.rand.org/content/ 
dam/rand/www/external/labor/seminars/adp/pdfs/2011/stange.pdf (presenting 
evidence from student enrollment decisions of the high school classes of 1992 
and 2004 that most students are more willing to pay for spending on 
amenities like student activities, sports, and dormitories than on college 
instruction, but noting that high-achieving students tended to focus more on 
academic quality). 
 107. David Dill, Will Market Competition Assure Academic Quality? An 
Analysis of the UK and US Experience, 20 HIGHER EDUC. DYNAMICS 47, 66–67 
(2007)  
[T]he effects of market competition on academic behavior 
compromise the capacity of universities to maintain and improve 
academic standards. . . . Many universities have responded to the 
more competitive market by linking academic promotion to student 
evaluations of teachers and tying departmental budget allocations 
to student enrolments [sic]. [This] provides the opportunity for 
instructors to increase the demand for their individual courses and 
programmes by inflating grades and/or lowering academic 
standards rather than by actually improving student learning. 
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boost course evaluations by assigning better grades for less work. 
Students actively shop for classes with professors who give 
generous grades.108 Students also give better course evaluations 
to professors who grade more generously and who flatter 
students—and worse evaluations to professors who demand more 
work and more substantive learning.109  
Presumably, many professors respond to such incentives by 
reducing the rigor of their classes and inflating grades.110 The 
result is that student-customers study less, learn less,111 and are 
more satisfied with the experience—at least until it is time to 
                                                                                                     
 108. Talia Bar, Vrinda Kadiyali & Asaf Zussman, Grade Information and 
Grade Inflation: The Cornell Experiment, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 101–02 (2009) 
(presenting evidence “that the provision of [average] grade [and grade 
distribution] information [to Cornell students] led to increased enrollment into 
leniently graded courses” and that students of high ability were less likely than 
students of lower ability to pursue courses with more lenient grading). 
 109. See Scott E. Carrell & James E. West, Does Professor Quality Matter? 
Evidence from Random Assignment of Students to Professors, 118 J. POL. ECON. 
409, 412, 430 (2010); Clifford H. Edwards, Grade Inflation: The Effects on 
Educational Quality and Personal Well Being, 120 EDUC. 538 (2000). 
 110. See Donald L. Crumbley et al., What Is Ethical About Grade Inflation 
and Coursework Deflation?, 8 J. ACAD. ETHICS 187, 187 (2010) (arguing that 
course evaluations have “caused grade inflation, coursework deflation, and a 
reduction in student learning as a result of unethical behavior of professors and 
administrators”); Kiridaran Kanagaretnam et al., An Economic Analysis of the 
Use of Student Evaluations: Implications for Universities, 24 MANAGERIAL & 
DECISION ECON. 1, 1–13 (2003) (stating that excessive weight on student 
evaluations can have negative consequences); David A. Love & Matthew J. 
Kotchen, Grades, Course Evaluations, and Academic Incentives, 36 E. ECON. J. 
151, 151 (2010) (modeling professor behavior and suggesting that increased 
emphasis on course evaluations can lead to grade inflation); Charles E. Snare, 
Implications of Considering Students as Consumers, 45 C. TEACHING 122, 122 
(1997) (stating that the student-as-customer approach leads to grade inflation, 
reduced rigor, and less substantive learning); James J. Wallace & Wanda A. 
Wallace, Why the Costs of Student Evaluations Have Long Since Exceeded Their 
Value, 13 ISSUES IN ACCT. EDUC. 443, 445 (1998) (same); see also Brenda S. 
Sonner, A is for “Adjunct”: Examining Grade Inflation in Higher Education, 76 
J. EDUC. BUS. 5, 7 (2000) (presenting evidence that adjunct instructors give 
higher grades than full-time faculty and suggesting that this may be because 
adjuncts face greater pressure to obtain high course evaluations so that their 
teaching contract will be renewed). 
 111. See generally Philip Babcock, Real Costs of Nominal Grade Inflation? 
New Evidence from Student Course Evaluations, 48 ECON. INQUIRY 983 (2010) 
(providing evidence that higher nominal grades (i.e., grade inflation) can 
dramatically reduce student effort and study time). 
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enter the labor market. Potential employers may not be so 
satisfied with the quality of the education job applicants have 
received, and recent graduates may not be very satisfied with the 
employment opportunities that are available to them.112  
B. Educational Institutions May Have Incentives to Funnel 
Students into Areas That Do Not Maximize Students’ 
Future Incomes or Employment Prospects 
Some college majors are more challenging than others. Grade 
inflation is generally more prevalent in humanities and social 
sciences and less prevalent in science, technology, engineering, 
and mathematical subject areas (STEM).113 STEM majors spend 
                                                                                                     
 112. BYRON AUGUSTE ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., AN ECONOMY THAT 
WORKS: JOB CREATION AND AMERICA’S FUTURE 57 (2011) (“[E]mployers still 
have trouble finding workers with specific skills. And many students lack a 
clear picture of which jobs and skills will be in high demand.”); ERIN SPARKS 
& MARY JO WAITS, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N CTR. FOR BEST PRACTICES, 
DEGREES FOR WHAT JOBS? RAISING EXPECTATIONS FOR UNIVERSITIES AND 
COLLEGES IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 8 (2011)  
Currently, businesses and states are not getting the talent they 
want—and students and job seekers are not getting the jobs they 
want. There are problems with quality. For instance, employers 
responding to a recent survey estimated that 40 percent of college 
graduates available to them do not have the necessary applied 
skills required to meet their needs. 
 113. See VALEN E. JOHNSON, GRADE INFLATION: A CRISIS IN COLLEGE 
EDUCATION (2003) (reporting the most generous grading at Duke University 
in the humanities, intermediate grading in the social sciences, and the most 
stringent grading in sciences and engineering); Alexandra C. Achen & Paul 
N. Courant, What Are Grades Made Of?, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 77, 81–82, 90 
(presenting evidence that science and math classes at the University of 
Michigan generally offer lower average grades than social science and 
humanities classes, particularly for introductory level, required classes); 
Patrick D. Larkey, Comment: An Alternative to Traditional GPA for 
Evaluating Student Performance, 12 STAT. SCI. 269, 270 (1997) (“The few 
studies that have been done all indicate that there has been relatively more 
grade inflation in ‘softer’ subjects.”); Kevin Rask, Attrition in STEM Fields 
at a Liberal Arts College: The Importance of Grades and Pre-collegiate 
Preferences, 29 ECON. EDUC. REV. 892, 894 (2010) (“Grades given in the 
sciences are often among the lowest.”); Richard Sabot & John Wakeman-
Linn, Grade Inflation and Course Choice, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 159, 161–63 
(1991) (presenting data from Williams College showing that humanities 
departments generally give the highest grades while science, math, and 
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more hours studying and have fewer hours for paid work or 
leisure,114 and often take longer to complete their degrees.115 Yet 
STEM majors receive lower grades. A large proportion of 
incoming students report that they intend to study a STEM field. 
But before graduation, many students switch from STEM to the 
humanities or social sciences.116 Students switch even though 
their future employment prospects and wages might be higher if 
they majored in certain select STEM fields.117 This flight from 
                                                                                                     
economics departments generally give lower grades); see also, e.g., 
ARCIDIACONO ET AL., supra note 17, at 19 (presenting additional evidence 
from Duke University that grades are higher in the humanities and social 
sciences than in natural sciences, engineering, and economics). 
 114. See NATIONAL SURVEY OF STUDENT ENGAGEMENT, ANNUAL RESULTS 15 
(2011) (reporting that engineering and science majors study more hours per 
week than humanities, education, or business majors, and that business, social 
science, and humanities majors spend more hours per week working). 
 115. See Sylvia Hurtado et al., Degrees of Success Bachelor’s Degree 
Completion Rates Among Initial STEM Majors, HIGHER ED. RES. INST. RES. 
BRIEF, Jan. 2010, at 3 fig.3, http://www.heri.ucla.edu/nih/ downloads/2010%20-
%20Hurtado,%20Eagan,%20Chang%20-%20Degrees%20of%20Success.pdf 
(“[S]tudents who initially enter undergraduate STEM programs have 
substantially lower degree completion rates than their same-race peers who 
enter other academic disciplines.”). 
 116. See Paul M. Romer, Should the Government Subsidize Supply or 
Demand in the Market for Scientists and Engineers?, in INNOVATION POLICY AND 
THE ECONOMY 221, 237 (Adam B. Jaffee et al., eds., 2001); Ben Ost, The Role of 
Peers and Grades in Determining Major Persistence in the Sciences, 29 ECON. 
EDUC. REV. 923, 923–34 (2010); Rask, supra note 113, at 892–900. 
 117. See Mark C. Berger, Cohort Size Effects on Earnings: Differences by 
College Major, 7 ECON. EDUC. REV. 375, 381 (1988) (reporting that wages for 
science and liberal arts majors are depressed more by an increase in the size of 
their college cohort than are wages for engineering or business majors); Mark C. 
Berger, Predicted Future Earnings and Choice of College Major, 41. INDUS. & 
LAB. REL. REV. 418, 426 (1988) (reporting relatively high earnings for U.S. 
business and engineering graduates and relatively low earnings for liberal arts 
and education graduates); Black et al., supra note 18, at 365 (finding that 
engineers earn more than economics majors, who earn more than most other 
social science, business, and humanities majors, and that MBAs with chemical 
engineering undergraduate majors earn more than other MBAs and that “the 
measured differentials reflect in part real differences in the market returns to 
different fields of study”); Charlotte Christiansen et al., The Risk Return Trade-
off in Human Capital Investment, 14 LABOUR ECON. 971, 984–85 (2007) 
(reporting relatively high risk-adjusted returns for engineering and health 
sciences degrees and relatively low risk-adjusted returns for humanities and 
education degrees for a sample of Danish graduates); Scott L. Thomas, Deferred 
Costs and Economic Returns to College Major, Quality, and Performance, 41 
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STEM is likely due at least in part to university-created grading 
incentives.118 
                                                                                                     
RES. HIGHER EDUC. 281, 301–02, 304–06 (2000) (reporting relatively low debt-to-
income ratios for recent U.S. college graduates who majored in engineering, 
health science, or business and relatively high debt-to-income ratios for 
graduates who majored in education, humanities, or social sciences, primarily 
because of much higher incomes for majors in engineering, business, or science); 
infra note 162 (discussing substantial financial sacrifices by humanities and 
education students); cf. Morton Paglin & Anthony M. Rufolo, Heterogeneous 
Human Capital, Occupational Choice, and Male-Female Earnings Differences, 8 
J. LAB. & ECON. 123, 140–41 (1990) (arguing that wage differences across majors 
are due in part to innate differences in mathematical ability and self-sorting by 
students). 
However, not all STEM graduates fare well. There is evidence of an 
“oversupply” of science Ph.Ds seeking professorships within universities, and 
declining pay and working conditions for Ph.Ds in many fields. See B. Lindsay 
Lowell & Hal Salzman, Into the Eye of the Storm: Assessing the Evidence on 
Science and Engineering Education, Quality and Workforce Demand 2 (2007), 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411562_salzman_Science.pdf (presenting 
evidence that there are three times as many U.S. science and engineering 
graduates as available job openings in these fields); B. Lindsay Lowell et al., 
Paper Presented at the Annual Meetings of the Association for Public Policy: 
Steady as She Goes? Three Generations of Students through the Science and 
Engineering Pipeline 31–32 (Nov. 7, 2009) (presenting evidence that starting in 
the early 1990s, top performing students increasingly opted out of science and 
engineering employment) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
Beryl Lieff Benderly, The Real Science Gap, MILLER-MCCUNE, July/Aug. 2010, 
at 30, 33 (“[B]ecoming a scientist now entails a penurious decade or more of 
graduate school and postdoc positions before joining the multitude vainly vying 
for the few available faculty-level openings.”); Romer, supra note 116, at 241 
(arguing that there is a glut of scientists within universities but a shortage of 
scientists who can work in industry). 
 118. See Valen E. Johnson, An Alternative to Traditional GPA for 
Evaluating Student Performance, 12 STAT. SCI. 251, 251 (1997) (“[D]ifferences in 
grade distributions result in a substantial reduction in the number of courses 
taken by students in subjects like mathematics and the natural sciences, as well 
as other challenging upper-level undergraduate courses.”); Sabot & Wakeman-
Linn, supra note 113 (providing evidence that students respond to grades as 
incentives and choose to study humanities rather than science and math, even 
though there is likely to be greater employment opportunity in STEM fields, 
because universities offer higher average grades and a narrower grading 
distribution in humanities classes); Larkey, supra note 113, at 270  
[T]here has been relatively more grade inflation in “softer” subjects. 
Grade inflation has become an important edge for some fields in 
competing for students as core curricula have waned and student 
choices have waxed. It is a perverse form of price competition; they 
have been able to offer higher grades for equivalent or lesser amounts 
of work.  
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Figure 5.1: Compared to Other High-Income Countries, the U.S. 
Produces Relatively Few STEM Degrees 
  
                                                                                                     
See also Ost, supra note 116, at 923–34 (presenting evidence that science majors 
are pushed away by low grades in their major and pulled away by higher grades 
in classes in other fields); Rask, supra note 113, at 892–900 (estimating that 
roughly 2% to 4% more students would complete STEM education if the grading 











































STEM college degrees as percent of total by country, 2008  
Percent of total college graduates 
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
Graduates by Field of Education. 
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Figure 5.2: Students Who Take Courses in High Value Fields 
Receive Lower Grades, Especially in the Early Years of College 











Freshman Sophomore Junior Senior
Humanities / Social Sciences (excluding economics)
Natural Science / Engineering / Economics
Grades by course type and school year for a sample of Duke undergraduates 
Noncumulative within-year grade point average  
Source: Peter Arcidiacono, Esteban M. Aucejo, & Ken Spenner, What Happens 
After Enrollment? An Analysis of the Time Path of Racial Differences in GPA 
and Major Choice (2011) Table 10. 
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Figure 5.3: Students in High Value Fields (Other Than Business) 
have slightly higher ability levels and … 
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in their intended major
Studens who switch
majors
Students who did not
have an intended
major
Humanities / Social Sciences (excluding economics) degree completers
Natural Science / Engineering / Economics degree completers
SAT scores by pre-college intended major and completed major for a sample 
of Duke undergraduates 
Mean SAT points  
Source: Peter Arcidiacono, Esteban M. Aucejo, & Ken Spenner, What Happens 
After Enrollment? An Analysis of the Time Path of Racial Differences in GPA 
and Major Choice (2011) Table 11. 
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Figure 5.4:  Students in High Value Fields (Other Than Business) 


















Hours per week preparing for class
Hours per week spent preparing for class by full time college seniors, by major  
Source: Indiana University Center for Postsecondary Research, National 















Percent of full time seniors who spend more than 20 hours per week preparing 
for class, by major  
Source: Indiana University Center for Postsecondary Research, National 
Survey of Student Engagement 15 (2011) Figure 8. 
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Figure 5.5: Students Who Initially Intend to Major in High Value 
STEM Fields Switch to Less Demanding Fields Prior to 
Graduation 
Why might universities wish to use high grades and low 
workloads to channel students away from fields that are in 
demand in the labor market? In some cases, it may not be a 
university policy so much as a series of decisions by individual 
departments or professors.  
One less than completely satisfying explanation is that 
professors who teach “softer,” more subjective material find it 
more difficult to distinguish between students of high and low 











Percent of bachelors degrees conferred each year versus percent of college-bound 
students who intended to major in field four years ealier 
Source: College Board; National Center For Education Statistics. 
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ability.119 A higher cost to professors of sorting students by ability 
would explain a narrower grading distribution, but not 
necessarily higher average grades or lower workloads. Some 
STEM professors might wish to “weed out” weaker students 
because of concern about the harm such students might cause if 
they graduate with satisfactory grades and then err on the job—
imagine a poorly designed bridge—whereas liberal arts professors 
may be less concerned about the quality of graduates engaged in 
nonlethal endeavors. Of course, low grades, large class sizes, and 
limited academic support may deter even some high-ability 
students from pursuing STEM educations, and many STEM 
careers involve little risk to public safety. 
Another possibility is that humanities and social sciences 
professors feel compelled to compete for student enrollments by 
offering better grades for less work, because they cannot compete 
by offering equally attractive post-graduation employment 
opportunities.120 STEM professors may feel less pressure than 
humanities professors to compete for student enrollments 
because STEM professors can generate revenue for the university 
by bringing in research grants or developing commercially useful 
patents.121 
But why do universities tolerate such interdepartmental 
grade-based competition for enrollments? Universities could 
standardize grading by creating a mandatory grading curve 
across disciplines or requiring professors to rank students on a 
                                                                                                     
 119. See Achen & Courant, supra note 113, at 78 (“[D]epartments that 
evaluate student performance using interpretive methods will tend to have 
higher grades, because using these methods increases the personal cost to 
instructors of assigning and defending low grades.”); id. at 87–88; Larkey, supra 
note 113, at 270 (“[T]here is apparently more resistance to [grade] inflation in 
domains with more sharply and logically defined right and wrong answers.”). 
 120. See Achen &. Courant, supra note 113, at 78 (“Grades can be used in 
conjunction with other tools to attract students to departments that have low 
enrollments and to deter students from courses of study that are congested.”); 
Larkey, supra note 113, at 270. 
 121. BOK, supra note 10, at 74 (“[T]eaching loads . . . have dropped 
furthest . . . in scientific disciplines, such as mathematics and experimental 
physics, where the interests of undergraduates have steadily given way to the 
demands of pure research.”); id. at 140–42 (discussing efforts to commercialize 
university-developed technologies). 
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percentile scale.122 Universities could make grading even more 
meaningful by using rankings adjusted for the difficulty of the 
course and the level of competing students. Indeed, one such 
proposal—complete with a workable methodology—was put forth 
by a professor of statistics at Duke University, considered, and 
ultimately rejected by his university.123  
One possibility is internal university politics and 
interdepartmental rivalries.124 Another possibility is that such 
changes are simply not in the overall interests of universities.125 
                                                                                                     
 122. Larkey, supra note 113, at 270 (“There are many possible measures of 
aggregate performance for comparing students that are superior to GPA. They 
are superior in that they better represent comparative performance and remove 
incentives for students to choose courses and instructors based on their relative 
difficulty.”).  
Similarly, universities could reduce the number of credits granted for each 
hour of instruction in humanities or social sciences, compared to each hour of 
instruction in STEM subjects, because the STEM subjects require more out-of-
class work for each hour of instruction. 
 123. See Johnson, supra note 113, at 266–68 (explaining the benefits of 
using academic indexing for grade calculation instead of the traditional GPA 
approach); Charlie Mehl, Book: Grade Inflation Exists at Duke, CHRON. (Duke 
Univ.), Apr. 4, 2003, http://www.dukechronicle.com/article/book-grade-inflation-
exists-duke (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (reporting that Valen E. Johnson’s 
academic indexing proposal was rejected by the Duke Arts and Sciences Council 
in 1997) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 124. See Jessica Lichter, No Easy Solution for Grade Inflation Exists, Some 
Say, CHRON. (Duke Univ.), Mar. 19, 2009, http://www.dukechronicle. 
com/article/no-easy-solution-grade-inflation-exists-some-say (last visited Feb. 3, 
2013) (noting that the Duke academic departments that voted against Valen E. 
Johnson’s grade indexing proposal all gave higher than average grades, while 
the departments that voted in favor almost all gave lower than average grades) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 125. See Romer, supra note 116, at 237 
A liberal arts university that has a fixed investment in faculty who 
teach in areas outside of the sciences and that faces internal political 
pressures to maintain the relative sizes of different departments may 
respond to this pressure by making it more difficult for students to 
complete a degree in science. Faculty in the departments that teach 
the basic science courses will be happy to “keep professional 
standards high” and thereby keep teaching loads down. Faculty in 
other departments will be happy to make study in their departments 
more attractive, for example by inflating the average grade given in 
their courses. 
Donald G. Freeman, Grade Divergence as a Market Outcome, 30 J. ECON. EDUC. 
344, 344 (1999) (arguing that universities adjust their grading distributions to 
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Instruction in any area with attractive career opportunities 
outside academia—whether in medicine, law, business, or certain 
STEM fields—will be relatively expensive. Those with talent in 
such fields have attractive employment opportunities in the 
private sector or government, and those who agree to forgo those 
opportunities to teach at universities must therefore be offered 
higher wages than other professors.126  
Undergraduate students usually pay the same tuition price 
per credit regardless of what they study,127 so students who are 
willing to study subjects with limited value in the labor market 
                                                                                                     
channel students away from classes that are overcrowded relative to supply of 
qualified instructors and toward courses in which teaching capacity is 
underutilized). 
 126. See, e.g., RICHARD B. FREEMAN, THE MARKET FOR COLLEGE-TRAINED 
MANPOWER: A STUDY IN THE ECONOMICS OF CAREER CHOICE 165–67 (1971) 
(documenting shortages of faculty in high-demand fields in the United States in 
the 1960s when academic norms called for roughly equal pay across disciplines); 
GARY RHODES, MANAGED PROFESSIONALS: UNIONIZED FACULTY AND 
RESTRUCTURING ACADEMIC LABOR 75 (1998) (“The pattern of salary dispersion by 
field suggests that academic managers have been willing and able to respond to 
field-defined labor markets.”); Ronald Ehrenberg, Hirschel Kasper & Daniel 
Rees, Faculty Turnover at American Colleges and Universities: Analyses of 
AAUP Data, 10 ECON. EDUC. REV. 99, 99–110 (1991) (presenting data confirming 
the importance of salary to faculty retention); Faculty Salaries Vary by 
Institution Type, Discipline, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 11, 2011 (presenting 
data showing that faculty salaries are highest in law, business, economics, 
computer science, engineering, and health science, and lowest in performing 
arts, education, and the humanities); MIKE HORSLEY, ET AL., DEP’T OF EDUC., 
EMP’T & WORKPLACE RELATIONS, Salary Relatives and the Academic Labour 
Market 47–79 (2003) (documenting Australian universities’ difficulty hiring 
faculty when candidates were qualified for more highly paid private sector work, 
especially in finance and business, science, engineering, and information 
technology). 
 127. A few public universities charge a higher price for courses or majors in 
high cost, high value areas such as business or engineering, in part because 
these areas are expensive and state legislatures have refused to approve general 
tuition increases. There is some anecdotal evidence suggesting that differential 
tuition has reduced the likelihood that low-income students will study toward 
high value degrees. Universities that charge differential tuition or fees include 
the University of Wisconsin, Rutgers, the University of Illinois, the University of 
Kansas, and the University of Nebraska. See Jonathan D. Glater, Certain 
Degrees Now Cost More at Public Universities, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/29/education/29tuition.html?pagewanted=all&
_r=0 (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
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may be more profitable to teach than students who insist on 
instruction with higher value in the labor market (i.e., 
engineering, business, or health science).128 Universities can use 
grades or higher student-to-faculty ratios to channel students 
away from fields in which instruction is expensive.129  
Higher student-to-faculty ratios in STEM fields detract from 
the quality of instruction in these fields. Students in STEM 
majors are less likely to complete their degrees in four or five 
years, and frequently complain about inadequate academic 
support.130 
As discussed in greater detail below, the government could 
counteract these perverse incentives through risk-based pricing, 
which would create constructive financial incentives for both 
students and universities. Students who persisted in challenging, 
high-value majors would be rewarded with lower interest rates 
and a lower total cost of education. Universities that channeled 
more students toward fields with high value in the labor market 
would find their “institutional interest rate” decrease, which 
would encourage prospective students to matriculate and 
increase university revenues. By contrast, students or 
universities that devoted resources toward low-value instruction 
would find their interest rates increase and their resources 
shrink. 
                                                                                                     
 128. See BOK, supra note 10, at 41 (“Universities may offer worthless 
instruction because of . . . financial pressure.”). 
 129. See Achen & Courant, supra note 113, at 78, 89 (arguing that 
universities adjust their grading distributions to channel students away from 
classes that are overcrowded relative to supply of qualified instructors and 
toward courses in which teaching capacity is underutilized); Freeman, supra 
note 125, at 344 (same). 
 130. See Hurtado et al., supra note 115 (stating that STEM majors have 
lower rates of degree completion than other college majors); Assia Boundauli, 
Why Would-be Engineers End Up as English Majors, CNN (May 21, 2011, 10:16 
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/05/17/education.stem.graduation/index.html 
(last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (“Science and math programs are designed and taught 
to winnow down the number of students. University tenure systems often 
reward professors who conduct research and publish their work, but not those 
who teach well.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
Christopher Drew, Why Science Majors Change Their Mind, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 
2011, at ED16 (citing difficult coursework, intense competition, and grade 
inflation in non-STEM majors as reasons for the high attrition rate in STEM 
degree programs). 
582 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527 (2013) 
The federal government could also help universities obtain 
the resources they need to hire more qualified instructors in high 
demand, labor-market-relevant fields by boosting federal student 
loan limits. At a minimum, loan limits could be increased for 
students who are studying toward high-income, low 
unemployment careers, so that universities can obtain the 
revenues they need to offer competitive salaries to qualified 
instructors in these fields.131  
But if universities are student-customer driven, why do 
students not already demand more instruction in fields that will 
prepare them better for the labor market? One possibility is that 
students prefer to enjoy a leisurely college experience and are 
relatively indifferent to the long-term financial consequences.132 
A second possibility is that liberal arts majors correctly perceive 
that maximizing their undergraduate GPA will improve their 
chances of admission to an elite graduate program that will 
ultimately boost their long term income, and are more willing or 
able than STEM majors to delay entering the labor force.133 And 
indeed, some labor economists have suggested that studies 
                                                                                                     
 131. Cash-strapped colleges have already started to charge students more 
for high-demand classes. See Jordan Weissman, The Future of College: The 
Biggest Classes Are the Most Expensive, ATLANTIC, Mar. 16, 2012, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/03/the-future-of-college-the -
biggest-classes-are-the-most-expensive/254589 (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 132. See supra note 97 (presenting evidence that many students place high 
value on leisure and personal enjoyment both during and after college). 
 133. Eric Eide & Geetha Waehrer, The Role of Option Value of College 
Attendance in College Major Choice, 17 ECON. EDUC. REV. 73, 73 (1998) 
(“[A]necdotal evidence suggests that many students choose to major in fields 
never intending to terminate their education with an undergraduate degree, but 
rather they intend to enroll in professional or academic graduate programs.”); 
Kimberly A. Goyette & Ann L. Mullen, Who Studies the Arts and Sciences? 
Social Background and the Choice and Consequences of Undergraduate Field of 
Study, 77 J. HIGHER EDUC. 497, 524–27 (2006) (reporting that lower 
socioeconomic status students are more likely to choose vocational majors and 
more likely to be employed in higher paying jobs four years after graduation, 
while higher socioeconomic status liberal arts majors are more likely to enroll in 
graduate school, which may lead to higher long-term incomes); Johnson, supra 
note 118, at 251–52 (“For those students whose primary objective is to gain 
admittance to medical school or law school . . . ‘grade shopping’ may represent 
an optimal career strategy.”). 
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focusing on wages and employment at graduation undervalue 
humanities and social science degrees relative to engineering and 
business degrees because they ignore the option value 
nonvocational degrees confer by facilitating enrollment in 
graduate school.134 A third possibility is that students do not have 
good information about the labor market until it is too late. 
C. Many Students May Not Understand the Connection Between 
Their Chosen Course of Study and Future Income and 
Employment Prospects 
Students—who are by definition still learning about their 
chosen field—may not have accurate information about post-
graduation employment prospects and wages in their own or 
other fields. Empirical studies have documented systematic 
mistakes in undergraduate students’ perceptions about 
prospective wages by college major and occupation. According to 
                                                                                                     
 134. Eide & Waehrer, supra note 133, at 74, 77 (arguing that humanities 
and social science degrees may prepare students for a wider range of graduate 
schools than engineering, computer science, or business degrees and therefore 
have higher option value). The investigators only analyzed the probability of 
attending graduate school conditional on a certain choice of major, not the type 
of graduate school attended or wages after completion of graduate school. 
The assumption that social science and humanities degrees are 
undervalued on a relative basis may not hold in the absence of grade inflation 
(which may improve chances of admission to elite programs) or with more 
nuanced analysis of different types of graduate degrees or post-graduate-school 
wages. At least with respect to professional schools, graduate students with 
undergraduate backgrounds in business, economics, or STEM seem to have 
considerable advantages. See, e.g., Black et al., supra note 18, at 365–66 (finding 
that economics majors make more money than most other majors when they 
enter the work force directly after graduation, and economics majors who attend 
law or business schools have higher wages than those who majored in other 
fields, except for MBAs with undergraduate degrees in Chemical Engineering).  
Law students with technical backgrounds may find it easier to specialize in 
high-wage, high-demand areas of legal practice, such as patents, tax, 
bankruptcy, commercial law, healthcare regulation, energy regulation, financial 
regulation, or other technical fields. Business students who can manage 
engineers, evaluate technical companies, or analyze large data sets seem to be 
in higher demand than those with soft skills such as communications or 
marketing. And medical school requires that students have scientific 
backgrounds. 
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one study of undergraduates at the University of California at 
San Diego, students typically mistake expected wages by 20%.135 
According to another study of male undergraduates at Duke, 
students typically overestimate wages in their own field, and 
7.5% of students would switch majors if they optimally forecasted 
wages.136 It should be noted that this study controlled for the 
influence of students’ abilities and career preferences on choice of 
major.137  
Studies also suggest that students generally learn about 
labor market prospects a year or so before graduation—too late to 
easily change majors.138 Students are better informed of starting 
salaries than about potential increases,139 and might 
overestimate the importance of starting salary relative to lifetime 
earnings. Disconcertingly, there is evidence that the students 
who know the least about major and occupational wage 
differences are those from poor families.140 This is not due to 
lower ability levels of less wealthy students; the investigators 
suggest it may be because such students have fewer college-
educated relatives and friends who can inform them about the 
                                                                                                     
 135. Julian R. Betts, What Do Students Know About Wages? Evidence from a 
Survey of Undergraduates, 31 J. HUM. RESOURCES 27, 49 (1996). 
 136. See Peter Arcidiacono, V. Joseph Hotz & Songman Kang, Modeling 
College Major Choice Using Elicited Measures Expectations and 
Counterfactuals, 1–2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
15729, 2010), http://www.nber.org/papers/w15729.pdf  
[S]tudents think the market premium is higher for their own major 
compared to those for majors they did not choose. . . . We estimate 
that over 7.5% of students would switch majors if this forecast error 
was not present. Thus, our results suggest an important role for 
informational differences in modeling the choice of college major. 
 137. See id. (“Our model-based estimates clearly indicate that expected 
earnings do matter for student’s choice of major, even after controlling for 
ability and career preferences.”). 
 138. See Betts, supra note 135, at 47–48 (reporting that students do not 
acquire most of their knowledge about wages until their final year of education). 
 139. See id. at 39 (“Students’ knowledge of salaries of younger workers is 
quite good, but becomes progressively worse as the experience of the worker in 
question increases.”). 
 140. See id. at 37–38, 43. All students surveyed were enrolled at UCSD. Id. 
at 29. The authors controlled for ability as measured by GPA, and even after 
controlling for GPA, students from lower income families were less 
knowledgeable about occupational wages. Id. at 35–36, 43. 
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labor market for college-educated workers. Students are not 
simply uninformed, but in some instances, they are actively 
misled by aggressive and deceptive recruiting efforts.141  
Studies have demonstrated that students choose their major 
based largely—but not exclusively—on expected post-graduation 
wages.142 Many students would switch to majors linked to higher 
                                                                                                     
 141. See Braucher, supra note 71 at 471 (noting market failures caused by 
information asymmetries and aggressive sales and marketing tactics by for-
profit higher education institutions); Frontline, College, Inc.: The Sales and 
Marketing Story, PBS (Apr. 4, 2010), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ 
teach/collegeinc/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (detailing the marketing practices of 
for-profit higher education institutions and the debt accrued by their students) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Frontline, Educating 
Sergeant Pantzke, PBS (June 28, 2011), http://www. 
pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/educating-sergeant-pantzke/ (last visited Feb. 3, 
2013) (describing for-profit colleges’ efforts to recruit military veterans) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also GREGORY D. KUTZ, GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., FOR PROFIT COLLEGES: UNDERCOVER TESTING FINDS 
COLLEGES ENCOURAGED FRAUD AND ENGAGED IN DECEPTIVE AND QUESTIONABLE 
MARKETING PRACTICES 1 (2010) (“Undercover tests at 15 for-profit colleges found 
that 4 colleges encouraged fraudulent practices and that all 15 made deceptive 
or otherwise questionable statements to GAO’s undercover applicants.”). But cf. 
Nick Anderson, GAO Revises its Report Critical of Practices at For-Profit 
Schools, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/12/07/AR2010120707412.html?sid=ST2010120800393 
(last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (noting that the report was revised to correct errors 
and softened) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
It is unclear if marketing abuses also occur at non-profit institutions. Sales 
and marketing efforts appear to be more aggressive in the for-profit sector, 
which spends an average of 23% of revenue on sales and marketing compared to 
0.5% in the nonprofit sector. See Emma Roller, Senate Bill Would Bar Colleges 
from Using Federal Student Aid for Marketing, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 
18, 2012. 
A study by the Government Accountability Office suggested that after 
controlling for student characteristics, graduates of for-profit institutions 
generally have worse outcomes, although some for-profit programs performed 
well. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION: STUDENT 
OUTCOMES VARY AT FOR-PROFIT, NONPROFIT, AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS 5–8 (2011) 
(comparing graduation rates, employment outcomes, student loan debt, default 
rates, and licensing exam results of students graduating from for-profit, 
nonprofit, and public institutions).  
 142. See Richard J. Cebula & Jerry Slopes, Determinants of Student Choice 
of Undergraduate Major Field, 19 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 303, 303 (1982) (presenting 
evidence that “earnings differentials among fields and differences in the rate of 
change in earnings among fields are the most important factors in the student’s 
decision”); Claude Montmarquette, Kathy Cannings & Sophie Mahseredjian, 
How Do Young People Choose College Majors?, 21 ECON. EDUC. REV. 543, 554 
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post-graduation wages if students had more accurate and timely 
information.143 Expected wages play a particularly important role 
in major choice for students from low socioeconomic status 
backgrounds.144 Choosing the right major could help poor 
students use education to achieve upward socioeconomic mobility.  
Recently, there have been several attempts to make the 
education and labor markets more transparent. These include 
data supplied for free by the U.S. Departments of Labor and 
Education,145 new “scorecards” and “shopping sheets” for 
educational institutions,146 and entrepreneurial efforts to make 
labor market information more accessible.  
As discussed in greater detail below, risk-based pricing of 
student loans could help make wages and employment prospects 
more transparent and salient to students at an earlier stage in 
their educational careers. 
                                                                                                     
(2002) (“[C]hoice of college concentration depends decisively on the expected 
earnings in a particular concentration.”). But see Peter Arcidiacono, Ability 
Sorting and the Returns to College Major, 121 J. ECONOMETRICS 344, 372 (2004) 
(finding that the wage premium for certain college majors does not drive 
students of higher ability to select those majors as much as student subject 
matter preferences). 
 143. See Arcidiacono, Hotz & Kang, supra note 136, at 2–3 (stating that 
many students would switch their majors if they had more accurate salary 
information). 
 144. See Kimberly A. Goyette & Ann L. Mullen, supra note 133, at 524–27 
(reporting that low socioeconomic status students are more likely to choose 
vocational majors and more likely to be employed in higher paying jobs four 
years after graduation, while higher socioeconomic status liberal arts majors are 
more likely to enroll in graduate school); Yingyi Ma, Family Socioeconomic 
Status, Parental Involvement, and College Major Choices—Gender, 
Race/Ethnic, and Nativity Patterns, 52 SOC. PERSP. 211, 211 (2009) (finding that 
lower socioeconomic students favor more lucrative majors compared to higher 
socioeconomic status students). 
 145. See Research and Statistics, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
http://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/landing.jhtml (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (providing 
links to research and statistics on educational programs and job markets) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 146. What College Students Need to Know, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2012, at 
A18. 
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D. Skilled Labor Markets Suffer from Periodic Booms and Busts 
Students generally do not have good information with which 
to forecast the likelihood of employment in a given field.147 
Without a good forecast of decisions by employers (the demand 
side) and knowledge of how many other students are studying 
toward a particular field (the supply side), such prediction is 
difficult if not impossible. Instead, students appear to assume 
that the future will resemble the present.  
This assumption and the long production lag for skilled labor 
leads to boom and bust cycles in the labor market known as 
“cobweb” cycles.148 At the start of the cycle, many students seek to 
study toward a high-income occupation. Years later, when they 
all simultaneously try to enter the labor force, the large supply of 
labor causes wages to crash in their occupation. In the second 
stage of the cycle, students choosing an occupation at the time of 
the crash then avoid training for the newly low income 
occupation, and years later, there will be a shortage of labor for 
that occupation, causing wages to rise and the cycle to repeat.  
Cobweb cycles have been demonstrated in a wide range of 
skilled labor markets, including markets for engineers, lawyers, 
scientists, and professors. The number of years in the cycle is 
                                                                                                     
 147. See infra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 148. See ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER: RISK IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 132 (2003) (explaining the concept of cobweb cycles); FREEMAN, supra 
note 126, at 22–26 (outlining the cobweb cycle theory); Richard B. Freeman, 
Supply and Salary Adjustments to the Changing Science Manpower Market: 
Physics, 1948–1973, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 27, 38 (1975) (“[L]arge numbers of 
physics graduates create a market setting likely to reduce enrollments and 
future degrees in the field in accord with the cobweb scenario.”); Richard B. 
Freeman, Legal Cobwebs: A Recursive Model of the Market for New Lawyers, 57 
REV. ECON. & STAT. 171, 173–75 (1975) (applying the cobweb model to the legal 
market); Richard B. Freeman, A Cobweb Model of the Supply and Starting 
Salary of New Engineers, 29 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 236, 248 (1976) (applying 
the cobweb model to the market for engineers); Christoph Engel & Hanjo 
Hamann, The Hog-Cycle of Law Professors (Max Planck Inst. for Research on 
the Collective Good, Working Paper No. 2012/8, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2046484 (documenting an 
eight-year cycle for German law professors); cf. Gary A. Zarkin, Cobweb Versus 
Rational Expectations Models: Lessons from the Market for Public School 
Teachers, 13 ECON. LETTERS 87, 87 (1983) (arguing that “cobweb” effects can be 
explained within a rational expectations model of occupational choice). 
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typically proportional to the number of years of advanced 
training required to enter the profession. 
E. Skills Mismatches Reduce Employment and Output 
Mismatches between skills and employment opportunities 
lead to an inefficient reduction in productivity and higher 
unemployment.149 Economists at the Federal Reserve have 
estimated that the mismatch between worker skills and employer 
needs accounts for more than one-fourth of unemployment in the 
United States.150 When employment opportunities are available 
but workers lack the required skills, the resulting reduction in 
employment is called “structural unemployment.” 
As will be discussed below, even educational institutions 
themselves may not always have good information about the 
labor market or the resources to acquire that information. Some 
of the best information, such as confidential tax or social security 
records—which may have more accurate wage data than 
surveys—may only be available to or acquirable by the 
government. 
Because the U.S. government’s role in the higher education 
market is primarily as a lender,151 risk-based pricing of federal 
student loans may offer the best approach to reconcile traditional 
academic values with the goals of a more transparent and 
                                                                                                     
 149. See AUGUSTE ET AL., supra note 112, at 57 (“[E]mployers still have 
trouble finding workers with specific skills. And many students lack a clear 
picture of which jobs and skills will be in high demand.”); Robert Shimer, 
Mismatch, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1074, 1074 (2007) (arguing that geographic 
attachment and skills mismatch contribute to structural unemployment). 
 150. See Narayana Kocherlakota, President, Fed. Res. Bank of Minneapolis, 
President’s Speech at Missoula, Montana: Back Inside the FOMC (Sept. 8, 
2010), available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/news_events/pres/speech_ 
display.cfm?id=4532 (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (“How much of the current 
unemployment rate is really due to mismatch? The answer seems to be a lot. 
[With better matching] we would have an unemployment rate closer to 6.5 
percent, not 9.6 percent. . . . [O]ver 2.5 percentage points of the current 
unemployment rate is attributable to mismatch.”). 
 151. See ANNE PRISCO ET AL., THE ALLIANCE FOR INT’L HIGHER EDUC. POLICY 
STUDIES, FEDERAL POLICIES AND HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 12 
(2002) (“Student financial assistance is at the core of federal strategies for 
influencing higher education priorities and outcomes.”). 
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efficient labor market, higher wages, and lower structural 
unemployment. 
V. The Theory of Risk-Based Credit Pricing 
Lenders are not like ordinary retail merchants. Whereas a 
merchant can complete a transaction at the time of sale, a lender 
will have an ongoing relationship with the borrower for the entire 
duration of the loan. The lender continues to bear risk that at 
some point the borrower will become unable to repay and will 
default on the debt.152 
Risk-based credit pricing involves adjusting the interest rate 
on loans so that the interest rate compensates the lender not only 
for the time value of money,153 but also for the risk that borrowers 
will default on their debts and cause the lender to incur losses.  
                                                                                                     
 152. Default refers to late payment or partial or complete failure to repay. 
Defaults can be distinguished from one another by their severity, or the losses to 
the lender in the event of default, which can range from 0% to 100% of the loan 
value. See Understanding Default, FEDERAL STUDENT AID, http://studentaid.ed. 
gov/repay-loans/default (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (defining and explaining 
default and its consequences) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 153. The time value of money is the idea that the value of money is higher in 
the present than in the future, either because money today could be invested to 
produce profit in the future, or because people tend to prefer instant 
gratification and would generally rather consume the same good or service now 
rather than in the future. See Michael Simkovic & Benjamin Kaminetzky, 
Leveraged Buyout Bankruptcies, the Problem of Hindsight Bias, and the Credit 
Default Swap Solution, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 188, 188 n.214 (explaining the 
time value of money concept). 
The time value of money is a broader concept than inflation, which refers to 
general changes in price levels, so that a dollar at one point in time will not 
purchase the same basket of goods and services in the future. Inflation is 
generally positive (i.e., the value of money declines over time). However, even 
with zero inflation, there would still be a positive time value of money because 
of the prospect of real (after-inflation) profitable investments and because of 
preferences for present consumption. 
The time value of money is typically measured as the interest rate charged 
to a hypothetical debtor with no risk of defaulting, also called the risk-free rate. 
Although no debtor is completely risk-free, the risk-free rate for dollar-
denominated loans is typically assumed to be the rate of interest on U.S. 
government securities. See id. at 188–89; Joost Driessen, Is Default Event Risk 
Priced in Corporate Bonds?, 18 REV. FIN. STUD. 165, 169 (2005) (noting that U.S. 
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From the perspective of risk-based credit pricing, uniform 
student loan pricing is a redistributive policy. Uniform pricing 
subsidizes the riskiest borrowers while profiting from the safest 
borrowers. In the student loan context, uniform credit pricing is a 
subsidy to students who are studying fields with the lowest value 
in the labor market and a tax on students who are studying fields 
with the highest value in the labor market and the best 
employment prospects.154 This subsidy creates perverse 
incentives—discouraging the most able students and most 
economically valuable programs, while encouraging the highest 
risk and least economically valuable programs. 
Risk-based student loan pricing should reduce moral hazard 
by forcing student borrowers to internalize the risks created by 
their own decisions, encouraging students to study toward high-
value occupations. Risk-based student loan pricing should reduce 
adverse selection by discouraging students with poor prospects 
from borrowing heavily to attend expensive education programs 
of dubious value, while encouraging the most promising students 
to borrow what they need to complete valuable degrees. 
Moreover, risk-based pricing would clarify the differential 
economic value of different courses of study, and help students 
make choices that are in their own long-term best interests. 
Over time, risk-based student loan pricing should cause 
colleges to shift educational resources toward teaching subjects 
                                                                                                     
Treasury bonds are assumed to be default-free); Francis A. Longstaff, Sanjay 
Mithal & Eric Neis, Corporate Yield Spreads: Default Risk or Liquidity? New 
Evidence from the Credit Default Swap Market, 60 J. FIN. 2213, 2223 (2005) 
(“[T]he Treasury curve . . . is the standard benchmark riskless curve in most 
empirical tests in finance.”); Robert C. Merton, On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: 
The Risk Structure of Interest Rates, 29 J. FIN. 449, 449 (1974) (noting that 
government bonds are essentially default-risk-free). For example, for a 10-year 
student loan, the yield on a 10-year Treasury bond might be used as the risk-
free rate. 
 154. To be more precise, uniform pricing is a subsidy to those with the 
highest risk of default and a tax on those with the lowest risk of default. 
However, because students who need to borrow generally come from middle 
class backgrounds, and will therefore rely on their future labor income (or their 
spouse’s labor income) to repay their student loans, risk will in practice 
generally turn on career prospects. See JAQUELINE E. KING, FINANCING A 
COLLEGE EDUCATION: HOW IT WORKS, HOW IT’S CHANGING 27 (1999). 
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and skills that are most valued in the labor market.155 This 
should improve the risk profile of borrowers, and reduce student 
loan defaults and structural unemployment.  
Some may argue that wages in the labor market do not 
reflect the social value of certain occupations.156 For example, 
progressives frequently claim that teachers are 
undercompensated relative to their education levels and social 
contribution.157 Indeed, the original NDEA158 emphasized the 
importance of training more teachers as well as STEM 
specialists, and current student loan programs include special 
loan forgiveness provisions for teachers.159 By contrast, many 
economists have suggested that an individual’s willingness to 
sacrifice income to pursue less lucrative education and linked 
career paths suggests that such education or career paths may be 
more enjoyable and constitute a form of nonmonetary 
compensation.160  
                                                                                                     
 155. The transition may be gradual because the institution of tenure limits 
the flexibility of academic staffing. However, to the extent that untenured 
faculty, adjunct faculty, or graduate students teach classes in low-value fields, 
universities could adjust and reallocate resources toward higher value fields 
fairly rapidly. 
 156. See, e.g., EILIS LAWLOR, HELEN KERSLEY, SUSAN STEED & MARTIN 
COTTINGHAM, NEW ECON. FOUND., A BIT RICH: CALCULATING THE REAL VALUE TO 
SOCIETY OF DIFFERENT PROFESSIONS 27–28 (2009) (arguing that not all highly 
compensated occupations generate social value); Warren, Baum & Sitaraman, 
supra note 65, at 132–36 (advocating the value of military and civil service). 
 157. See LAWRENCE MISHEL, SYLVIA A. ALLEGRETTO & SEAN P. CORCORAN, 
ECON. POL’Y INST., THE TEACHING PENALTY: AN UPDATE THROUGH 2010 (2011) 
(arguing that teacher salaries are too low to attract top-performing graduates). 
There is little controversy that teacher compensation in the United States is not 
sufficient to attract and retain many top-performing college graduates. Whether 
the current workforce of teachers is “undercompensated” relative to its 
contributions is a separate question. 
 158. See National Defense Education Act of 1958, Title VIII, § 802, Pub. L. 
No. 85-864, 72 Stat. 1580, 1597–98 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
20 U.S.C.) (“Funds paid to a State under this title for area vocational education 
programs may be used, in carrying out such programs . . . for . . . maintenance of 
adequate programs of administration, supervision, and teacher-training . . . .”). 
 159. See Teacher Loan Forgiveness, FEDERAL STUDENT AID, http://student 
aid.ed.gov/repay-loans/forgiveness-cancellation/charts/teacher#what-are-the-eli 
gibility (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 160. See Annette Alstadsæter, Measuring the Consumption Value of 
 
592 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527 (2013) 
However, if public sector workers are undercompensated, 
questions remain about whether public sector compensation 
should be increased through taxpayer-funded loan subsidies or 
through a taxpayer-funded increase in starting salaries for 
college graduates entering public service.  
Risk-based pricing does not demand a rigid embrace of 
laissez-faire. In every developed economy, both markets and 
governments set wages. If wages for public sector occupations are 
below socially optimal values, then this reflects a failure by 
governments to set taxes and spending at appropriate levels. If 
wages in socially destructive occupations are high, this reflects a 
failure of regulation and taxation to punish socially destructive 
behavior and channel profits toward productive activity. Risk-
based student loan pricing does not create any of these failures—
it simply reflects the current reality of U.S. political economy, 
and provides information and incentives to help college students 
navigate a challenging labor market. 
To reject risk-based pricing outright in favor of uniform 
student loan pricing, one would have to believe that all low 
compensation occupations have positive externalities, all high 
compensation occupations have negative externalities, and that 
these externalities precisely match differences in wages and 
employability. In other words, one would have to believe that 
wage differentials are not only inefficient, but are the exact 
opposite of the efficient distribution of wages, and everyone with 
a college degree should earn the same income.  
Furthermore, one would have to assume that supply-side 
subsidies such as low student loan interest rates are preferable to 
targeted demand-side subsidies such as higher taxpayer-funded 
wages for specific occupations.161   
                                                                                                     
Education, 57 CESIFO ECON. STUD. 458, 468 (2010) (measuring the consumption 
value of education based on the expected income sacrificed by high ability 
students who attended teachers college in Norway in the 1960s instead of 
business school, and finding that students typically were willing to sacrifice 10–
30% of their lifetime incomes); Annette Alstadsæter & Hans Henrik Sievertsen, 
The Consumption Value of Higher Education, (CESifo, Working Paper No. 2871, 
2009) (finding that after controlling for ability, U.S. liberal arts college majors 
sacrifice 46% of their potential income in order to enjoy the consumption value 
of a liberal arts education). 
 161. Whereas demand-side subsidies would help workers to capture the 
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There are many reasons to favor demand-side subsidies 
(higher wages) over lower interest rates. Loan subsidies would 
effectively increase public sector pay only for workers with 
student loans. Public sector employers might try to capture part 
of this subsidy by reducing entry-level base salary, thereby 
making public sector careers relatively less attractive to 
graduates who have no debts. Loan subsidies could 
unintentionally funnel the children of the poor into low paying 
public sector careers and affluent graduates into private sector 
careers with better long-term earnings. Such career sorting risks 
exacerbating class divisions and reducing social mobility.  
By contrast, increased public service starting salaries would 
equally encourage students with debts and those without to enter 
public service. This could improve the quality of public service 
personnel by making such jobs attractive to a wider range of 
qualified applicants, increasing competition for public service 
jobs. It could also help prevent public service careers from 
becoming segregated along class divisions.  
If certain occupations are “undercompensated,” then 
governments should increase compensation using the tax and 
spending power.162 Risk-based student loan pricing simply 
reflects the willingness—or unwillingness—of market 
participants and governments to pay for services, and channels 
human capital to where it is valued most. Indeed, governments 
may have no choice but to increase public sector compensation if 
college students become savvier about prospective wages in 
different occupations and refuse to accept low-wage (but 
supposedly valued) positions.  
                                                                                                     
social benefits they arguably provide, subsidies that increase the supply of 
workers entering particular occupations help maintain low wages in those 
fields. See Douglas S. Massey, The Social and Economic Origins of Immigration, 
510 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 60, 64 (1990). 
 162. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay 
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for 
the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States . . . .”). 
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A. A Simple Risk-Based Credit Pricing Model 
Consider the following simplified example of risk-based 
credit pricing, adapted from Michael Simkovic & Benjamin 
Kaminetzky, Leveraged Buyout Bankruptcies, the Problem of 
Hindsight Bias and the Credit Default Swap Solution.163 
Assumptions are listed below. 
• Each group wants to borrow $100,000 
• Each borrower borrows the same amount 
of money 
• There are no transaction costs or 
administrative costs 
• All payments and defaults are made at 
the end of year 1 
• The relevant risk-free rate is 3% per year 
• The lender is risk-neutral and not 
subject to liquidity risk 
• 6+ 
• The lender can borrow at the risk-free 
rate 
• Group A  
o Borrowers in Group A will repay 
their loans in full.  
• Group B 
o Ten percent of the borrowers in 
Group B will default on their loans in 
the first year, while 90% of the 
borrowers in Group B will repay 
their loans in full.  
o The Group B borrowers who default 
will repay 70% of the balance of their 
loans. 
Group A is risk-free. If the lender were to lend to Group A 
borrowers at 3%, the lender would end the year with $103,000 
($100,000 in principal repayment plus $3000 in interest 
payments). This would exactly match the lender’s cost of capital 
and—in the absence of any administrative costs—would cause 
                                                                                                     
 163. 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 118, 188–94, 218–21 (2011).  
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the lender to break even. At any price above 3% interest, the 
lender would make a profit, and at any price below 3%, the lender 
would lose money. 
Lending to Group B involves credit risk, but there is an 
interest rate at which the lender should be indifferent between 
lending to Group A or Group B. Specifically, there is an interest 
rate at which the lender would expect to have the same $103,000 
at the end of the year after lending to Group B. The expected value 
of the loan to Group B is the sum of the repayments by the 90% of 
creditors who will repay their loans in full and the repayments by 
the 10% who will default on their debts and only repay 70% of 
their loans. For the 90% who will repay, the lender will receive 
$90,000  (1 + the interest rate). For the 10% who will default, the 
lender will receive $10,000  0.7  (1 + the interest rate). Solving 
for the interest rate that will enable the lender to earn $103,000, 
we get ($103,000 - $97,000) / $97,000 = 6.19%. 
Under simplified assumptions,164 the formula for calculating 
the break-even interest rate could be rewritten as:  	 1 	1 1 
(Eq. 1)  
in which: 
i = break-even interest rate  
r = risk-free rate  
D = probability of default in year 1  
(1 – D) = probability of no default in year 1  
L = loss rate given default; (1 – L) = recovery rate165 
                                                                                                     
 164. In practice, the formula for calculating the break-even interest rate will 
be somewhat more complicated for a number of reasons. First, every loan 
program will entail some administrative and other transactions costs, and these 
costs must be recovered either through fees, interest spreads, or some other 
source of revenue. Second, student loans last for more than one year. The 
probability of default may be higher in some years than in others, and the loss 
rate given default for any given loan will generally go down over time as the 
borrower repays the principal. Third, there is an interaction between the 
interest rate charged and the probability of default; all else being equal, a 
higher interest rate will increase the probability that the borrower will default, 
while a lower interest rate will reduce the probability of default by making 
payments more affordable.  
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The break-even interest rate is an important concept because 
it helps us understand whether a student loan, priced at a 
particular level, is a budget-neutral transaction, a profit center 
for the government/taxpayer, or a subsidy to the student 
borrower. Risk-based pricing does not rely on perfectly accurate 
predictions for individuals, but rather predictions that more or 
less hold statistically true for groups of borrowers. 
B. Data-Driven Risk-Based Pricing 
At a technical level, the question is as follows: what 
readily observable characteristics can be used, individually or 
in combination with one another, to explain variation in loan 
defaults and loss rates? Multivariate statistical methods such 
as ordinary least squares regression (OLS) can be used to build 
a model that predicts loan losses.166  
An analyst would load panel data consisting of individual 
loans into statistical software. Each loan would be associated 
with observable characteristics of the borrowers at the time the 
loan was extended, called predictors—for example college 
major, class rank, standardized test scores, geographic 
location, type of school attended, expected debt-to-income 
ratios at graduation—and the eventual outcome—that is, did 
the borrower default on the loan, and if so, what percent of the 
loan did the lender lose.  
The result of OLS is a mathematical equation of the 
following form: 	. . . 	  
(Eq. 2) 
                                                                                                     
 165. The Department of Education estimates its recovery rate on defaulted 
loans, after taking into account collection costs and the time value of money, as 
between 75% and 82%. DEP’T OF EDUC., STUDENT LOANS OVERVIEW, FISCAL YEAR 
2013 BUDGET REQUEST, at R-31 (2012). This high recovery rate may be due in 
part to the limits on bankruptcy discharge and extensive mechanisms available 
to collect defaulted federal student loans. In Equation 1, L therefore can be 
assumed to be between 0.18 and 0.25. 
 166. Alternately, a logit or probit model could be used because the value of 
E(DL) should always be between 0 and 1.  
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in which:  
E(DL) is the predicted loss as a percent of the loan (after 
taking into account the time value of money) 
x is the value of each predictor (1 through n) 
n is the number of predictors 
b is the value of each coefficient (1 through n) which 
describes the direction and magnitude of the relationship 
between the predictor and losses. 
e is the error term. 
The value determined in equation 2 can be plugged into 
equation 1 as (  to price the interest rate on the loan. This 
analysis is purely technical and data driven. The only assumption 
is that the future will look like the period of time during which 
the loans in the panel data were extended and tracked.  
Empirically validated predictors, and ethical considerations 
regarding the use of certain predictors, are discussed in detail in 
Part V. Because some predictors of default are beyond students’ 
control, or relate to hallmarks of disadvantage, using them to 
price student loans would undermine the federal student lending 
programs’ policy goals of providing equal opportunity and upward 
mobility. 
C. Risk-Based Pricing Is Not Necessarily the Same as Market-
Based Pricing 
Risk-based pricing as used in this Article has a precise 
definition that mathematically connects pricing to risk; it is not 
simply the price that a private lender would charge in an 
unregulated market. The goal of private lenders is to maximize 
profit, and this entails charging the highest price possible 
without losing too much volume or taking on too much risk. To 
the extent that consumer credit markets are less than perfectly 
efficient and price competitive, and demand for credit is inelastic, 
private lenders should have opportunities to charge prices that 
are higher than those required to compensate them for risk.  This 
is what Alan M. White refers to as “opportunity pricing.”167  
                                                                                                     
 167. Alan M. White, Risk-Based Mortgage Pricing: Present and Future 
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Consumer credit markets may be less than perfectly efficient 
because of complicated contractual terms or fee structures, 
information asymmetries, limited mathematical skill of 
borrowers, liquidity issues, or transaction or search costs.168 
Empirical studies have demonstrated limited price competition in 
the mortgage and credit card markets,169 and it is probably safe 
to assume that pricing is also less than perfectly competitive in 
the private student loan market.  
Journalists have documented efforts by some private student 
lenders to pay college financial aid officers to steer students 
toward specific lenders—that is, efforts to compete other than by 
providing credit to borrowers at the lowest price and on the best 
terms.170 Complaints collected by the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau suggest that some debtors who borrowed from 
private student lenders were not aware that they were eligible for 
lower cost federal loans.171  
                                                                                                     
Research, 15 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 503, 504–05 (2004), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1012445 (arguing that subprime 
mortgage lenders engage in “opportunity pricing” rather than efficient risk-based 
pricing and have exploited market inefficiencies to charge fees and interest rates 
that exceed what can be justified based on risk-related costs).  
 168. See id.; Patricia A. McCoy, Rethinking Disclosure in a World of Risk-Based 
Pricing, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 123 (2007) (arguing that application fees in subprime 
mortgage markets can prevent comparison shopping and reduce price competition); 
Alan M. White & Cathy L. Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 233, 266 (2002); see also infra note 193. 
 169. See, e.g., Andra C. Ghent & Marianna Kudlyak, Recourse and Residential 
Mortgage Default: Evidence from U.S. States, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 3139, 3139–86 
(2011) (finding that although mortgage default rates are lower in states with lender 
friendly collections laws, mortgage interest rates are not any lower in such states); 
Michael Simkovic, The Effect of BAPCPA on Credit Card Industry Profits and 
Prices, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 7–22 (2009) (finding that although lender friendly 
bankruptcy reforms reduced losses to credit card lenders, credit spreads and fees on 
credit cards increased, likely because of industry consolidation and market 
inefficiencies).  
 170. See Glater, supra note 35, at 48–51 (describing the student loan scandal of 
2007). 
 171. See Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau Publishes Private Student Loan Borrower Comments (June 13, 
2012), available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/pressreleases/consumer-financial-
protection-bureau-publishes-private-student-loan-borrower-comments/ (last visited 
Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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Because opacity and limited price competition create a 
favorable business environment for lenders, private lenders may 
not volunteer transparent, simple information that would make 
credit markets more efficient and price competitive. And without 
such clear, simple disclosures, risk-based pricing may not 
influence students’ behavior. 
Even in relatively efficient credit markets such as corporate 
bond markets, credit spreads will typically exceed default risk 
because credit spreads also incorporate factors such as liquidity 
risk, systemic risk, and investor risk aversion.172 However, the 
U.S. government is generally not subject to such risks—the U.S. 
government’s borrowing costs actually go down during financial 
crises as investors flood into Treasuries,173 and the Federal 
Reserve can provide liquidity in the event that investors are 
unwilling to do so. The U.S. government can therefore safely lend 
at lower interest rates than private lenders, and by lending 
directly to students, avoid leaky subsidies to private lenders such 
as guarantees and liquidity injections in times of crisis.174 
D. Government’s Incentives Are Uniquely Well Aligned with 
Students’ 
The discussion in Parts IV.A–B above considers only the role 
of government as student lender, and ignores the role of 
government as tax collector and provider of social insurance. 
Taking into account the broader role of government suggests that 
the government should be more risk-tolerant. Under some 
scenarios, the government might even benefit by running a risk-
based student loan program at a loss—that is, as a subsidy 
program.  
                                                                                                     
 172. See Simkovic & Kaminetzky, supra note 153, at 194–99 (discussing the 
components of credit spreads in the corporate bond market). 
 173. See id. at 198 (noting that banks’ funding costs increase relative to the 
federal governments’ in times of crisis). 
 174. See Simkovic, Competition and Crisis in Mortgage Securitization, supra 
note 70, at 61–64 (arguing for direct mortgage lending by the federal government to 
avoid moral hazard and subsidies to private lenders in times of crisis). 
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If the government were only a lender, its interests would 
diverge from those of student borrowers, who resemble equity 
holders. However, as a tax collector, the government is in effect 
an equity investor in the student borrowers’ future income, and 
the government’s interests are therefore more closely aligned 
with those of student borrowers. 
Pure lenders wish to minimize defaults and loan losses; they 
are sensitive to downside risk, but indifferent to upside potential, 
because any upside will go to the borrower, not the lender.175 
Student loan losses depend not only on average occupational 
income levels, but also on income distributions.176 Lenders prefer 
narrower income distributions, because lenders face asymmetric 
payoffs—the best lenders can hope for is full repayment of each 
loan.177 If an income distribution widens, a larger fraction of 
borrowers will have low incomes and will default on their loans, 
but the borrowers with higher incomes will not pay the lender 
any more than they are contractually required to pay.178  
In other words, there is a difference in interests between 
student lenders—who should prefer lower risk occupations—and 
student borrowers, who should be more willing to take greater 
educational and occupational risks in return for higher expected 
returns.  
Unlike a private lender, the government can benefit from 
student borrowers’ upside potential because the government 
collects payroll and income taxes. The government—like student 
                                                                                                     
 175. See Simkovic & Kaminetzky, supra note 153, at 214–18 (discussing the 
differing interests of equity and debt investors).  
A private lender, Lumni, is currently experimenting with “human capital 
contracts,” or equity-like student loans, for a select handful of borrowers who 
have funding needs that exceed their eligibility for federal student loans. David 
Bornstein, Op-Ed., Instead of Student Loans, Investing in Futures, N.Y. TIMES 
OPINIONATOR (May 30, 2011, 8:25 PM), 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/30/ instead-of-student-loans-invest 
ing-in-futures/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). Lumni provides relatively small amounts of money at what 
appear to be rates substantially higher than federal student loans, perhaps 
because of adverse selection problems and high risks, or small scale and high 
startup costs, or because of opportunity pricing. Id. 
 176. Simkovic & Kaminetzky, supra note 153, at 214–18. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
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borrowers and unlike private lenders—should therefore be more 
willing to trade off greater risk (in the form of a wider 
distribution of incomes) in return for greater rewards (in the form 
of higher average income). 
The extent to which the government should embrace risk will 
depend on a variety of factors, including labor tax rates,179 loan-
to-income ratios,180 the likelihood of emigration,181 and social 
insurance levels.182  
Under some scenarios, the government can improve public 
finances and overall welfare by intentionally running a student 
loan program at no profit, or even at a loss when measuring 
direct revenue against direct costs. This is because a subsidy may 
cause more workers to pursue education that will increase their 
lifetime incomes and therefore their lifetime tax contributions. 
Higher tax revenues from the additional student borrowers who 
succeed may more than offset higher loan losses from the 
additional student borrowers who fail. A subsidy is most likely to 
be welfare-enhancing when individual students are risk-averse—
for example, because they cannot easily diversify their 
investment in human capital—and the government is risk 
neutral because it is more diversified. 
 The government should ideally view itself not as a mere 
lender, but rather as a diversified investor in the global 
competitiveness of the United States labor force.183 
                                                                                                     
 179. All else being equal, the government should be more risk-tolerant if 
labor tax rates are higher or more steeply progressive because tax revenue will 
be higher as average income increases and the distribution of incomes increases 
(more income will be taxed at higher rates).  
 180. All else being equal, the government should be more risk-tolerant if the 
size of the loan is smaller relative to the average lifetime income because the 
government’s potential loan losses will be smaller relative to the government’s 
potential tax revenues.  
 181. All else being equal, the government should be more risk-tolerant if the 
probability of skilled emigration is lower because expected future tax revenue 
will be higher.  
 182. All else being equal, the government should probably be more risk 
tolerant if social insurance levels are lower because downside risk for the 
student borrower will have less of an impact on public finances. However, to the 
extent that education can raise incomes or reduce unemployment, higher social 
insurance levels may weigh in favor of a larger subsidy for education. 
 183. The U.S. government should promote the interests of the U.S. work 
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Operationalizing such a view would require a complex behavioral 
and financial model that is beyond the scope of this Article.  
For our purposes, it should simply be noted that credit 
spreads calculated using the methods described in Part IV.B do 
not take into account positive externalities associated with higher 
education, and could therefore be interpreted as an upward 
bound on the interest rate that the government should charge 
student borrowers.  
E. Forecasting Change Is Both Necessary and Perilous 
A purely data-driven analysis of student loan performance 
and labor markets is appealing because it is objective and 
ameliorates concerns about political influence or corruption. Any 
labor market forecasts used to price student loans might face 
political pressure.184 Employers in many industries may wish to 
channel students toward their field to drive down labor costs and 
upgrade their workforces.185 Conversely, skilled workers might 
wish to channel students away from their own fields to reduce 
competition and keep wages high.186 Employers may claim labor 
                                                                                                     
force because the U.S. government cannot tax the work forces of other countries.  
The U.S. government is also elected to represent the interests of U.S. citizens, 
most of whom depend on wages as their primary source of income. 
 184. See Richard B. Freeman, Labor Market Imbalances: Shortages, 
Surpluses or What? 159, 171–73 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos. Conference Series 
Working Paper, 2006), http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/conf/conf51/conf51d.pdf. 
 185. Several scholars and journalists have claimed that business interests 
made empirically unsupported claims of labor shortages of scientists and 
engineers in the 1980s to drive down wages in those fields, and have continued 
in recent years to make empirically dubious claims of shortages. See id. at 171–
73; Richard B. Freeman, Is A Great Labor Shortage Coming? Replacement 
Demand in the Global Economy 1, 10–11 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 12541, 2006); Eric Weinstein, How and Why Government, 
Universities, and Industry Create Domestic Labor Shortages of Scientists and 
High-Tech Workers (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper), available 
at http://www.nber.org/~peat/PapersFolder/Papers/SG/NSF.html (last visited 
Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Benderly, 
supra note 117, at 31; Lowell et al., supra note 117, at 1–2. 
 186. The “scamblog” literature, in which ostensibly disgruntled lawyers and 
doctors advise others not to follow in their career footsteps, may reflect efforts 
by the shrewdest and most highly paid skilled workers to reduce competition 
and increase wages in their own fields. Department of Labor and Census data 
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“shortages” and workers may claim “surpluses,” but these claims 
are amorphous in a market system in which supply-and-demand 
imbalances can be corrected by changes in wages.187 Risk-based 
lending policies should be based on hard numbers such as real 
wages and unemployment rates in different occupations, not on 
empirically unverifiable claims by interested parties. As 
suggested by the data in Figure 6 below, long-term historic wages 
by major are often a reasonably good predictor of future wages by 
major. 
  
                                                                                                     
on wages and unemployment rates, and Department of Education data on 
student loan default rates, overwhelmingly suggest that attorneys and medical 
doctors remain among the highest paid and most secure of all workers in the 
United States. Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Million Dollar Law 
Degree (Jan. 21, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); see also Default Rates, FED. STUDENT AID, 
http://studentaid. ed.gov/about/data-center/student/default (last visited Feb. 3, 
2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Default Rates Rise for 
Federal Student Loans, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Sept. 12, 2011), http://www. 
ed.gov/news/press-releases/default-rates-rise-federal-student-loans (last visited Feb. 
3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); First Official Three-
Year Student Loan Default Rates, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Sept. 28, 2012), 
http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/first-official-three-year-student-loan-de fault-
rates-published (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Occupational Outlook Handbook, BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/ooh/home.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Wages, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR 
http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/wages/index.htm#. UHWUgRXA-AY (last visited Feb. 3, 
2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 187. As discussed above, labor and education markets are not perfectly 
efficient competitive markets that flawlessly and quickly adjust to reach 
equilibrium. See supra note 188. However, there is evidence that students 
respond to changes in starting salaries and that labor markets can thereby 
adjust, however imperfectly. See, e.g., RICHARD B. FREEMAN, THE OVEREDUCATED 
AMERICAN 62–63, 98–108 (1976) (explaining that the surplus of doctorate 
students in the 1970s led to a market drop in job prospects, which led to a 
decline in the number of students seeking a Ph.D. in the 1980s). 
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Figure 6: Past Starting Salary for Graduates with a Certain 
Major Is a Reasonably Good Predictor of Future Starting Salaries 
by Major 
Unfortunately, the assumption that the past accurately 
predicts the future in the student loan and labor markets—the 
continuity assumption—might not always be the wisest, 
especially during periods of rapid technological change or crisis. 
The introduction of risk-based pricing could itself alter labor 
markets by channeling students toward certain occupations and 
away from others.188 Forecasting change based on leading 
indicators rather than historic data could be critical to avoid an 
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overshoot.189 For example, there is some evidence that labor 
market policies to encourage more students to study science in 
the 1960s may have contributed to high unemployment rates and 
low wages for scientists such as physicists in the 1970s.190 
The continuity assumption could be relaxed by incorporating 
additional information about the labor market to forecast 
changes, for example, by using a cobweb model including data 
about future labor supply (i.e., the total number of students in a 
city or state, across the United States or around the world 
studying toward each occupation and the number of years until 
they complete their training) and future demand (the number of 
job openings for each profession according to employer surveys or 
industry growth estimates combined with input-output tables). 
The Department of Education could be offered limited 
discretion—that is, it could be permitted to use a forecasting 
model to set an interest rate within a range of the rate suggested 
by the historic data.191 Or perhaps the Department of Education 
should establish the historic baseline and the discretionary 
forecast should be under the aegis of the U.S. Department of 
Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
Ideally, risk-based pricing could be used to help labor 
markets adjust more quickly and with less volatility than seen in 
traditional cobweb cycles. Reliable, detailed, and timely data is 
essential. Forecasting would benefit from greater integration of 
dispersed data sources and timelier reporting. 
Existing data sources include government data—U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) Occupational Employment Statistics 
(OES), the BLS National Compensation Survey (NCS), the BLS 
Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS), the Bureau 
of the Census Current Population Survey (CPS), Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) data, Social Security Administration (SSA) 
data, and a variety of surveys compiled by the National Center 
                                                                                                     
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 62–73, 98–108. 
 191. For a discussion of limitations of existing employment forecasting 
models, see Richard B. Freeman, supra note 185, at 13 (arguing that global 
rather than national or local labor markets, market and technological changes, 
factor substitution, and other issues dramatically limit the accuracy of 
employment forecast models). 
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for Education Statistics (NCES); foundation data such as the 
College and Beyond Database (C&B) and Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID); and proprietary data from payroll processors or 
the National Association of Colleges and Employers (NACE).192  
F. Private Lenders Could Be Enlisted to Correct Forecast Errors 
 The government could provide an additional safety-valve to 
correct for erroneous forecasts by providing private employers or 
other investors an opportunity to fund student loans at lower 
interest rates than the government if the investors believe that 
government forecasts are too conservative for particular fields of 
study.193 Such an approach would be less susceptible to 
                                                                                                     
 192. See e.g., College and Beyond Database: Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, 
1994, DUKE UNIV. SANFORD SCHOOL OF PUB. POL’Y: PHILANTHROPY CENTRAL, 
http://cspcs.sanford.duke.edu/sites/default/files/descriptive/college_and_beyond_
database.pdf; Current Population Survey (CPS), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/cps/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey, 
U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/jlt/ (last visited Feb. 3, 
2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); NACE – Salary 
Survey, NAT’L ASSOC. OF COLLEGES AND EMP’RS, http://www.naceweb.org/salary-
survey-data/?referal=research&menuID=71&nodetype=4 (last visited Feb. 3, 
2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); National 
Compensation Survey , U.S BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/eci/ 
(last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
Occupational Employment Statistics, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
http://www.bls.gov/oes/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); Panel Study of Income Dynamics, INST. FOR SOC. RES., 
http://psidonline.isr.umich.edu/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Publications and Products—Annual Reports 
Program, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/ 
getpubcats.asp?sid=091 (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); Social Security Data, U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
http://www.ssa.gov/open/data/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Tax Statistics, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Tax-Stats-2 (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 193. For price competition to be most effective, it would probably be 
necessary to create a standard student loan contract that could vary only with 
respect to one or a few numeric price terms (i.e., the interest rate) and feature 
clear and easy-to-understand disclosures. Complex pricing schemes and varied 
contractual terms can reduce price competition in consumer credit markets by 
exploiting bounded rationality or cognitive biases, confusing borrowers, and 
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manipulation than forecasts based on surveys of employers, 
because private lenders would face loan losses if they used overly 
optimistic forecasts.194  
Indeed, two small lenders are already engaged in “cherry 
picking,” funding loans to low risk students at elite MBA 
programs at slightly below the federal government’s rates.195 
G. Limited Dischargeability of Student Loans in Bankruptcy 
Reduces Lender Incentives to Monitor Students and Risk-
Adjust Student Loan Pricing 
Any investment, including education, involves some risk of 
failure and loss. Although investment risks are typically shared 
in part by lenders and in part by borrowers,196 risk sharing is 
                                                                                                     
limiting their ability to comparison-shop. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, 
Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7–9 (2008); Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction 
by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1415–20 (2004); Susan Block-Lieb & Edward 
J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower: Rationality, Behavioralism, and 
the Misguided “Reform” of Bankruptcy Law, 48 TEX. L. REV. 1481, 1528–48 
(2006); Simkovic, The Effect of BAPCPA on Credit Card Industry Profits and 
Prices, supra note 169, at 21; Cass R. Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing: 
A Consumer’s Guide 3–6 (Univ. of Chi., Olin Law & Econ. Program, Research 
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 253, 2006), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=772186. 
 194. The incentive to make accurate forecasts could be enhanced by making 
student loans more readily dischargeable. 
 195. One lender, Social Finance (or SoFi), initially funded Stanford Business 
School students and is now expanding to other elite schools. The other, 
CommonBond, is starting at the University of Pennsylvania Wharton School of 
Business. Both offer in-school loans at 6.24%, slightly below the 6.8% and 7.9% 
rates charged by the federal student loan program. See Ann Carrns, SoFi 
Tapping Alumni to Help with Student Loans, N.Y. TIMES BUCKS BLOG (Apr. 3, 
2012, 12:12 PM), http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/sofi-tapping-alumni-
to-help-with-student-loans/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); COMMONBOND, http://www. commonbond.com/ (last visited 
Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Roberto Vargas, 
SoFi Loans Popular with GSB, STAN. DAILY (Apr. 11, 2012), 
http://www.stanforddaily.com/2012/04/11/sofi-loans-popular-with-gsb/ (last visited 
Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Erin Zlomek, To 
Fund Your MBA, Borrow From Alums, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 5, 2012), 
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-07-05/to-fund-your-mba-borrow-from-
alums (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 196. See ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 6–10 (1986) (discussing rationales 
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limited in U.S. education finance. Instead, risks are imposed 
primarily on student borrowers.197 Risks are shifted from lenders 
to student borrowers by restricting student-loan debtors’ access to 
a bankruptcy discharge and curbing exemptions from collections 
for income sources such as social security retirement and 
disability benefits.198  
This risk-shifting toward student borrowers implicitly 
reflects an assumption that individual student borrowers are in a 
better position to assess and bear the risks of education than is 
the government or a private lender.199 However, as discussed 
above in Parts III and IV, there are strong theoretical and 
practical reasons to believe that the government as creditor may 
often be in a better position to evaluate the risk of education and 
spread that risk, and risk should therefore be shared more 
equally.200 
                                                                                                     
for limited liability); THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY 
LAW 229–30 (1986) (analogizing the bankruptcy discharge for individuals to 
limited liability for corporate investors); Paul Halpern, Michael Trebilcock & 
Stuart Turnbull, An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 
30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 127 (1980) (explaining risk sharing in the corporate 
context); Richard Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 
U. CHI. L. REV. 499, 507–09 (1976) (arguing that limited liability for corporations 
is desirable because it enables shareholders to share risks of losses with 
creditors).   
 197. Understanding Default, supra note 152; see also infra notes 210–24 and 
accompanying text (discussing limits on dischargeability in bankruptcy); cf. 
Section V.H. (discussing a recent shift toward greater debt forgiveness for 
federal student loan borrowers through income based repayment plans). 
 198. Facing Loan Default, supra note 197. 
 199. See JACKSON, supra note 196, at 229 (“Recent scholarly treatments of 
discharge law have focused on whether the debtor or the creditor is the superior 
risk bearer and whether discharge should be presumptively available.”); 
Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 953, 982 
(arguing that debtors are more able to control their financial activities and 
judge their financial circumstances than lenders, thus debtors are presumably 
more able to bear risks); id. at 981 (“A discharge system provides a technique for 
allocating the risk between a debtor and his creditors.”); id. at 982 (arguing that 
a debtor is presumably better able to bear risks than creditors because a debtor 
is “in greater control of [his] financial activities than any particular lender” and 
therefore a better judge of his own circumstances). 
 200. See, e.g., Barr-Gill & Warren, supra note 193, at 69–74 (discussing the 
need for safety regulation in various consumer credit markets because of 
limitations on information and rationality); Katherine Porter, College Lessons: 
The Financial Risks of Dropping Out, in BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS THE 
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Thomas Jackson explains the policy goals behind the 
bankruptcy discharge as one of nuanced paternalistic regulation 
of credit.201 The goal is to protect debtors by enlisting 
sophisticated creditors: 
In each case [of risky activities] society decides—or should 
decide—at what point the expected costs of a given activity 
outweigh the prospective benefits to the individual and society. 
Borrowing, however, cannot be regulated by means of the 
rough and general rules . . . . Discharge policy provides an 
alternative . . . . Discharge . . . heightens creditors’ incentives 
to monitor: by providing for a right of discharge, society enlists 
creditors in the effort to oversee the individual’s credit 
decisions . . . . The availability of the right of discharge induces 
creditors to restrict the individual’s credit intake and thus to 
assist in ensuring that he does not seriously underestimate his 
future needs. 202 
In theory, restricting access to discharge for student borrowers 
should reduce (though not eliminate) lenders’ risk of loss203 and 
thereby reduce lenders incentives to monitor borrowers and to 
ration and price credit according to risk.204  
                                                                                                     
MIDDLE CLASS 97 (Katherine Porter ed., 2012) (discussing advantages of risk 
sharing through a more generous discharge and higher interest rates for 
student loans); Kenneth Ayotte, Bankruptcy and Entrepreneurship: The Value of 
a Fresh Start, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 161, 164 (2007) (arguing that it is efficient 
to grant entrepreneurs more generous debt relief in bankruptcy to maintain ex-
post incentives that reward effort by the entrepreneur); John A. E. Pottow, 
Private Liability for Reckless Consumer Lending, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 405, 431–
32 (arguing that credit card lenders who lend to those who are unlikely to be 
able to repay should face legal liability because of their “competitive advantage 
in determining the repayment capacity of individuals”); John A. E. Pottow, 
Ability to Pay (U. Mich. Pub. L., Working Paper No. 237, 2011) available at 
http://ssrn.com/ abstract=1844570 (arguing in favor of the requirement under 
the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 that mortgage lenders only lend to borrowers who 
they believe have the ability to repay the loans). 
 201. JACKSON, supra note 196, at 248–52. 
 202. Id. at 248–49. 
 203. See Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit 
Card Debt, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 375, 379–81 (arguing that delaying bankruptcy 
discharge benefits creditors by extending the time period during which they can 
collect); Simkovic, supra note 169, at 1 (finding that bankruptcy reforms that 
restricted consumer borrowers’ access to a Chapter 7 discharge reduced credit 
card lenders’ losses). 
 204. See also Stephen J. Lubben, Derivatives and Bankruptcy: The Flawed 
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These predictions hold true with respect to the student loan 
market. Government and private lenders could protect 
themselves from losses due to default by engaging in good 
underwriting205—that is, by assessing the riskiness of different 
student borrowers and different courses of education, adjusting 
the pricing and availability of credit accordingly, and 
subsequently accepting and spreading losses. However, rather 
than undertake the socially useful task of evaluating students’ 
career and income prospects based on their academic 
performance and chosen field of study—and sharing this 
information with students through disclosures of differential loan 
pricing—lenders price loans uniformly and transfer as much of 
the risk as possible to student borrowers.206 
There are few credit-market signals to warn students of 
danger when they decide where to enroll and what to study. The 
government does not restrict loans to students who wish to 
attend relatively high-risk educational institutions.207 Nor does 
the government differentially price student loans according to 
borrower-specific or program-specific risks.208 Student borrowers, 
however, are sorely in need of good information. The 
                                                                                                     
Case for Special Treatment, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 61, 62–64 (2009) (arguing that 
special protections in bankruptcy for derivatives reduce banks’ incentives to 
monitor derivatives counterparties and contribute to financial instability); 
Stephen J. Lubben, Repeal the Safe Harbors, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 319, 
331–32 (2010) (same); Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Market’s Payment Priorities 
as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539, 550–51 (2011) (same); 
Jackson, supra note 196, at 248–49 (same); Simkovic, Secret Liens and the 
Financial Crisis of 2008, supra note 70, at 262 (same). 
 205. See Simkovic, Competition and Crisis in Mortgage Securitization, supra 
note 70 (explaining the underwriting process for mortgages). 
 206. Although many private student lenders purport to engage in “risk-
based” pricing, they often do so based on credit scores, which may reflect the 
credit history of the student’s parents rather than the future earning potential 
and creditworthiness of the student. See Credit Scores, FINAID.ORG, 
http://www.finaid.org/loans/creditscores.phtml (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also supra Part IV.C (discussing 
“opportunity pricing”). There are, however signs that at least some private 
lenders are beginning to price differences in earnings risks across programs. See 
supra notes 160, 173. 
 207. See supra Part II.B. 
 208. See supra Part II.D. 
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consequences to student borrowers of making the wrong choice 
can be severe and lifelong.209  
Whereas the U.S. Bankruptcy Code generally gives 
individual borrowers an “insurance policy” against failure in the 
form of a bankruptcy discharge,210 student loans are somewhat 
more difficult to discharge than most kinds of debt.211 Student 
loans have become more difficult to discharge through a series of 
amendments enacted over the last forty years, ostensibly to 
protect taxpayers by shifting risks onto students.  
Federally-backed student loans have been available for many 
decades, first under the NDEA in the late 1950s and early 1960s, 
and subsequently under the HEA starting in 1965.212 Until 1976, 
                                                                                                     
 209. See Atkinson, supra note 9, at 5 n.13 (explaining that student loan debt 
can have negative consequences); Porter, supra note 200, at 85–100 (arguing 
that educational debt is risky because, although completing a four-year college 
degree reduces the risk of bankruptcy by increasing income, attending college 
without completing a four-year degree exacerbates financial distress by 
increasing debt without significantly increasing income); id. at 96–97 
The burdens of student loan debt have consequences for people’s 
financial futures [including] a lower rate of saving . . . retarding 
opportunity for other family members . . . defer[ing] entry into the job 
market, losing seniority and reducing the number of working years 
they have to save for retirement. 
See also Warren, Baum & Sitaraman, supra note 65, at 130 (discussing the 
impact of educational debt on life decisions). 
 210. See Barry Adler et al., Regulating Consumer Bankruptcy: A Theoretical 
Inquiry, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 591 (2000) (analogizing bankruptcy discharge to 
a form of social insurance, both in terms of its ability to mitigate poverty and in 
terms of ex-ante moral hazard concerns); JACKSON, supra note 196, at 230–32 
(same). 
 211. In spite of formal language in the Bankruptcy Code limiting discharge, 
some student borrowers have received relief from their loans in bankruptcy. See 
Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal: Undue 
Hardship Discharge Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 179, 188 (2009) [hereinafter 
Pardo & Lacey, Real Student-Loan Scandal]. 
According to one scholar, relief is often offered to those who seek it, but too 
few bankruptcy lawyers attempt to discharge student loans in bankruptcy. See 
Jason Iuliano, An Empirical Assessment of Student Loan Discharges and the 
Bankruptcy Undue Hardship Standard, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 495 (2012). 
 212. See Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the 
Bankruptcy Courts: An Empirical Assessment of the Discharge of Educational 
Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 405, 420–21 (2005) [hereinafter Pardo & Lacey, Undue 
Hardship] (exploring the dischargeability status of federally insured and 
guaranteed student loans during the 1960s and 1970s) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 35(a) 
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these loans were dischargeable in bankruptcy, the same as credit 
card debt or any other unsecured loan.213  
In the early 1970s, salacious stories began to circulate in 
Congress about young graduates discharging their debts en 
masse in bankruptcy shortly after completing their educations.214 
According to the rumors, young professionals with few hard 
assets to lose and a lifetime of high future incomes around the 
corner were opportunistically trying to discharge their student 
loan obligations.215  
The rumors of strategic default were largely unfounded. 
According to research by Professor Rafael Pardo, strategic default 
by high-income student debtors was extremely rare.216 Professor 
Pardo supports this assertion with both a contemporary study by 
the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO)217 and comments by 
members of the House of Representatives.218  Similarly, empirical 
studies of student debtors in Canada have found that bankruptcy 
                                                                                                     
(1976) (repealed 1978)). 
 213. See id. 
 214. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE 
UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 137, at 140 (1973); Pardo & Lacey, Real Student 
Loan-Scandal, supra note 211, at 419–24. 
 215. See JACKSON, supra note 196, at 250–51 
As a general rule, college and graduate students have few current 
assets but large future income streams. Using bankruptcy is 
relatively painless to them, as they have few assets to lose, and 
obtaining a discharge offers a substantial benefit, as it frees up the 
future income stream from the substantial obligation of repaying a 
student loan. 
 216. Pardo & Lacey, Undue Hardship, supra note 212, at 420 
Despite evidence presented to the Commission [on the Bankruptcy 
Laws of the United States] that less than one percent of federally 
insured loans were discharged in bankruptcy, its recommendation 
essentially sought to preempt “potential abuses,” defaults that 
industry representatives of the student loan system anticipated 
would occur. The Commission thus reacted viscerally to anecdotal 
evidence. 
 217. Id. The General Accounting Office (GAO) was renamed the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) in 2004. Id. at 423 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595 
(1997) reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6094, 6100–08). 
 218. Id. at 422–23 (quoting Representative James O’Hara’s critique of 
nondischargeability of student loans as treating student debtors like criminals 
or frauds). 
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abuse by high-income professionals is rare, and a recent study 
has found extremely low student loan default rates among former 
U.S. law students.219 
Nevertheless, tales of student opportunism may have 
persuaded Congress to tighten the rules for student loans. In 
1976, a time delay was imposed so that debtors could not 
discharge student loans that were incurred within five years 
before the bankruptcy filing, unless denial would constitute an 
“undue hardship” for the debtor or his or her family.220 Over the 
next several decades, Congress further restricted dischargability 
of student loans221 and some bankruptcy courts interpreted this 
as a cue to raise the bar in their interpretation of “undue 
hardship.”222 In 1990, the time-bar was extended from five years 
to seven, and in 1998 it became indefinite (i.e., a debtor would be 
required to demonstrate “undue hardship,” no matter how long 
ago the student loan debts were incurred).223 In 2005, restrictions 
on dischargability were extended to fully private loans, not just 
guaranteed or direct loans.224  
Although various judicial tests have been advanced to clarify 
the meaning of “undue hardship,” Professor Pardo’s research 
suggests that hardship remains in the eye of the beholder: in 
practice, discharge depends more on the particular bankruptcy 
judge than on the objectively measurable financial condition of 
the student debtor.225 
                                                                                                     
 219. Stephanie Ben-Ishai, Government Student Loans, Government Debts 
and Bankruptcy: A Comparative Study, 44 CAN. BUS. L.J. 211, 237–38 (2006-
2007) (reviewing the Canadian literature); Simkovic & McIntyre, supra note 186 
(showing very low student loan default rates among former law students who 
entered repayment from 1990 to 2010). 
 220. Pardo & Lacey, Undue Hardship, supra note 212, at 420–21 (citing 
Higher Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, § 127(a), 90 Stat. 
2081, 2141 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3 (1976), repealed by Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 316, 92 Stat. 2549, 2678 (effective Oct. 
1, 1979))). 
 221. Id. at 427; John A.E. Pottow, The Nondischargeability of Student Loans 
in Personal Bankruptcy Proceedings: The Search for a Theory, 44 CAN. BUS. L.J. 
245, 249–50 (2006); Braucher, supra note 71, at 473. 
 222. Pardo & Lacey, Undue Hardship, supra note 212, at 428. 
 223. Braucher, supra note 71, at 473–74.  
 224. Id. at 473–74.  
 225. Pardo & Lacey, Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 211, at 185; 
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Many scholars have questioned whether these special 
restrictions on discharge of student loans were needed to prevent 
abuse of the bankruptcy system by strategic defaulters. Most 
scholars conclude that special protections for student loans are 
unnecessary, empirically or theoretically unjustifiable, or that 
other factors weigh heavily in favor of a shift toward greater 
dischargeability.  
For example, Thomas Jackson,226 Rafael Pardo,227 Katherine 
Porter,228 John Pottow,229 and Abbye Atkinson,230 have all pointed 
out that student loan abuse would be curtailed through other 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. In 1984, the Bankruptcy Code 
was amended so that a bankruptcy court could dismiss a case 
without granting a discharge if the petitioner’s debts were 
“primarily consumer debts” and if granting a discharge “would be 
a substantial abuse” of the bankruptcy system.231 These anti-
abuse provisions were strengthened in 2005.232 Perhaps Congress 
was concerned that some student loans would not meet the 
threshold test as “consumer debts” because they were incurred 
with a “profit motive”—that is, the student borrower expected the 
degree to boost future income by more than direct educational 
costs and opportunity costs.233  
                                                                                                     
Pardo & Lacey, Undue Hardship, supra note 212, at 411, 478–509; cf. Iuliano, 
supra note 211. 
 226. See JACKSON, supra note 196, at 251. 
 227. See Pardo & Lacey, Undue Hardship, supra note 212, at 430–31. 
 228. See Porter, supra note 200, at 98. 
 229. See Pottow, supra note 221, at 251–55. 
 230. See Atkinson, supra note 9, at 34–37.  
 231. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2006); see also id. § 1325(a)(3) (requiring that a 
Chapter 13 plan be “proposed in good faith”). 
 232. The Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 
(BAPCPA) changed the standard for dismissal of a Chapter 7 petition from 
“substantial abuse” to “abuse” and eliminated a presumption in favor of 
granting the debtor relief. Id. § 707(b)(1); 6-707 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 707.4 
(16th ed. 2011). 
 233. See In re Dickerson, 193 B.R. 67, 70 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996) (finding 
that student loans were not consumer debt); In re Gentri, 185 B.R. 368, 373 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995) (finding that medical school loans were not consumer 
debts); In re Hill, No. 94-01881, 1994 WL 738663, at *1 (Bankr. D. Idaho Dec. 
22, 1994) (finding that student loan debt was not consumer debt); In re Groves, 
160 B.R. 121, 123 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1993) (finding that student loans were not 
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However, if the concern is that student loans might be 
profitable investments, then why should a legitimate investment 
in human capital subject the student investor to unique risks 
that do not apply to investors in any other form of capital? 
Conversely, why should a “substantial abuse” standard not apply 
equally to other unsecured business debts?234 The Bankruptcy 
Code already limits discharge of debts obtained by fraud or false 
pretenses, regardless of whether those debts are business or 
consumer debts.235 So why is greater protection required for 
student loans? 
John Pottow explores several possible theoretical 
justifications for the special limitations on the discharge of 
student loans, and finds all of them wanting.236 Professor Pottow 
considers the possibility that student debtors are particularly 
dishonest and student loans presumptively fraudulent and the 
similar possibility that the inalienability of an education and 
higher future wages incentivizes opportunistic behavior.237 He 
finds both theories consistent with the treatment of student 
debtors under U.S. law,238 but empirically doubtful in light of 
research by Professor Pardo and the GAO.239 Professor Pottow 
                                                                                                     
“consumer” debts for purposes of classification under a Chapter 13 plan). But see 
In re Stewart, 175 F.3d 796, 806–07 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding that medical school 
loans that were used for living expenses rather than tuition and books were 
consumer debts); In re Millikan, No. 07-01759-AJM-7, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 4696, 
at *7–17 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Sept. 4, 2007) (finding that student loans were 
consumer debts notwithstanding debtor’s profit motive). 
 234. See Pottow, supra note 221, at 254 (“In fact, in business, far from being 
disparaged as fomenting ‘opportunism,’ the bankruptcy discharge is styled as 
fostering “entrepreneurialism.”). 
 235. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A); Pardo & Lacey, Undue Hardship, supra 
note 212, at 430.  
 236. See Pottow, supra note 221, at 276 (“[T]he most attractive [theories for 
restricting student loan discharge] seem to be the ones least reflected in many of 
the current bankruptcy laws, just as the ones most recognizable in today’s 
statutes seem grounded in confusion and myth.”). 
 237. Id. at 251–55. 
 238. Id. (“The theory that comes closest to persuasion as to why student 
loans should have restricted dischargeability in bankruptcy is that of the 
opportunistic debtor, ‘softly’ defrauding the system if she walks away from 
publicly subsidized debt that enables a high-income career.”). 
 239. Id. at 255 (“T]here seems to be a documented lack of empirical evidence 
supporting routine abuse by rich-career students using bankruptcy just out of 
 
616 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527 (2013) 
suggests that much of the opposition to dischargability of student 
loans stems from a kind of class envy—a vision of student debtors 
as individuals who became rich at the expense of the public.240 
Pottow therefore argues for income-contingent repayment to 
reduce the burdens on debtors who have lower incomes.241 
Apparently in agreement with Professor Pottow, several 
scholars argue for greater student loan forgiveness toward those 
for whom education does not produce a private financial benefit. 
Abbye Atkinson presents evidence that African Americans receive 
less financial benefit from education than whites, and argues that 
the nondischargeability of student loans therefore 
disproportionately harms college-educated African Americans.242  
Kathryn Porter presents evidence that those who receive 
some college education but do not complete a four-year degree—
either because they pursue a two-year associate’s degree or 
vocational program, or because they drop out prior to completing 
a four-year degree—will often be in a worse financial position 
than those who never attended college at all.243 Porter argues for 
greater forgiveness for those who fail to complete their educations 
because of family or financial misfortune.244  
                                                                                                     
school.”). 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. at 276–78. 
 242. See Atkinson, supra note 9, at 2–5; id. at 5–6 
Congress has largely placed the burden and risk of paying for college 
firmly on the shoulders of the student . . . . [T]hese educational loan 
policies may reveal a judgment, however inadvertent, about who, as a 
practical matter, should and who should not be going to college. More 
troubling is that this judgment seems to track racial divisions. 
 243. See Porter, supra note 200, at 85–100 (arguing that educational debt is 
risky because, although completing a four-year college degree reduces the risk of 
bankruptcy by increasing income, attending college without completing a four-
year degree exacerbates financial distress by increasing debt without 
significantly increasing income); id. at 96–97  
The burdens of student loan debt have consequences for people’s 
financial futures [including] a lower rate of saving, . . . retarding 
opportunity for other family members, . . . defer[ring] entry into the 
job market, losing seniority and reducing the number of working 
years they have to save for retirement. 
 244. Id. at 98–100. 
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Jean Braucher questions the nondischargeability of student 
loans for those who attend low-quality institutions that do little 
to enhance their students’ career prospects, particularly given the 
governments’ limited efforts to police educational quality and 
protect students from deceptive sales and marketing practices.245  
Professor and now Senator Elizabeth Warren argues that 
college-educated individuals who forgo a higher paying job in the 
private sector to pursue public service after graduation should 
receive more generous loan forgiveness.246 Professor Warren 
bases her argument in part on an assumption that individuals 
who work in public service are undercompensated relative to the 
value they contribute to society.247 
H. Income-Based Repayment Plans  
The scholarly arguments for greater student loan forgiveness 
have been partially successful. Although the Bankruptcy Code 
continues to restrict student loan discharge, debt forgiveness has 
been advanced through recent changes to federal student loan 
programs known as income based repayment plans (IBR), 
introduced in 2007 through the College Cost Reduction and 
Access Act.248 Under IBR, federal student loan payments are 
capped at a percentage of the student debtor’s income, typically 
around 10%.249 The payment decreases as the number of people in 
the debtor’s household increases.250 After the student debtor 
                                                                                                     
 245. Braucher, supra note 71, at 462–65. 
 246. Warren, Baum & Sitaraman, supra note 65, at 131–36, 142. 
 247. Id. at 142 (“By tying debt forgiveness to public service, Americans 
would have the chance to say that everyone who does this kind of work deserves 
a substantial reward from the rest of us. No longer would public service 
opportunities be limited to a few poorly funded programs.”). 
 248. For an overview of the new Income Based Repayment Plan, see Philip 
G. Schrag & Charles W. Pruett, Coordinating Loan Repayment Assistance 
Programs with New Federal Legislation, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 583, 590–97 (2010). 
 249. The annual payment is 15% multiplied by the amount by which the 
debtor’s adjusted gross income exceeds 150% of the poverty level for a household 
the size of the debtor’s family. This will usually work out to around 10% of the 
debtor’s adjusted gross income. Id. at 590–91. 
 250. Id. at 594 (“A larger family entitles the borrower to a larger deduction, 
and therefore permits a smaller monthly payment.”). 
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makes all payments for a number of years, any remaining debt is 
forgiven.  
Consistent with Professor Warren’s views,251 IBR is more 
generous to student debtors who work in the public sector. Public 
sector workers need only work and make payments for ten years 
prior to forgiveness of the balance of their federal student loans, 
whereas private sector workers must work and make payments 
for twenty to twenty-five years.252 If the debtor’s income rises so 
that payments would be lower under a traditional (non-IBR) ten-
year repayment plan, debtors may instead make the lower 
traditional ten-year payment.253 
IBR is less attractive than discharge in bankruptcy. IBR debt 
forgiveness may result in taxable income to student debtors who 
work in the private sector,254 whereas a bankruptcy discharge is 
not treated as income.255 Whereas a Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
discharge would provide immediate relief,256 and a Chapter 13 
bankruptcy discharge would provide relief after a three-to-five-
year period of income-based repayment,257 IBR requires ten to 
                                                                                                     
 251. For Warren’s views generally on student loans and public sector 
employment, see supra notes 246–50 and accompanying text. 
 252. Schrag & Pruett, supra note 248, at 591–92; see also Alison Damast, 
Obama’s New ‘Pay as You Earn’ Plan a Windfall for MBAs, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK, Nov. 2, 2012 (describing a new federal plan that provides 
student loan forgiveness after 20 years); Philip G. Schrag, Failing Law Schools: 
Brian Tamanaha’s Misguided Missile, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS (forthcoming 
2013) (same). 
 253. Schrag & Pruett, supra note 248, at 591. 
 254. Id. at 593; see also 26 U.S.C. § 108(f) (2006) (describing the income from 
discharge of indebtedness with respect to student loans). Debt forgiveness is 
treated as taxable income to the extent the student is balance-sheet solvent or 
rendered balance-sheet solvent by the forgiveness, that is, the debtors’ assets 
exceed the debtors’ liabilities at the time of the forgiveness. See id. § 108(d)(3)) 
(defining “insolvent”); id. § 108(a)(1)(B) (providing for exclusion of discharge 
income if “the discharge occurs when taxpayer is insolvent”); id. § 108(a)(3) 
(defining the limitation on the insolvency exclusion). 
 255. Id. § 108(a)(1)(A). 
 256. Post-petition wages are not property of the estate under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 541(a)(6) for a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. See, e.g., In re Hellums, 772 F.2d 379, 
380 (2nd Cir. 1985) (per curiam). A Chapter 7 discharge will therefore leave the 
debtor’s future wage income unencumbered. 
 257. A five-year repayment plan is required in Chapter 13 for above-median 
income debtors. The payments are based on the debtor’s income, less minimal 
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twenty-five years of repayment. The lengthy repayment period 
under IBR may mitigate moral hazard.258 IBR is formulaic, and 
may therefore be less expensive to administer and more 
consistently applied than the “undue hardship” standard in 
bankruptcy.259 
IBR reduces the downside risk of education, and may provide 
welcome relief to student debtors who are in a difficult financial 
position. However, IBR only provides relief ex-post. It does not 
generate information or establish incentives that lead to a more 
efficient allocation of educational resources ex-ante.  
Risk-based pricing is compatible with IBR and could 
incorporate risk of loss due to borrowers entering IBR. To the 
extent that IBR is intended as a back-door wage subsidy for 
public service workers, losses from IBR for students entering 
public service could be excluded from risk-based pricing. 
                                                                                                     
living expenses. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(d), 1325(b) (2012). 
 258. See D. Bruce Johnstone, Conventional Fixed-schedule versus Income 
Contingent Repayment Obligations: Is there a Best Loan Scheme?, 34 HIGHER 
EDUC. EUR. 189, 190–91 (2009) (describing a proposed hybrid of income-
contingent and traditional loans in which reduction in payments due to low 
incomes would be deferred over longer repayment periods, not necessarily fully 
forgiven at earlier stages); Pottow, supra note 221, at 267–68 (indicating that 
the use of longer time periods in loan forgiveness programs serves to “smoke out 
the false debtor”); Bruce Chapman, Income Contingent Loans for Higher 
Education: International Reform (Austl. Nat’l Univ. Ctr. for Econ. Pol’y 
Research, Discussion Paper No. 491, 2005), http://cbe.anu.edu.au/ 
research/papers/ceprdpapers/DP491.pdf; cf. SHILLER, supra note 148, at 140–46 
(attributing the failure of Yale’s Tuition Postponement Option—a voluntary 
program in the 1970s that linked repayment obligations to wages and reflects 
general problems encountered by such programs—to moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems, exacerbated by a failure to distinguish between students 
with different majors); Marc Nerlove, Some Problems in the Use of Income-
contingent Loans for the Finance of Higher Education, 83 J. POL. ECON. 157, 
160–65, 180 (1975) (noting that previous IBR programs have suffered from 
moral hazard and adverse selection problems). 
 259. See Pottow, supra note 221, at 268 (describing the application of “the 
U.S. ‘undue hardship’ test” as “an unpredictable and expensive way” to “back-
end income-contingency into the American system”). 
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VI. Ethical Considerations and the Limits of Risk-Based Pricing 
A. Factors That Predict Student Loan Defaults 
The most important predictor of default is probably the 
student borrower’s employment prospects and whether post-
graduation income is adequate to service educational debts.260 
Studies have also found that students are less likely to default if 
they are employed in a field that is related to their major.261 Some 
studies report that defaults are lower for STEM majors.262 
Students who drop out are much more likely to default, and 
attrition can be predicted from poor academic performance both 
before college and during college. 263 
                                                                                                     
 260. See Thomas A. Flint, Predicting Student Loan Defaults, 68 J. HIGHER 
EDUC. 322, 344 (1997) (noting that in contrast to other factors, “the borrowers’ 
own disposable incomes do significantly influence default”); Jacob P. K. Gross et 
al., What Matters in Student Loan Default: A Review of the Research Literature, 
39 J. STUDENT FIN. AID, no. 1, 2009, at 23 (“Most students who default do so 
because their personal income is inadequate to keep up with their payments.”); 
Laura G. Knapp & Terry G. Seaks, An Analysis of the Probability of Default on 
Federally Guaranteed Student Loans, 74 REV. ECON. & STAT. 404, 410 (1992) 
(noting that graduation correlates strongly with lower default, perhaps because 
it increases job and wage prospects); Kirk Montverde, Managing Student Loan 
Default Risk: Evidence from a Privately Guaranteed Portfolio, 41 RES. HIGHER 
EDUC. 331, 336, 350–52 (2000) (emphasizing the importance of the individual 
student’s ability to attain employment); J. Fredericks Volkwein et al., Factors 
Associated with Student Loan Default Among Different Racial and Ethnic 
Groups, 69 J. HIGHER EDUC. 206, 223, 228 (1998) (“[E]ven though student 
borrowers with advanced degrees emerge from college with higher levels of debt, 
their investment generally enables them to enter careers that . . . make loan 
repayment more likely.”).  
 261. Flint, supra note 260, at 346. 
 262. See id. at 330; Volkwein et al., supra note 260, at 222; see also J. 
Fredericks Volkwein & Bruce Szelest, Individual and Campus Characteristics 
Associated with Student Loan Default, 36 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 41, 41–72 (1995) 
(suggesting that while type of major is “not itself significantly influential in 
default,” a science or technology major may have “an indirect influence”). 
 263. See Flint, supra note 260, at 330 (higher grade point average and 
graduation both decrease the probability of nonpayment of loans); Knapp & 
Seaks, supra note 260, at 408 (noting that “[t]he single variable with the 
greatest statistical and economic significance is the occurrence of the student’s 
graduation”); Montverde, supra note 260, at 336 (noting that studies had found 
“degree completion” and “college GPA” as “significantly predictive of default 
risk”); Volkwein et al., supra note 260, at 222 (“[D]egree completion has a 
dramatic influence on lowering the rate of loan default.”).  
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Other individual characteristics that have been shown to 
predict default include race,264 age,265 parental education 
                                                                                                     
 264. Student borrowers who are members of racial minority groups are more 
likely to default than white students, and African Americans are the most likely 
to default, and this relation holds true even after controlling for post-graduation 
income. Gross et al., supra note 260, at 21–22; see also MATT STEINER & NATALI 
TESZLER, TEX. GUARANTEED & TEX. A&M UNIV., THE CHARACTERISTICS 
ASSOCIATED WITH STUDENT LOAN DEFAULT AT TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY 48 (2003), 
http://www.tgslc.org/pdf/tamu_default_study.pdf (finding that white borrowers 
at Texas A&M in College Station “[had] default rates below the average,” while 
minorities had above-average rates, with “black borrowers hav[ing] the highest 
default rate”); J. Frederick Volkwein & Alberto Cabrera, Who Defaults on 
Student Loans? The Effects of Race, Class, and Gender on Borrower Behavior, in 
CONDEMNING STUDENTS TO DEBT: COLLEGE LOANS AND PUBLIC POLICY 105, 109 
(Richard Fossey & Mark Bateman eds. 1998) [hereinafter Volkwein & Cabrera] 
(“African and Native American borrowers from all institution types have high 
default rates.”); Dana E. Christman, Multiple Realities: Characteristics of Loan 
Defaulters at a Two-year Public Institution, 27 COMMUNITY COLL. REV. 16, 23–25 
(2000) (noting a study in which “default rates were found to be higher for 
minority students” and data to support the notion that “Non-Whites” are more 
likely to default); Laura L. Greene, An Economic Analysis of Student Loan 
Default, 11 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 61, 61–68 (1989) (noting that 
African American status correlates with higher default and higher default 
amount); Elizabeth Herr & Larry Burt, Predicting Student Loan Default For 
The University Of Texas at Austin, 35 J. STUDENT FIN. AID, no. 2, 2005, at 37 
(2005) (noting the results of the study “impl[y] that minority students, 
particularly Blacks and Hispanics, are at a greater risk of default); Knapp & 
Seaks, supra note 260, at 408 (noting that African Americans are more likely to 
default); Volkwein & Szelest, supra note 262, at 51–52 (showing data that 
indicates higher default rates for African Americans and Native Americans); 
Wellford W. Wilms, Richard W. Moore & Roger E. Bolus, Whose Fault Is 
Default? A Study of The Impact of Student Characteristics and Institutional 
Practices on Guaranteed Student Loan Default Rates in California, 9 EDUC. 
EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 41, 46 (1987) (“Blacks have the highest 
propensity to default . . . .”). This may be due to higher dropout rates, higher 
divorce rates, lower wealth levels, and larger numbers of dependents. Volkwein, 
et al., supra note 260, at 224–25. A risk-based approach that focused on 
expected income as the sole proxy for ability to pay would probably under 
predict defaults by minority borrowers and help maintain educational access for 
students from diverse backgrounds. 
 265. Older students are more likely to default. See, e.g., JENNIE H. WOO, 
CLEARING ACCOUNTS: THE CAUSES OF STUDENT LOAN DEFAULT 6 (2002), 
http://cdm16254.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p178 
601ccp2/id/29 08/rec/3 (“Older students default more often than younger ones.”); 
Christman, supra note 264, at 23 (noting that “being over 25 years old [was a] 
characteristic associated with high default rates’’); Flint, supra note 260, at 347 
(noting that it is uncertain why “older borrowers constitute a greater risk for 
default”). But see STEINER & TESZLER, supra note 264, at 48 (finding that for 
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levels,266 family income levels,267 family structure,268 debt 
burdens, and (for law students) credit scores.269  
Characteristics of educational institutions may not provide 
much additional predictive accuracy. Although two-year 
community colleges have higher default rates than traditional 
nonprofit four-year institutions—and wealthier institutions tend 
                                                                                                     
students at Texas A&M in College Station that “[b]orrowers between the ages of 
23 and 26 have the lowest default rate (3.2 percent), with both younger 
borrowers and older borrowers representing increased levels of default risk”); 
Herr & Burt, supra note 264, at 39 (noting that while students “over 40 have 
higher loan default rates than borrowers in their late twenties and thirties,” so 
do younger borrowers, i.e., “between the ages of 20–24”). 
 266. Students whose parents are less educated are more likely to default. 
See SANDRA BARONE, MATT STEINER & NATALI TESZLER, TEX. GUARANTEED 
STUDENT LOAN CORP., MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF STUDENT LOAN DEFAULTERS AT 
TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY-KINGSVILLE 23–24 (2005), available at 
http://www.tgslc.org/pdf/tamu_k_multivariate_analysis.pdf (indicating that 
parental education level, if sufficiently high, “may reflect a borrower’s previous 
exposure to responsibilities such as repaying a student loan”); STEINER & 
TESZLER, supra note 264, at 49, 51 (finding that for students of Texas A&M in 
College Station, parental education attainment generally relates inversely to 
rate of default); Volkwein, et al., supra note 260, at 215 (noting that one of the 
features “associated with low levels of loan default include . . . a college-
educated parent”); Volkwein & Szelest, supra note 262, at 51–52 (showing tables 
indicating higher default rates for those whose parents have lower education 
levels); Herr & Burt, supra note 264, at 35 (showing higher rates of default for 
lower mother and father educational attainment levels).  
 267. Students whose parents have lower incomes are more likely to default. 
See STEINER & TESZLER, supra note 264, at 57 (finding that for students at Texas 
A&M in College Station, “[i]n general, default rates decrease as income 
increases”); WOO, supra note 265, at 5 (“[A]mple family resources, either higher 
incomes or assets, significantly lowered the probability of default.”); Knapp & 
Seaks, supra note 260, at 406 (indicating that parental income level is a 
significant factor and correlates negatively with default); Volkwein et al., supra 
note 260, at 221 (highlighting “parent income below $17,000” as one of three 
factors resulting in “significant increases in the probability of loan default”); 
Volkwein & Szelest, supra note 264, at 51–52 (showing higher rates of default 
for lower parental income levels); Wilms et al., supra note 264, at 42 (indicating 
that previous studies had shown that “[l]ow family income [is] also associated 
with high defaults”); Herr & Burt, supra note 264, at 37 (noting that, in line 
with the results of other studies, “students whose parents have higher incomes 
are less likely to default”). 
 268. Students who are divorced or separated or who have dependents are 
more likely to default. See Montverde, supra note 260, at 336; Volkwein & 
Szelest, supra note 262, at 57. 
 269. Montverde, supra note 260, at 340–44. 
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to have lower default rates—studies suggest that higher default 
institutions’ loan performance may be due to these institutions 
disproportionately serving students whose individual 
characteristics make them more likely to default—for example, 
students who are from lower income or less wealthy families.270 
B. Preserving Equal Opportunity, Social Mobility, and Individual 
Choice 
Although risk-based pricing involves technical analysis of 
data, it also implicates important ethical considerations. As 
discussed above, risk-based pricing reduces the transfer of value 
from low-risk borrowers to high-risk borrowers by forcing all 
borrowers to internalize their own risks.  
In some situations, differences in relative risk levels may be 
driven by choices and behaviors that can be changed, and that we 
might affirmatively wish to encourage borrowers to change. In 
such situations uniform pricing creates moral hazard—that is, 
                                                                                                     
 270. Gross et al., supra note 260, at 21; see also Flint, supra note 260, at 348 
(noting that “[l]arge numbers of low-income and minority students enroll in 
proprietary schools,” which also tend to have higher rates of default); Knapp & 
Seaks, supra note 260, at 406–07, 410 (finding the variables of two-year versus 
four-year institution not statistically significant and concluding that “individual 
characteristics, and not institutional characteristics, [that] are key determinates 
of default”); Montverde, supra note 260, at 351–52 (indicating that personal 
characteristics like the “borrower-based credit effect” overcome institutional 
factors in determining default probability, and underlying factors that affect 
individual capacity to repay such as “location” or the “prevailing . . . labor 
market” are what “may actually lie behind the apparent school effect”); 
Volkwein & Cabrera, supra note 264, at 109–13 (finding, inter alia, that 
incidences of default at certain institutions are primarily attributed to certain 
minority groups and “organizational characteristics of institutions” do not have 
a significant effect on default); Volkwein et al., supra note 260, at 226, 231–33 
(indicating that in controlling for student characteristics, institutional 
characteristics had no significant impact on probability of default and certain 
institutions tend to attract students with greater default risk that is beyond the 
control of the institution, dependent instead on personal characteristics); cf. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION: STUDENT OUTCOMES 
VARY AT FOR-PROFIT, NONPROFIT, AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS 5–8 (2011) (finding worse 
outcomes at proprietary institutions after controlling for student 
characteristics). 
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uniform pricing encourages high-risk behavior.271 Risk-based 
pricing could improve efficiency by forcing borrowers to 
internalize risk and thereby cause them to make more 
responsible choices. The most obvious example would be choice of 
courses and major, which is almost entirely under the student’s 
control. Indeed, students from disadvantaged backgrounds 
already disproportionately choose fields of study linked to higher 
post-graduation wages.272 Risk-based pricing would benefit these 
students by reducing the total cost of their educations. 
In other situations, relative risk levels may be driven by 
factors that are beyond the borrower’s control. In such cases, we 
might question the propriety of compounding misfortune by 
charging the unfortunate a higher interest rate than the 
fortunate. In such situations, risk-based pricing is unlikely to 
improve efficiency because borrowers cannot reduce their risk 
levels by making different decisions. 
The most obvious examples of factors that are outside the 
realm of choice and may predict default risk include race273 and 
parents’ socio-economic status.274 Parental financial resources are 
                                                                                                     
 271. See Sam Ramsey Harking & M. Rashidian, Student Loan Default: 
Borrower Characteristics, Institutional Practices, and the Business Cycle, 20 J. 
EDUC. FIN. 449, 463 (1995). 
 272. See supra note 133 and accompanying text; see also WILLIAM G. BOWEN 
& DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG TERM CONSEQUENCES OF 
CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 70–72 (1998) 
(finding that black and white students at selective colleges were equally likely to 
major in engineering, natural science, and economics); id. at 99–103 (finding 
that black graduates of selective colleges were more likely than white graduates 
of selective colleges to attend law schools and medical schools, and also more 
likely to attend top programs in law, medicine, or business); cf. ARCIDIACONO ET 
AL., supra note 17, at 3 (“Although blacks and whites initially have similar 
interests regarding whether to major in the more strictly graded fields [of 
natural science, engineering, and economics], the patterns of switching result in 
68% of blacks choosing humanities and social science majors compared to less 
than 55% of whites.”). 
 273. Black male college graduates earn less than white male college 
graduates, even after controlling for socioeconomic status, SAT scores, high 
school grades, college selectivity, college major, college class rank, graduate 
school, and sector of employment. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 272, at 144–48. 
 274. Students from higher socioeconomic status backgrounds earn more 
than those from low socioeconomic status backgrounds. BOWEN & BOK, supra 
note 272, at 136. The relation is partly due to higher socioeconomic students 
being more likely to attend graduate school. Id. However, higher SES students 
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strong predictors of the likelihood of default, but students do not 
get to choose their parents.275 Even credit scores of students will 
sometimes reflect the credit histories of their parents rather than 
choices made by the individual student. 
C. Risk-Based Pricing and Choice of Major 
As discussed above, risk-based pricing reduces the transfer of 
value from low-risk borrowers to high-risk borrowers by forcing 
all borrowers to internalize their own risks. Choice of major or 
field of graduate study probably represents the clearest example 
of student loan risk driven by a borrower’s personal decision. The 
data suggests that there are certain majors that are much lower 
risk than others, as measured by post-graduation wages and debt 
to income ratios—specifically, engineering, certain science and 
technology majors, and business majors are relatively low-risk.276 
By contrast, humanities and education majors are relatively high 
risk.277 Many of the differences in wages across majors and 
related occupations persist even after controlling for differences 
in student ability. Risk-based pricing of student loans would 
encourage more college students to choose majors that would 
better prepare them for post-graduation employment 
opportunities, could reduce unemployment rates, and reduce 
default rates on student loans. 
Some may be concerned that risk-based pricing would 
channel too many students who are incapable of succeeding in 
STEM or business into these majors and produce a surplus of 
low-quality scientists or engineers. The data does not support this 
view. Although there are differences in average standardized test 
scores across majors, there is substantial overlap in the 
distribution of abilities across majors, and many students in 
                                                                                                     
earn more even after controlling for race, gender, SAT scores, high school 
grades, college selectivity, college major, college class rank, graduate school, and 
sector of employment. Id. at 136–38. 
 275. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.  
 276. See supra note 108 and accompanying text; see also supra note 232 and 
accompanying text. 
 277. Supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
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majors with low value in the labor market should be capable of 
succeeding in fields that are more highly valued in the labor 
market. Indeed, business majors have among the lowest 
standardized test scores, but have above-average labor market 
outcomes.278  Figures 7.1 and 7.2 below highlight the overlapping 
distribution of abilities of students in different fields.  
Specifically, the charts show what percent of GRE test-takers 
intent on graduate study in various fields scored higher on the 
quantitative portion of the GRE than the median test taker 
intent on studying business (7.1) or engineering (7.2). 
  
                                                                                                     
 278. See supra notes 13–18 and accompanying text; see also EDUC. TESTING 
SERV., GRE GUIDE TO THE USE OF SCORES 2010–11, at 17–19 (2010), 
http://www.ets.org/s/gre/pdf/2010-11_gre_guide.pdf (providing in Table 4 GRE 
scores by intended major of those taking the test); Arcidiacono, supra note 142, 
at 344 (“Even after controlling for selection, large earnings premiums exist for 
certain majors.”); STEPHEN D.H. HSU & JAMES SCHOMBERT, UNIV. OF OR. DEP’T OF 
PHYSICS, DATA MINING THE UNIVERSITY: COLLEGE GPA PREDICTIONS FROM SAT 
SCORES (Apr. 15, 2010), http://arxiv.org/pdf/ 1004.2731v1.pdf (studying a sample 
of University of Oregon graduates and finding that SAT scores predict academic 
success, but even students with relatively low SAT scores are capable of 
succeeding in most college majors—including economics, chemistry, biology, and 
computer science). 
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Figure 7.1: Many Students Who Currently Choose Lower Value 
Fields Have the Ability to Succeed in Higher Value Fields, 
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average scores of students who intend to study business in graduate school, by 
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Figure 7.2: Many Students Who Currently Choose Lower Value 
Fields Have the Ability to Succeed in Higher Value Fields, Such 
as Engineering 
Risk-based pricing could make labor market data more 
salient to college students by making the long-term consequences 
of educational choices apparent the moment the student needs to 
borrow. Prior to matriculation, when students have not yet begun 
to specialize, students could be offered blended “institutional 
rates” that reflect the distribution of majors among graduates of 
their college programs. At the start of every subsequent 
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to pay tuition—students could be presented with a fixed interest 
rate for their new loans279 that reflects the individual students’ 
course selections280 and developments in the labor market.  
Students could also be given an explanation of the 
implications of the interest rate for the long-term cost of their 
education, and a list of actions they could take that would reduce 
their interest rate, such as changing majors and/or courses.281 
This could be especially helpful to students from low-income 
backgrounds, who may be the least informed about occupational 
                                                                                                     
 279. It would be unfair and impractical to change the interest rate for 
outstanding loans based on new information that was not available to students 
at the time they borrowed. It may also be sensible to permit students to lock in a 
rate for a certain number of semesters or years if providing predictability is 
more important than encouraging mid-course adjustments. 
 280. It makes more sense to focus on observable behavior—such as the 
courses students actually complete—rather than declarations of intent (i.e., a 
declared major). For example, a student might receive the pre-med interest rate 
after successfully completing a gatekeeper class such as organic chemistry.  
Declarations of intent can more easily be gamed by students seeking a low 
interest rate for the early years of a high-risk course of study.  
 281. Whether risk-based pricing of student loans or economically equivalent 
grants would be more effective to change student behavior is an empirical 
question. The empirical literature on whether borrowers react rationally to 
interest rates is somewhat mixed. See, e.g., Sumit Agarwal, Souphala 
Chomsisengphet, Chunlin Liu & Nicholas S. Souleles, Do Consumers Choose the 
Right Credit Contracts?, 15–17 (Working Paper, 2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=843826 (finding that a 
significant proportion of borrowers make suboptimal choices when trading off 
between upfront fees and interest rates, although mistakes become less common 
as the amount of money at stake increases); Sumit Agarwal, Paige Marta Skiba 
& Jeremy Tobacman, Payday Loans and Credit Cards: New Liquidity and 
Credit Scoring Puzzles?, in 99 AM. ECON. REV., PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
121ST MEETING OF THE AM. ECON. ASS’N 412, 416 (2009) (concluding that some 
consumers will borrow using more expensive payday loans even when less 
expensive credit card debt is available to them); Block-Lieb & Janger, supra 
note 193, at 1535–48 (discussing limitations on consumer borrowers 
comprehension of interest rates); David B. Gross & Nicholas S. Souleles, Do 
Liquidity Constraints and Interest Rates Matter for Consumer Behavior? 
Evidence from Credit Card Data, 117 Q. J. ECON. 149, 150–52, 182 (2002) 
(finding that borrowers react strongly to credit card interest rates by adjusting 
their borrowing up when rates decrease and down when rates increase, and 
arguing that previous studies that have found a limited impact of interest rates 
suffered from inadequate data on household-specific interest rates). Much of the 
literature has focused on subprime consumer debtors, and it is unclear to what 
extent it can be generalized to college students. 
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wages and the most likely to borrow. And by studying toward 
higher wage and lower risk occupations, students from low-
income backgrounds might be able to maximize the economic 
value of higher education and their own opportunities for upward 
social mobility.  
We need not assume that every student chooses a course of 
study based purely on financial considerations. All that is 
required for risk-based pricing to change behavior is that some 
proportion of students are motivated at least in part by financial 
considerations, and that monetary incentives coupled with 
additional information could change those students’ behavior. 
Over the long run, if risk-based pricing of student loans 
succeeds in channeling enough students toward high-demand 
occupations, the gap between wages in different occupations and 
for different college majors could shrink, reducing inequality. 
D. The Promise and Perils of “Meritocratic” Risk-Based Pricing 
The distinction between risks driven by student choice and 
risks driven by misfortune is not always clear-cut. Factors like 
class ranking282 or standardized test scores283 may be driven in 
part by choice—how much time to devote to studying and how 
much to leisure—and in part by innate ability or advantages 
related to being from a prosperous family.  
However, the use of class ranking284 or test scores could help 
channel students toward the areas in which they have the 
greatest competitive advantage and therefore the greatest 
opportunity for success. For example, notwithstanding the strong 
average career prospects for engineers and doctors, it might be 
                                                                                                     
 282. Higher grades predict higher earnings, even after controlling for race, 
socioeconomic status, gender, SAT scores, college selectivity, college major, 
college class rank, graduate school, and sector of employment. BOWEN & BOK, 
supra note 272, at 140–42. 
 283. SAT scores somewhat predict earnings, particularly between low scores 
and moderate scores. Id. at 133–35. 
 284. GPA is a poor measure because of differences in grading distributions 
across institutions, majors, courses, and professors. See supra notes 113–23 and 
accompanying text. Standardized percentile rankings within each course and 
aggregated by major would be more meaningful. 
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preferable for great writers with limited spatial abilities to 
pursue careers in law or journalism. Risk-based pricing that 
incorporates some measure of field-specific ability would do a 
better job of sorting students into areas that are the best fit for 
the individual student’s talents. 
The decision to use factors such as rankings and test scores 
as predictors may involve a tradeoff between equality and 
efficiency. On average, minorities and students from less 
prosperous backgrounds tend to have lower test scores and 
grades.285 Nevertheless, grades and test scores remain good 
predictors of academic and financial success, even after 
controlling for race and socioeconomic status.286 One possible 
compromise would be to use class ranking or standardized test 
scores that have been adjusted to remove differences that might 
be explained by race or parental socioeconomic status.287 Such 
an approach, however, would entail subjective and potentially 
controversial judgments.288 
                                                                                                     
 285. See, e.g., RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, REWARDING STRIVERS: HELPING LOW 
INCOME STUDENTS SUCCEED IN COLLEGE 10–13 (2010) (noting significantly lower 
predicted SAT scores for those who are disadvantaged and black as opposed to 
advantaged and white, respectively). 
 286. Many studies that have questioned the predictive value of the SAT 
have used statistically questionable techniques, such as over-controlling (by 
using grades or other standardized test scores, which are meant to measure 
academic ability and correlate with SAT scores), or truncating the range of 
scores by only examining students who already have very similar SAT scores 
because they attend the same caliber of institution. Some studies have also 
failed to correct for differences in grading distributions. See, e.g., Christopher M. 
Berry & Paul R. Sackett, Individual Differences in Course Choice Results in 
Underestimation of the Validity of College Admissions Systems, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 
822, 822 (2009) (“[T]he validity of SAT scores and high school [GPAs] as 
predictors of academic performance has been underestimated because of 
previous studies’ reliance on flawed performance indicators . . . .”); Nathan R. 
Kuncel & Sarah A. Hezlett, Fact and Fiction in Cognitive Ability Testing for 
Admissions and Hiring Decisions, 19 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSCYHOL. SCI. 339, 
340–44 (2010) (reaffirming the efficacy of standardized testing in predicting 
future academic performance despite various studies that questioned the 
validity of tests). 
 287. See, e.g., KAHLENBERG, supra note 285, at 167–75, 185–90 (describing 
how a system of adjustment for socioeconomic factors at more extreme ends of 
disadvantage may be implemented with respect to the SAT and ACT). 
 288. For example, in the late 1990s, Educational Testing Services attempted 
to develop an alternative SAT “strivers” score that would flag students who 
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E. Debt-to-Income Ratios and Paternalistic Borrowing Limits 
Student debt levels probably primarily reflect external 
circumstances—parental wealth, socioeconomic status, and extent of 
parental support—but may also somewhat reflect factors within the 
student’s control—whether to attend a more expensive college or 
accept a scholarship at a less prestigious institution, whether to live 
at home, whether to work during school, or whether to overload on 
credits to graduate early. Because some debt-reducing choices might 
adversely affect students’ academic performance and career 
prospects, risk-adjusting student loans based on debt levels may 
disproportionately harm high-ability students of limited means—
precisely the upwardly mobile clientele that federal student loans are 
meant to serve.  
The focus should not be exclusively on the cost of education—the 
focus should be on whether education provides value that exceeds its 
cost. Nonprofit universities with higher tuition prices generally spend 
more on instruction per student, and, after controlling for student 
characteristics, their graduates earn more money.289 Attempts to cap 
tuition, including arbitrary limits on access to student loans,290 could  
                                                                                                     
performed better than expected based on factors such as parental socioeconomic 
status. The original strivers project was discontinued amid heated controversy. 
Claire Barliant, Striving to Stay Alive, SALON (Oct. 18, 1999, 12:00 PM), 
http://www.salon.com/1999/10/18/strivers/ (last visited on Feb. 3, 2013) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 289. Stacy Berg Gale & Alan B. Kruger, Estimating the Payoff to Attending 
a More Selective College: An Application of Selection on Observables and 
Unobservables, 117 Q. J. ECON. 1491, 1524 (2002) (“We do find that students 
who attend colleges with higher average tuition costs tend to earn higher 
income years later, after adjusting for student characteristics. . . . [T]uition 
matters because higher cost schools devote more resources to student 
instruction.”). 
 290. William Bennett, former Secretary of Education under President 
Ronald Reagan, claimed that student loans and other government aid increase 
the cost of education, and have used these claims to justify budget cuts that 
target government support for education. William J. Bennett, Op-Ed, Our 
Greedy Colleges, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
1987/02/18/opinion/our-greedy-colleges.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Most empirical investigations of the 
“Bennett Hypothesis” have focused on grant aid rather than student loans, and 
have found mixed results. None of these studies have established that funding 
captured by universities does not ultimately benefit students through increased 
educational quality, student support services, or access for low-income students. 
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See, e.g., MICHAEL MCPHERSON & MORTON O. SCHAPIRO, KEEPING COLLEGE 
AFFORDABLE: GOVERNMENT AND EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 72–73 (1991) (rejecting 
the Bennett Hypothesis and finding that colleges tend to provide additional grant 
aid in response to federal grant aid); LESLEY J. TURNER, COLUMBIA UNIV., THE 
INCIDENCE OF STUDENT FINANCIAL AID: EVIDENCE FROM THE PELL GRANT PROGRAM 
26 (2012), http://www.columbia.edu/~ljt2110/LTurner_JMP.pdf (“Across all 
sectors, every dollar of Pell Grant aid reduces students’ effective prices by 84 
cents, with institutions appropriating the remaining 16 cents through price 
discrimination.”); Bridget T. Long, How do Financial Aid Policies Affect Colleges? 
The Institutional Impact of the Georgia HOPE Scholarship, 39 J. HUM. RESOURCES 
1045, 1062–63 (2004) (finding that private universities captured at most 30% of 
new grant aid in Georgia’s HOPE program, which was viewed as not rising to “the 
level of college exploitation insinuated by Bennett”); Michael S. McPherson et al., 
Recent Trends in U.S. Higher Education Costs and Prices: The Role of Government 
Funding, in 79 AM. ECON. REV. 253, 255 (1989) (finding the Bennett Hypothesis 
implausible because tuition increased the fastest at well-endowed, elite private 
institutions that were the least dependent on government aid as a source of 
revenues); Larry D. Singell, Jr. & Joe A. Stone, For Whom the Pell Tolls: The 
Response of University Tuition to Federal Grants-in-aid, 26 ECON. EDUC. REV. 285, 
291–94 (2007) (rejecting the Bennett Hypothesis for in-state tuition at public 
universities, but finding that private universities adjust tuition to capture most 
grant aid and public universities adjust out-of-state tuition); cf. Michael J. Rizzo & 
Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Resident and Nonresident Tuition and Enrollment at 
Flagship State Universities, in COLLEGE CHOICES: THE ECONOMICS OF WHERE TO 
GO, WHEN TO GO AND HOW TO PAY FOR IT 303, 338–39 (Caroline M. Hoxyby ed., 
2004) (finding that flagship public universities increase in-state tuition to absorb 
grant aid, “[c]onsistent with the Bennett Hypothesis,” but do not increase out-of-
state tuition to absorb grant aid). 
The empirical evidence for the claim that federal student loans increase 
education costs is weak. ALISA F. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. 
STATISTICS,  2 STUDY OF COLLEGE COSTS AND PRICES, 1988–89 TO 1997–98, at 80–
81, 10 (U.S. Dep’t Educ. 2001), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2002/2002158.pdf; see also 
Glater, supra note 35, at 66 (“Empirical studies of changes in tuition do not 
support the assertion that colleges raise prices in response to greater perceived 
availability of funds to students.”); Warren, Baum & Sitaraman, supra note 65, 
at 141 n.71 (“Some observers suggest that the increased availability of student 
loans fuels increases in college prices. However, most empirical analyses fail to 
find such an effect.”). One of the few studies that may provide limited support 
for the Bennett Hypothesis focused exclusively on for-profit educational 
institutions, and the results therefore cannot be generalized to nonprofit higher 
education. The results may also be explained by grant aid rather than loans, or 
by unobserved differences in institutional costs or quality. Stephanie Riegg 
Cellini & Claudia Goldin, Does Federal Student Aid Raise Tuition? New 
Evidence on For-Profit Colleges 1, 13–25 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 17827, 2012), http://scholar.harvard.edu/goldin/files/does_federal_ 
student_aid_raise_tuition_new_evidence_on_for-profit_colleges.pdf. 
There are more plausible explanations for rising costs of higher education, 
such as an economy-wide increase in demand for educated labor and therefore 
an increase in costs for all service industries that rely on highly educated labor, 
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degrade the quality,291 availability,292 and value of education. 
Borrowing limits are a heavy-handed approach to managing 
risk, and impinge on the freedom of students and their access to 
university education.293 There are less intrusive approaches 
available, such as risk-adjusting interest rates to account for 
default risk.294  
In some extreme and rare situations, higher interest rates 
may be inadequate to offset losses because default rates are 
already very high and there are too few nondefaulting borrowers 
in the same risk pool.295 In such rare situations, loan limits could 
                                                                                                     
including medicine, dentistry, and legal services, as well as higher education. 
Robert B. Archibald & David H. Feldman, Why Do Higher Education Costs Rise 
More Rapidly than Prices in General?, CHANGE, May–June 2008, at 30–31. For a 
discussion of factors contributing to the costs of higher education, see generally 
ROBERT B. ARCHIBALD & DAVID H. FELDMAN, WHY DOES COLLEGE COST SO MUCH? 
(2011). 
Another explanation for perceived increase in costs is a shift in costs from 
taxpayers to students and their families, as per-student real public support for 
higher education has generally declined since the early 1980s. Evidence 
suggests that the decline in government support for education is linked to the 
growth of anti-taxation political movements. See Robert B. Archibald & David 
H. Feldman, State Higher Education Spending and the Tax Revolt, 77 J. HIGHER 
EDUC. 618 (2006). Tuition sticker prices also increase as universities charge 
wealthy students more to fund need-based aid—and lower net cost—for poorer 
students. See, e.g., ARCHIBALD & FELDMAN, supra at 150–53. 
 291. Caroline M. Hoxby, How the Changing Market Structure of U.S. Higher 
Education Explains College Tuition 41–42 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 6323, 1997), http://static-71-166-250-129.washdc.east. 
verizon.net/eLibrary/ARCHIVES/GENERAL/NBER_US/N971200H.pdf (arguing 
that increased competition has led to an increase in both the cost and quality of 
college education, and that price controls are inadvisable). 
 292. See Michael S. McPherson & Morton O. Schapiro, Does Student Aid 
Affect College Enrollment? New Evidence on a Persistent Controversy, 81 AM. 
ECON. REV. 309, 317–18 (1991) (indicating that federal aid appears to correlate 
with increased enrollment by low-income students). 
 293. Glater, supra note 35, at 72–73 (arguing for higher federal student loan 
limits to increase access and reduce the need for high-cost private loans). 
 294. See Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 193, at 1513–18 (explaining how 
the growing use of risk-based pricing by lenders enables them to profitably 
make more credit available to risky borrowers and mitigates the need for credit 
rationing). 
 295. See William Adams, Liran Einav & Jonathan Levin, Liquidity 
Constraints and Imperfect Information in Subprime Lending, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 
49, 65–83 (2009) for a study documenting the use of both risk-based interest 
rates and loan limits in high-default subprime auto-lending.  
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be used as a last resort. However, loan limits can only be fully 
effective as a paternalistic measure if they apply to all debt 
students might turn to if access to federal student loans is 
restricted—including private student loans, credit cards, home 
equity loans and other sources of credit.296 
To the extent that loan limits are used at all, the following 
risk-based principles should be applied: Education programs and 
majors that are linked to higher post-graduation incomes and 
higher employment rates should have higher loan limits than 
programs and majors that are linked to lower post-graduation 
incomes and lower employment rates. All else being equal, 
educational programs that require fewer years to complete should 
have higher borrowing limits per year, and higher total 
borrowing limits. An educational program that can produce an 
equally productive—and equally well-paid—skilled worker in 
fewer years is worth more than an educational program that 
takes longer to produce the same economic result. Expanding 
loan limits for productive programs would enable students to pay 
a premium for efficiency, and encourage universities to become 
more efficient. 
F. Risk-Based Pricing and Institutional Autonomy 
Risk-based pricing could also be used to change the behavior 
of educational institutions. As discussed above, educational 
institutions currently have financial incentives to channel 
students away from classes and majors that are expensive to 
teach—because the instructors have skills that are valuable in 
the labor market outside the universities—and toward classes 
that are less expensive, because they are less valuable in the 
                                                                                                     
 296. See, e.g., Dilip Soman & Amar Cheema, The Effect of Credit on 
Spending Decisions: The Role of Credit Limit and Credibility, 21 MARKETING 
SCI. 32, 32 (2002) (arguing that borrowers rely on credit limits imposed by 
consumer lenders as an indicator of the borrowers’ own future income). Limiting 
private student loans would be especially important because these loans are not 
dischargeable in bankruptcy except for showing of “undue hardship.” 11 U.S.C. 
§ 523(a)(8) (2006). 
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labor market and the instructors have few employment 
alternatives.297  
If risk-based pricing emphasized the market value of 
different majors, and students responded accordingly by shifting 
toward majors linked to higher-income employment and better 
job prospects, universities would feel pressure to shift more 
resources toward teaching marketable skills.  
The government could dissuade colleges from using grades to 
channel students away from expensive majors by requiring any 
educational institution that accepts federal student loans to 
disclose percentile class rankings298 on any documents that 
disclose grades or GPA. If percentile ranking data became widely 
available and well understood, graduate schools, employers, and 
students themselves would likely turn away from letter grades 
and toward more meaningful and standardized percentile 
rankings. Because every class would be subject to the same 
percentile distribution scheme, grading distributions could not so 
readily be used to alter enrollments to the benefit of universities 
and the detriment of students, employers, and taxpayers. 
Risk-based pricing could also make the allocation of 
educational resources more salient to prospective students. For 
example, entering freshmen, who will not yet have declared a 
major or taken any classes suggesting a specialty, could be 
offered an interest rate that reflects a weighted average based on 
the majors of upper level students or graduating seniors at their 
college—a reasonable proxy for the allocation of educational 
resources at that particular institution. These “institutional 
rates” could be made publicly available to help prospective 
students choose between the institutions to which they have been 
admitted, and to help shift students toward the institutions that 
are most responsive to the needs of the labor market. 
Shifting resources toward courses of study that are in 
demand and have a high value in the labor market will entail 
real and substantial costs for universities. To offset these costs, it 
may be necessary to increase student loan limits and to accept 
                                                                                                     
 297. See supra notes 108–20 and accompanying text. 
 298. Or possibly a variant such as the weighted measures developed by 
Valen E. Johnson. See supra notes 113–23 and accompanying text. 
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tuition increases, with the understanding that although the cost 
of higher education may increase, the value of higher education 
will increase by even more. 
Some may object to risk-based pricing on the grounds that it 
is likely to shrink enrollment in, and resources dedicated to, the 
humanities in order to increase enrollment and resources 
dedicated to STEM and business fields. We might also be 
concerned about the use of risk-based pricing as a cover for 
politically motivated interference with university research. The 
ability to target particular universities or particular departments 
within universities might raise such concerns. The more tightly 
risk-based pricing is tied to objectively verifiable loan loss data or 
data on occupational wages and employment—as opposed to 
forecasts or any other subjective criteria—the lower the risk of 
veiled attacks on academic freedom and impartial research.  
Some have argued that the humanities pay off economically 
in the long run, even if humanities graduates do not do as well in 
the short run.299 Better data would be needed to evaluate these 
claims—most studies of income by major rely on a few years of 
post-graduation data. Risk-based pricing can and should consider 
not just employment and income at graduation or the first few 
years thereafter, but longer-term economic outcomes. Such long-
term data could be gathered by a cooperative effort between 
government and universities to match schooling records with 
student loan performance data and federal income tax and Social 
Security Administration records.300 It is perfectly plausible that 
at least some humanities graduates go on to have successful, 
stable, and lucrative careers, for example, as lawyers or other 
professionals.301 Risk-based pricing is not inherently in favor or 
                                                                                                     
 299. See, e.g., Jim Pollock, Are Liberal Arts Degrees Worth Anything?, DEP’T 
OF POLITICAL SCI., UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, http://www.uta.edu/pols/ 
files/AreLiberalArtsDegreesWorthAnything.pdf.  
 300. Student and taxpayer privacy concerns could be addressed by releasing 
only aggregate data, or obscuring information that could be used to identify 
individuals. 
 301. See Simkovic & McIntyre, supra note 186 (finding that average lifetime 
earnings of law degree holders, discounted to present value at the start of law 
school, are approximately a million dollars greater than earnings of similar 
workers whose highest degree is a Bachelor’s). 
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against any particular discipline—it is in favor of allocating 
resources according to the needs of a dynamic labor market. 
Figure 8.1: Some Majors May Provide Better Opportunities to 










Graduate Degree Holder (age 30-54)
Experienced College Graduate (age 30-54)
Recent College Graduate (age 22-26)
Median earnings by college major, age, and education attainment 2009-2010 
Real 2011 USD thousands   
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey 2009 & 2010; Anthony P. Carnevale, Ban 
Cheah, & Jeff Strohl, Georgetown University Center on Education and the Workforce, Hard Times, 
College Majors, Unemployment, and Earnings: Not All College Degrees Are Created Equal (Jan. 2012). 
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Figure 8.2.1: Workers with Undergraduate Degrees in Some 
Fields with Low Starting Salaries Are Likely to Attend Law 






















































Propensity for Pursuing Professional Degrees by Undergraduate Major, 1993 
Percent of workers aged 35 to 55 from the 1993 National Survey of College Graduates  
Source: 1993 National Survey of College Graduates; Dan A. Black, Seth Sanders & 
Lowell Taylor, The Economic Reward for Studying Economics, 41 ECON. INQUIRY 365, 
371 Table 4 (2003). 
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Figure 8.2.2: Workers with Undergraduate Degrees in Some 
Fields with Low Starting Salaries Are Likely to Attend Law 
School or Medical School 
  






















Propensity for Pursuing Professional Degrees by Undergraduate Major, 2009 
Percent of college graduates aged 18 and over with professional degree 
Source: Stephanie Ewart, U.S. Census Bureau, What It’s Worth: Field of Training and 
Economic Status in 2009, 3 Table 3 (Feb. 2012); Survey of Income and Program 
Participation 2008. 
 
Note: Preprofessional majors, not shown, have the highest rates of professional school 
attendance, at 23.4% law degrees and 26.8% medical degrees. 
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Figure 8.3: The Most Valuable Graduate Degree Fields Are 


























































All workers with earnings
Annualized median earnings by advanced degree field, 2009 
Population age 18 and over where highest degree is an advanced degree 
2011 USD thousands 
Source: US Census Bureau, Survey of Income and Program Participation, 2008 
Panel, Table 4H. 
Note: Annualized earnings calculated by multiplying monthly earnings by 12.
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Figure 8.4.1: Among Those with a Law Degree, Workers with 


























Earnings of workers with a law degree, by undegraduate major 
Earnings as a percent of earnings for economics majors, workers aged 35 to 55 
Source: 1993 National Survey of College Graduates; Dan A. Black, Seth Sanders 
& Lowell Taylor, The Economic Reward for Studying Economics, 41 ECON. 
INQUIRY 365, 374 Table 7 (2003). 
 
Note: * No statistially significant difference compared to economics majors.  
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Figure 8.4.2: MBAs with High-Value Undergraduate Majors 

















































Earnings of workers with a master’s degree in business, by undegraduate major 
Earnings as a percent of earnings for economics majors, workers aged 35 to 55 
Source: 1993 National Survey of College Graduates; Dan A. Black, Seth 
Sanders & Lowell Taylor, The Economic Reward for Studying Economics, 41 
ECON. INQUIRY 365, 373 Table 6 (2003). 
 
Note: * No statistially significant difference compared to economics majors.   
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A rather more parochial argument is that, notwithstanding 
relatively poor job prospects of humanities graduates, the 
humanities have spiritual or moral value that makes them 
inherently superior to STEM or business or social science majors 
and therefore deserving of subsidies at every other field’s 
expense. There are few empirical studies to support this view—
much of the literature on “over-education” suggests that 
education that does not enhance employment prospects produces 
cynicism and dissatisfaction among graduates.302 Many of those 
who subscribe to the view that the humanities should be 
privileged simply hold it as an article of faith. 
Assuming arguendo that the humanities are spiritually 
sacred but economically marginal, then who should make the 
economic sacrifice to ensure that the humanities are taught? 
Should students of limited means be forced to mortgage their 
futures to pay for a humanities education of limited monetary 
value? Should poor students in more challenging and less 
spiritually rewarding disciplines be forced to overpay for their 
loans so that other students—generally from wealthier families—
can enjoy the humanities? This is the way the economic burden is 
allocated under the current system, and even the most ardent 
supporter of the humanities would be hard-pressed to defend it. 
If four years of postsecondary cultural edification really is a 
fundamental human right, shouldn’t higher education be funded 
through taxation and provided free at the point of service to every 
citizen? Perhaps, but where should such an expenditure rank in 
voters’ list of priorities? In a world of limited resources, choices 
must be made and priorities established.  
Most European and Asian governments that fund higher 
education through taxation have not treated the humanities as 
sacred—they have generally prioritized STEM instruction and 
labor market needs to a greater extent than have U.S. students 
                                                                                                     
 302. See, e.g., Val Burris, The Social and Political Consequences of 
Overeducation, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 454, 459–61 (1983) (finding that overeducation 
results in a statistically significant but small reduction in job satisfaction); id. at 
463–64 (finding that overeducated workers are less likely to believe that success 
is the result of hard work rather than luck, have a less positive view of labor 
unions, and are more likely to be status-conscious). 
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and universities.303 More direct government funding of 
postsecondary education in the United States would probably 
accelerate a shift away from the humanities, away from 
education as consumption, and toward education as investment. 
Risk-based student loan pricing could be understood as a 
compromise—an attempt to promote educational alignment with 
labor market needs while respecting U.S. cultural and political 
preferences for decentralized decision making.  
For better or worse, the United States has opted not to make 
higher education a basic human right paid for at public expense, 
but rather an economic investment primarily paid for by students 
and their families. The federal student loan program was 
established with clear policy goals: to provide skilled labor to 
meet the needs of a growing economy and to provide upward 
mobility by enhancing the earnings and employment prospects of 
young adults. It is inappropriate for the federal student loan 
program to subsidize programs that cannot meet these goals at 
the expense of programs that can. 
Other options remain for funding the humanities. Colleges 
can still try to convince students that the spiritual splendor of a 
humanities degree really is worth the financial sacrifice. With 
risk-adjusted pricing, students will be more likely to be fully 
informed of the financial risks of their decisions, and must be 
willing to internalize them, including the upfront cost of tuition, 
the foregone future income, and the long-term risk-adjusted 
student loan interest. With better information and proper 
incentives, students remain free to make whatever decision they 
think best.  
If colleges are truly dedicated to the proposition that 
everyone should have access to the humanities regardless of 
resources, colleges could make difficult budgetary decisions to 
reduce net tuition charges for humanities students of limited 
means. Or, colleges could admit more students from wealthy 
backgrounds who may prefer a leisurely and spiritually 
                                                                                                     
 303. See, e.g., CAROLINE KEARNEY, EFFORTS TO INCREASE STUDENT’S INTEREST 
IN PURSUING SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ENGINEERING, AND MATHEMATICS STUDIES 
AND CAREERS 7–10 (2011) (discussing national strategies of several European 
countries that include promotion of STEM learning). 
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rewarding college experience, and can pay for it without 
borrowing.  
The concept of higher education as primarily a spiritual 
experience comes from a time when higher education was a 
luxury available only to the wealthy.304 It may not suit a world of 
democratized access in which loans have become the funding 
mechanism of choice. 
VII. Conclusion 
Federal student loan programs were established to provide 
skilled labor to employers, to facilitate higher wages and 
economic advancement for students, and to promote human 
capital development and economic growth within the United 
States. These programs have successfully increased college 
degree attainment rates, boosted the incomes of millions of 
graduates, and benefited employers as well as the federal budget.  
Unfortunately, limited labor market transparency and 
skewed incentives have contributed to a mismatch between the 
allocation of educational resources and the demands of the labor 
market. Many students do not know which majors and programs 
are the best investment until they have nearly completed their 
studies, and many universities find it more convenient to channel 
students toward whatever can engage them at the lowest cost 
rather than whatever is most valuable to students and 
employers. Perversely, uniform pricing of student loans 
subsidizes the subject areas that are least economically valuable, 
while penalizing those that are most valuable. 
Risk-based pricing of student loan interest rates would help 
clarify the links between educational choices and employment 
opportunities. It would force students to internalize the risks 
created by their own decisions, and would pressure universities to 
become more responsive to employers’ needs. Ideally, it would 
channel educational resources to where they are valued most, 
reduce structural unemployment, reduce student loan loss rates, 
and boost wages and tax revenues. In the long run, it may even 
                                                                                                     
 304. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
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reduce wage inequality by channeling more workers toward the 
highest wage areas, fewer toward the lowest wage areas, and 
thereby causing wages to compress. 
Risk-based student loan pricing preserves a considerable 
degree of autonomy for students and educational institutions. 
Students remain free to study whatever they wish—they need 
only internalize the risk. Educational institutions remain free to 
allocate resources as they see fit, subject only to the constraints of 
a better-informed and more market-savvy population of students.  
Risk-based pricing does not require an assumption that the 
existing allocation of wages and employment opportunities is fair 
or even fully efficient. It simply rests on an assumption that 
market prices contain useful information about the extant 
allocation of resources, that is unfair to channel indebted 
students into lifelong financial sacrifices they may not fully 
understand (and in so doing, exacerbate those sacrifices by 
driving down wages in already low wage fields), and that possible 
inefficiencies in the wage structure are best corrected through the 
normal workings of a mixed economy—regulation and taxes 
designed to curb socially harmful activity,305 and wage subsidies 
and public sector employment designed to provide public goods. 
Risk-based pricing does not create the allocation of resources in 
the U.S. economy—it merely reflects political and economic 
reality.  
Within the umbrella framework of risk-based pricing, there 
remain a variety of possible solutions and tradeoffs. Should risk-
based pricing attempt to channel students toward their areas of 
competitive advantage by incorporating some measure of field-
specific ability? If so, what “meritocratic” measures are most 
predictive and least likely to undermine the goals of equal 
opportunity? Should risk-based pricing take into account debt 
levels to reward institutions that are cost efficient and students 
who are price conscious? Or would focus on debt levels 
                                                                                                     
 305. The suggestion is not that the government should directly set wages in 
the private sector. Rather, if there is a specific industry or activity in which 
wages are too high because of negative externalities, then the appropriate 
solution would be to regulate or tax the harmful industry or activity, which 
would increase noncompensation costs and indirectly reduce wages or 
employment in fields associated with negative externalities. 
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disproportionately harm the poorest students who have the 
greatest need to borrow? To what extent should risk-based 
pricing reflect historic data, and to what extent should it deviate 
based on forecasts? Which data sources are the most reliable? 
This Article introduces the basic concept of risk-based pricing 
in the student loan context, and outlines some of the key 
technical and ethical considerations. It is the beginning of a long 
conversation, and hopefully, a path toward ameliorating some of 
our nation’s greatest economic and social challenges. 
